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SYNOPSIS, 
The project of this thesis is multi-faceted. Starting with an examination 
of Kant's First Critique, it outlines the inextricable linkage between our 
understanding of subjectivity and a notion of space. Once such a connection 
has neen made, it describes the approach necessary to reorient the notions 
of space and subjectivity that have culminated in the postmodern cry that 
The Subject is Dead. This approach is named, "Cartography" and is borne out 
of an examination of the works of Bachelard, Deleuze and Guattari. Given 
the bases of the area of study, and the way that it will be studied, the 
next move made in this thesis is to examine the possible and desired 
outcomes of such an approach. Thus, from reading both Deleuze and Guattari, 
we will see that a Cartography will reorient that which constitutes 
subjectivities in such a way as to disable any effort of oppression, and it 
will redefine our understanding of the space constitutive of these 
subjectivitie::; as a material one. In a single phrase, then, this thesis can 
be described thus: To provide for an understanding of ~ material space and 
vectors of subjectification, in a way that enhances their mutual 
construction, so that the active formation of the two can destroy that 
which organises the subjective oppression currently experienced. 
i 
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PREFACE. 
Two of the most important moments in the the production of contemporary 
cultural criticism are space and subjectivity: 
1. Space. Space reigns; time has had its term of office in the government 
of western cultural thought. Postmodernism eulogises space; it spends much 
of its time describing the fragments of space, or fragments of places in 
space, that go to make up the spatial whole defined also by the global 
effects of capitalism. 
2. The Subject. We live in an age in which the Subject is Dead - or has 
died - in which the only possible way of understanding subjects is as 
fragmented, and fragmenting, beings undercutting the very premises 
according to which they are articulated. Contemporary life is one of media 
induced stupor, where interventionist politics and individualist thought 
have been irredeemably lost and dissipated and, asignifying flows are 
dominant. 
The postmod,erns, for example, shout such theses at the tops of their 
faltering and fragmentary voices; and though they try to give a 
genealogical description of their own historical posi tion, the attempt 
often fails according to its own slippery paradigms. 
Cartographies of Subjectification. 
It is often difficult to see the differences between modernism and 
postmodernism, or even between romanticism and postmodernism, upon an 
examination of the theoretical bases 'of each 'movement'. Cultural 
,Movements, rather than merely emphasising a programme according to which 
Preface 2 
·(critical) practices shou~d be undertaken (that is, a force understood as 
constituted only by a vector of prescription) are on the whole constructed 
as projects descriptive of their milieux. (This having been stated, we 
should not ignore the prescriptive, manifesto-producing moments of any such 
movements.) Romanticism, Modernism, Postmodernism; Realism, Symbolism, 
Cubism, Expressionism ... and the like, all describe ways in which the world, 
society and psychic events of the times can be understood. In all cases 
these "events" are understood as amorphous, heterogeneous, fluctuating, 
compressive and fragmentary of space-time; and in all cases, the 
epistemological structures built to comprehend, or allow comprehenson of, 
such events follow the pattern laid out by the Enlightenment Tradi tion. 
These schools of thought, or CuI tural Movements, base their interpretive 
structures (and, where appropriate, their prescriptive structures) upon the 
idea of the subject as a unified whole, locus of experience, or focus for 
the interpretation of such. 
Romanticism's subject - as has been fully examined by Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy in their L'Absalv l1tteralre' - was one felt as 
ei ther irredeemably fragmented or lost, wi thin a crisis announced by (or 
culminating in) the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. The 
response to this crisis was articulated by Kant's Copernican Revolution. 
Modernism's subject was that capable of coping with the crisis in 
Liberalism experienced throughout the latter stages of the nineteenth 
century and culminated in the First World War. Cubism, Expressionism and 
later-Modernism all defined attempts to understand the representation and 
concatenation of experience in a world of increasing fragmentation leading 
up to and immediately following the tumult of the Great War. In these 
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cases, the Subject functioned as the epistemological and metaphysical 
basis, or nexus, according to which the experience of an increasingly 
fragmented world could be rationalised, understood, or organised. 2 
The relationship of interdependence between a world of flux and the 
situation of the production of experience, has been further endorsed in the 
name of postmodernism. This may seem strange considering that the archetype 
of the contemporary postmodern age has been the dead subj ect - in which 
case there should be no possible unified site for the understanding and 
concatenation of data gleaned from a fragmented, mul tiplici ty of sources. 
When the Dead Subject was stumbled upon, philosophical attention focussed 
upon language <though not for the first time this century) and reflexivity, 
upon "presence" and "absence", Being and The Other: all various attempts to 
reinscri be the functions of the Kantian Subj ect but wi thin a' world of 
me~ia-induced, television-exacerbated fluctuation. The postmodern 
postmortem upon this Subject pronounced that though dead it could be 
reinscri bed wi thin the contemporary spatial organisation; It The Subj ect lt , 
however, was no longer an apt description of its state, its name would now 
be "schizophrenic". The fragmentations offered by the postmoderns are born 
astride the grave of a foetid, asphyxiating space. 
To give it its due, postmodernism does not neglect the relationships 
between the state of the subj ect and the types of space in which it is 
found. It is the project of the pages which follow, to describe the 
development of a space which has come to produce dead subjects. In so 
doing, we will find many ways in which such a dominant and oppressive space 
~an be dissolved in order that a new understanding of space, or spaces, can 
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be produced. Similarly, and. simultaneously, we will be able to provide 
analyses of the processes constitutive of subjectification such that, as we 
announce new space, we can announce new subjective constructs too. 
Postmodernism, then - seeing as this movement has provided the basis for 
the discussion so far - will not be shown to be necessarily false in its 
outlook, descriptions or conclusions; but rather, it will be characterised 
as weak. The postmodern space and dead subject may not be wrong, it's just 
that they don't do much. 
This thesis, then, begins with Kant's space and subject as constructed in 
his Critique Of Pure Reason; moves through Deleuze and Guattari's 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes and Bachelard's The Poetics Of Space 
in order to define the critical motor which motivates this thesis; 
continues by describing the material outcome of such a critique; and 
concludes by describing the new spaces and subjectivities prescribed at the 
outset. 
5 
INTRODUCTION 
'A SPATIAL REVOLUTION. KANT. SPACE AND THE SUBJECT, , 
Introduction. 
Just aver twa hundred years ago Kant published the first edi tion of !..he. 
Critique Of Pure Reasonl (the second edi tion fallowed after a gap of six 
years). Many claims have been made as to its influence an subsequent 
philosophical thought, an equally as diverse subjects. Nevertheless, one of 
its mast important consequences, especially in terms of the way the history 
of philosophy has been read since the publication of the First Critique, 
must be the attribution of a Copernican Revolution in philosophy. The 
nation of such a Copernican Revolution presupposes particular readings nat 
only of Kant's text - and its relation with his previous, sa-called, pre-
Cri tical wri tings - but also of the history of philosophy leading up to 
Kant (and possibly the history since Kant .. ,)j what I hope to concentrate 
upon, however, is the function of this revolution in The Critique Of Pure 
Reason insofar as it is related to his discussions of space and 
subjectivity. Whether or nat what Kant was doing in the First Critique 
deserves the name Revolution will be discussed obliquely in terms of the 
relationship between bath Kant and Hume's writing's an subjectivity, and 
mare specifically in terms of the claims Emilia Bencivenga makes in his 
book Kant's Copernican Reyolution (1987)2. 
For Kant space (and time3 ) are - to put it very simply for now - 'in us', 
Space (and time) are subjectivised, This is a consequence of (or an 
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intrinsic part of) Kant's Copernican Revolution. As the subject (however 
much it is emphasised that such a notion is a construct. to this problem, 
and its connection wi th The CritiQ.ue Of Pure Reason, I will return later) 
is positioned firmly at the centre of Kant's epistemological/archetectural 
system, so must the faculties which allow of its construction, 
comprehension, consciousness be similarly repositioned. Space (my concern) 
is situated 'within' as part of the a priDri forms of intuition. Briefly, 
space is a mode of structuring sensations/representations in accordance 
with geometric, dimensional paradigms, and so is purely formal. Space is 
here understood only insofar as it can be given (in) co-ordinates, or, 
rather, how it can be co-ordinated as it co-ordinates. Space is an 
organised system of differences which serves only to articulate the 
relati ve positions of obj ects and events - as those differences - into a 
system which can then not only become understandable, but def ine what 
constitutes experience (or the act of passing/the ability to pass 
judgement) itself. Furthermore, space cannot be intuited because it 
isn't/has no matter. 
This space is in need of re-directing. What will happen to the subject -
indeed, what will happen to subjects - when space becomes material? when 
space (still with its role of delimiting the boundaries of subjectivity) is 
forcibly wrenched from its cosy, co-ordinated work-place as formalising 
faculty and plunged into the realms of the material? What will happen when 
space is sucked like smog, sipped like tea and stroked like skin? when 
space describes that which is already existentially valorised and 
existentially valorises? When we have seen 'that space is' lived in rather 
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than merely moved through, hopefully we will have simultaneously re-written 
a new story about subjectivity. 
Space is no mere distancing, nor merely difference. This is the fallacy 
into which many of the more contemporary thoughts about space - as spacing 
- fall; spacing already implies distance and differentiation only; Such 
thought is still rigidly Kantian. Though these philosophies may have 
deconstructed oppositions and shown up the subj ect as the fiction it is, 
they still move within the framework articulated by Kant; Kant's Copernican 
Revolution is today's Copernican Reaction. The constellations which make up 
the Kantian Astrology may have been shown to be simulacra but we are still 
being told (how) to live according to them. The Subject Is Dead! js the 
cry, but it still spins lika a dead star in the same old space; only now, it 
has become a black hole and goes by the name of Other, or Being ... or 
whatever. 
What is needed is a re-orientation of the discussion; instead of (re-) 
writing the same old astrologies around the same old constellations, these 
constellations should be destroyed. The new space will provide the 
possibility of taking just such a parallax view. All schema are sent 
spinning forever, over the shifting surfaces of space; sometimes 
regrouping, sometimes even giving the fleeting impression that the old 
configurations are still in place, but they will spin all the same. 
Why, then, is .. i t necessary to pay any attention to what Kant wrote in the 
The Critique of Pure Reason just over two hundred ye·ars ago? Kant's 
C~pernican Revolution is important insofar as it relates the discussions of 
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spatiality and subjectivityj therefore. if a further turn is to be made. it 
would be helpful to base our discussion upon Kant's subjective turn. We 
should. then, look at what Kant wrote about space in the First Cri tique. 
taking account of his earlier. pre-critical, thoughts on space in an 
attempt to spatially determine his Copernican Revolution. All the while 
reference will be made to Kant's thoughts on the Subject, thereby marking 
the link between it and space. 
Kant's Copernican Revolution 
For hundreds of years the philosophical world lumbered under theological 
strictures which bound human rationali ty to God and Christiani ty. Then 
along came Kant. Singlehandedly - but maybe with some help from Hume - he 
wrenched epistemological problems away from the theologians and thrust them 
deep into the Subject. His Copernican Revolution is the crowning glory of 
the Age of Reasonj the quasi-mystical insights Kant instigated in the First 
Cri tique. of the role and construction of the Subj ect, qual i fy him for 
status as a genius ... at least! This is how Bencivenga would have it anyway. 
In his book Kant's Copernican Reyolution, Bencivenga analyses . what it is 
that allows the ti tIe 'revolution' to be given to changes identified in 
Kant's thought by the publication of The Critique of Pure Reason. With the 
figure of Thomas Kuhn ever present throughout his discussions. Bencivenga 
explains that the scientist or philosopher we can call revolutionary is the 
one who has become ill at ease with the existing conceptual frameworks, or 
paradigms, and whose subsequent work can denote a consiaerable shift of 
Vision. The revolutionary thinker is the one with the ability to extricate 
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him/herself from the cultural and historical specificities which determine 
the thought of others and rise above them in order to comment upon and 
surpass them. Such a figure seems to shift between a messiah (in its most 
spiritual enunciation) and an outsider (in its most existential). 
Bencivenga's book is useful insofar as it historically positions Kant's 
thought. Now and again, though, his view of revolution, and its 
consequential view of the revolutionary, seems to marr the work. At one 
point he argues that one major difficulty a scientific revolution (a 
'conceptual' shift of ideas) runs into, involves language: because a 
revolutionary text will want to break wi th existing linguistic-forms in 
order to articulate its 'new' thoughts, the problem thus confronted 
concerns the possibility of being understood. The dichotomy set up becomes: 
does the revolutionary risk incomprehensibility in order to be innovative? 
or remain reactionary by being understandable? 
Bencivenga's is an idealist notion of revolution. He seems to forget that -
in most revolutions - the revolutionary act is the final part of a general 
movement toward change. Therefore the linguistic communi ty wi thin which 
such revolutionary ideas/acts take place, will have already been 
constructed; indeed, one could say that the final revolutionary act would 
be impossible without such a community having been formed. To insist upon 
the role of the individual revolutionary (writer, philosopher or even 
general political figure) is to already take on board particular cultural, 
political and., critical assumptions: for example, that of the creative 
genius responsi ble for redirecting the course' of (western) 
t~ought/politics, singlehandedly constructing a new culture from the ruins 
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of the old (even though many contemporaries cannot see the ruins). This 
revolutionary is a christ-figure: a mystic, a visionary, a miracle-worker 
and disciple-maker. Bencivenga's Kant saw water and created wine, sips of 
which we may still be lucky enough to take today. This figure is more than 
idealist, it is noumenal. 
Such a reading would interpret Kant's famous assertion of an "awakening 
from the dogmatic slumbers", as a realisation of the attainabili ty of a 
future goal, as the walking from the cave into the sunlight or as the 
striving for a utopia. On the other hand, I would argue, this awakening 
signifies more than the realisation of the paucity of contemporary 
beliefs/practices, personal and communal. It is not that relevant from 
where the realisation sprang, except to say that it did not bubble solely 
out of the Great Mind of the individual revolutionary. On its most 
fundemental reading, the reference to "dogmatic slumbers" indicates the 
already happening of a paradigm shift: insofar as Kant was acknowledging a 
debt to Hume, we can see that a conceptual revolution is already part of a 
contextual, . socio-' intellectual' whole/communi ty, rather than as an 
Ursprung, or even a leap of fai th, made by an indi vidual genius. In this 
way, then, the dichotomy set up by Benci venga in order to describe the 
linguistic problem faced by the revolutionary, becomes redundant; because 
as Kant was working within paradigms already articulated by Hume, and as he 
was working away from those instigated by the "likes of Leibniz, Wolff and 
Baumgarten, he already had a definite linguistic"and philosophical universe 
in which to work. The question we should now ask becomes: what is it in 
Kant's thought - tor my purposes specifically" The Critique Of Pure Reason -
that deserves the name "conceptual revolution"? and how does it relate to 
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the thought of previous philosophers (including himself)? In order to 
provide the answer to such a question, I believe it 
explicate, on the most basic level, Kant's notions 
subjectivity as propounded in the First Critique. 
The Subject of Space in Kant's First Critique. 
is necessary to 
of space and 
Space is one of the two main topics of discussion in 'The Transcendental 
tfuthetic', the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, (the other being 
time). Kant attributes to the 'concept' of space (we shall soon see why it 
is a misnomer to call Kantian space a concept) particular traits: it does 
not inhere in things themselves, or in the sensations of things; it is a 
priori of all sensually experienced data; as such, space is that property 
of the mind which orders sense-experience. Space, Kant asserts in this part 
of the First Critique, is a Form of Intuition (intuitions naming everything 
that is, or has been, gleaned from sense-experlnce, be they direct or 
remembered representations) the Form of Outer Sense. How is 1 t, thoug~, 
that Kant comes to make the assertions he does about space? 
Kant provides fi ve arguments <and a conclusion) in the section of 'The 
Transcendental tfuthetic' which deals wi th the subj ect of space, one of 
which he calls a Transcendental Exposi tion, the others Metaphysical. The 
first argument begins, "Space is not an empirical concept which has been 
derived from outer experiences." (A23/B28) This identifies the most basic 
assumption that Kant makes about space, and. the one upon. which all his 
other assertions will depend. In no way, he asserts, can space be the 
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content of experience. - for space signifies only that which differentiates 
and co-ordinates the objects of our experience in order that we can have 
knowledge of them (but . this is looking too far ahead into the First 
Cri tique for the moment). It is only in terms of space - or, rather, in 
terms of spatial ordering - that we can be said to have outer experience 
whatsoever. The first argument, then, seeks to provide the most basic 
enunciation of the notion of space as a form of intuition; it sets out to 
define space negatively - that is, as that which is not empirically 
acquired - and in so dOing yields a positive, psychological description of 
its origin. Space is an a priori form of receptivity which co-ordinates our 
intui tions so that they are adequate for Synthesis. Kemp Smith, in his 
weighty A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique Of Pure Reason' (1923)4, 
identifies two possible psychological statuses for this farm of intuition, 
with regards to the ways in which space can be inferred: 1) As space exists 
as a co-ordinating power, and as it precedes experience as a potentiality, 
it" will come to consciousness only indirectly through the addi tion which 
it makes to given sensations." (Kemp Smith, p.101) Thus, space is known 
insofar as it is injected into the ordinary sensual representations. 2) On 
the ather hand, the mind possesses ·an original "representation of space, 
and that it is in light of this representation that it apprehends 
sensations." (Kemp Smith, p.102; Kemp Smith's emphasis.) According to this 
latter scenario, space provides a kind of template representation upon 
which outer-experienced representations can be articulated. This two-way 
distinction becomes _important for Kemp Smith's emphasis of the difference 
between space as a f~rm of intuition and as a formal intuition, to which I 
will return below. 
Introduction 
Kant's second argument I shall quote in full: 
Space is a necessary a priori representation, which 
underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent 
to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite 
well think it as empty of objects. It must therefore be 
regarded as the condition of the possibility of 
appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon 
them. It is an a priori representation which 
necessarily underlies outer appearance. (A24/B38-39) 
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Kant here gi ves another psychological argument why space is a form of 
intui tion. We can think of space as empty but not the non-existence of 
space; and so space must be already organised wi thin our psychological 
structure. To think in terms of space is, for Kant, a brutal fact. Kemp 
Smith provides a rather neat little summary of the first two arguments, he 
wri tes, "The [first argument] proves that space is a necessary subjecti ve 
antecedent; the [second] that it is a necessary objecti ve ingredient." 
(Kemp Smith, p.l04: Kemp Smith's emphases.) 
What, in the second edition of The Critique Of Pure Reason, is called the 
third argument sets out to show that space is not a concept but rather a 
pure intui tion. Kant provides two explanations to this end: 1) "[ W] e can 
represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, 
we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space." (A25/B39) 
Thus, insofar as space is singular and unique - and as Kemp Smith writes, 
"intuition stands for multiplicity in unity, conception for unity in 
multiplicity" (Kemp Smith, p.l05) - space cannot be a concept and must 
therefore be an intuition. 2) "[T]hese parts cannot precede the one all 
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embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of which it can be 
composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it. II (A25/B39; 
Kant's emphasis.) Now, as the whole of space must precede the parts, space 
must be an intui tion rather than a concept. furthermore, as the whole 
precedes the parts, the intui tion of space cannot be empirically acqUired, 
for in no way can such an intuition be represented. 
The fourth argument also shows that space is an intuition not a concept. it 
begins, II Space is represented as an infini te gi ven magni tude. " (A25/B39. 
Kant's emphasis.) If space was a general concept then all/any common 
properties would be abstracted and so no magni tude could be determined; 
moreover, no concept can contain wi thin itself an infini te number of 
(possible) representations. Therefore space must be an a priori intuition 
not a concept. Kemp Smith adds, as a final paragraph to his commentary on 
this argument, the following passage: 
There are apparently, on this pOint, two views in Kant, 
which were retained, up to the very last, and which are 
closely connected with his two representations of 
space, on the one hand as a formal intuition given in 
its puri ty and in its completeness, and on the other-
hand as the form of intuition, which exists only so far 
as it" is constructed, and which is dependent for its 
content upon given matter. (Kemp Smi th, p.109; Kemp 
Smith's emphases.) 
The first representation sees space as that which can be abstracted as the 
formal ground of all intuition, in which case Kant's asse~tion that space 
is a "subjective antecedent" of outer experience would be justified; the 
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second, identifies space as the farm of intuition which accompanies all 
outer experience in order that it can enter synthesis, in which case the 
assertion that space is an "objective ingredient" is justified. 
The 'Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space' is one of the few 
places where space is called a concept mistakenly so, it seems. 
Nevertheless, this section differs from the Metaphysical expositions 
insofar as it does nat seek to determine the nature of space, but rather to 
shaw how space makes possible synthetic a priori knowledge - in this case, 
to shaw what understanding of space we should have in order that it will 
correlate with our understanding of geometry. Kant writes, 
It [our representation of space] must in its origin be 
intuition; for from a mere concept no propositions can 
be obtained which go beyond the concept - as happens in 
geometry .... Further, this intuition must be a priori, 
that is, it must be found in us prior to any perception 
of an obj ect, . and must therefore be pure, not 
empirical , intuition. (B40-41) 
These, then, are the arguments Kant gives with respect to the nation of 
space. These are fallowed, however, wi th a section titled, 'Conclusions 
from the above Concepts', wherein twa paragraphs, (a) and (b), are fallowed 
by a couple of pages of argument. The farmer begins thus, II (a) Space does 
not ,represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent 
them in their relation to one another." (A26/B42) The conclusion is that as 
space does nat "inhere in things themselves, and as it does nat represent 
the relation of 'things in themsel ves to each other, then its a priori ty 
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must be subj ecti ve. Which leads into the straightforward statement of 
conclusion (b): "Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer 
sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone 
outer intuition is possible for us." (A26/B42) 
The rest of this section, which itself concludes that part of the 
'Transcendental £Sthetic' dealing exclusively with space, reiterates 
various of the paints already discussed. One is, however, particularly 
emphasised: that space is a purely subjective form of intuition. Kant 
wri tes, "If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we 
can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the 
representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever." (A26/B42-43) This 
marks the beginning of the subj ecti ve turn announced by IhA Critique of 
Pure Reason, which in turn designates the Copernican Revolution. 
Before I turn to deal in more detail wi th the idea of the Copernican 
Revolution and its relation to Kant's notion of subjectivity, I would first 
like to look at the sections of the First Critique called, the 'Refutation 
of Idealism' (B274-279) and 'General Note on the System of Principles' 
(B288-294) - both of which were added in the second edition to the section 
'Postulates of Empirical Thought'. 
Kant felt the need to produce these addenda in order to counteract charges 
of idealism that were levelled at the first edition of the First Critique. 
The introductory. paragraph to the 'Refutation of Idealism' identifies two 
types of idealism: 1) Problematic Idealism -' which holds' that the only 
empi,rically certain assertion is 'I am', and which thereby asserts that the 
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existence of obj ects in space is doubtful and indemonstrable. Such a 
posi tion is exemplified by Descartes. 2) Dogmatic Idealism - which says 
that space is itself impassible, maintaining, therefore, that things in 
space are merely imaginary entities. This position is exemplified by 
Berkeley. Kant says that Dogmatic Idealism - insofar as it rests upon the 
assumption that space (and spatiality) are properties of things in 
themselves, by equating the existence of objects in space with the 
existence of space itself has been shawn to be false in the 
'Transcendental £Sthetic'. His project in this section is to argue against 
the Cartesian posi tion and to shaw that having inner experience (of the 
type 'I am') is necessarily bound up with having outer experience (of 
things in space). Kant's thesis runs thus: 
The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of 
my Dwn existence proves the existence of Dbjects in 
space outside me. (B275. Kant's emphasis.) 
For Kant, outer experience - insofar as it has ,already been determined, or, 
rather, formalised according to the form of outer sense - is itself the 
determination of the possibility of inner experience. Inner experience -
the apperception of something as existing permanently (that is, across 
time) - can only have any kind of reali ty if such an apperception is 
articulated in accordance with intuitions, and therefore in accordance with 
representations that have already been spatialli ordered. Kant explains: 
For this [knowledge of the subject] we require, in 
addi tion to the thought of someth~ng existing, . also 
intuition, and in this case inner intuition, in respect 
of which, that is, of time, the subject must be 
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determined. But in order so to determine it. outer 
objects are quite indispensable; and it therefore 
follows that inner experience is itself possible only 
mediately. and only through outer experience. (B277) 
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It appears. then, that any representation ordered according to the form of 
inner sense - that is, anything with a temporal determination - can only 
have meaning if it has already been spatially ordered; and for anything to 
have already been so ordered, as we have seen, we must assume the existence 
of externally existing objects, of which we can have intuitions. 
Furthermore, Kant writes, If Not only are we unable to perceive any 
determination of time save through change in outer relations (motion) 
relatively to the permanent in space ... we have nothing permanent on which, 
as intui tion, we can base the concept of substance, save only matter. If 
(B277-278; Kant's emphasis. ) 
It is here that Kant brings into play the full range of his epistemological 
arguments; of which I will give a brief representation now. The 
'Transcendental ttsthetic', wi th which I have deal t -' in part - above, 
sought to detail the workings of the Faculty of Sensibility. This faculty 
furnishes intuitions - representations gained from immediate perception, or 
representations imagined or remembered - ordered according to its Foroo 
(space and time). These intuitionG are then able to enter into synthesis 
wi th concepts. Concepts are furnished form the 'Faculty of Understanding, 
and have, themselves, already been ordered according to the Forms of 
,. 
Understandi ng (otherwise known as, the Forms of Thought, or, the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding. or, the Categories). This, then, is the 
background to, probably, the most famous sentence in The CritiquR of Pure 
Introduction 
Reason, that "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind." (A5l/B75) Kant's contention is that we can only be 
said to have knowledge when an intuition has been brought together with a 
concept; this bringing together Kant terms Synthesis, and the power which 
works such synthesis is the Imagination. This notion of synthesis is very 
important in Kant. For, the combination of intuition and concept is not 
grounded in a primal possibility of unity - that is, subjective unity (the 
soul) or, the transcendental unity of apperception as Leibniz formulated it 
- rather, self-consciousness, the ability to think all representations as 
'mine', can only be based upon synthetic unity: 
Only in so far ... as I can unite a manifold of given 
representations in one consciousness, is it possible 
for me to represent to myself the identi ty of the 
consciousness in ( i. e. throughout] these 
representations. In other words, the analytic unity of 
apperception is possible only under the presupposition 
of a certain synthetfc unity. (B133; Kant's emphases) 
That which we call the conscious subject, even insofar as we can posit an 
'I' to every act of thought, is based solely upon the synthesis that is the 
Joining of a concept with an intuition. So we are brought immediately into 
the 'Refutation of Idealism' section, which itself posited that we can only 
base inner experience upon the supposi tion of outer. These thoughts are 
rei terated in the section that follows the I Refutation of Idealism',. to 
which I will now turn. 
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In the opening paragraphs of this section Kant repeats his assertion that 
knowledge can only come from the joining of intuition and concepti 
moreover, II no synthetic proposition can be made from mere categories." 
(B289) He goes on to provide examples to prove this assertion; examples 
which refer, mainly, to the categories of relation, and in passing, to the 
categories of quantity. Each time, Kant says that in order to fill out each 
of the various concepts provided by these categories, that is, to be able 
not merely to think things but to pass judgement upon events, there must 
always have been synthesis with an intuition. He concludes: 
The final outcome of this whole section is therefore 
this: all principles of the pure understanding are 
nothing more than principles a priori of the 
possibility of experience, and to experience alone do 
all a priori synthetic proposi tions relate - indeed, 
their possibility itself rests entirely on this 
relation. (B294) 
Kant's hope, then, is to have shown that any form of inner experience is 
tenable only on the basis of outer experience; that self-consciousness -
and self consciousness - are grounded on the imaginative synthesis worked 
upon intuitions and concepts, thereby ensuring that all knowledge must be 
based upon the perception of things as existing in space. 
It is quite clear that Kant's epistemology undewrites the importance of the 
role of the individual subject in his critical' project; and in so doing 
identifies the" content of his Copernican Revolution. What is also 
particularly interesting about this turn, is the important position space 
plays in Kant's system. As we have seen, in the 'Transcendental ~thetic' 
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and especially in the 'Refutation of Idealism', it is only upon the basis 
of the posi ting of outer intui tion that all else has sense. As I have 
already quoted above, Kant says that "inner experience is itself possible 
only mediately, and only through outer experience." (B277) Space, in 
formulating all possi ble representations so that they are able to enter 
into imaginative synthesis with concepts, is not merely the ground of all 
possible experience, nor is it merely the provider of that which will allow 
us to have an idea of ourselves as an individual subject; rather, it is 
only insofar as we can ever have spatial, outer, representations that we 
can have temporal, inner, representations at all. Inner sense, of ourselves 
as permanently exisiting, can only be understood on the basis of a primary 
spatially organised relationship with (outer) objects. Kant's sufbject is 
always already spaced. 
What remains to be discussed, however, is the relationship this formulation 
of space has in its immediate cuI tu'ral and philosophical context. For it is 
only after. such an analysis that we can co-determine Kant's views on 
subjectivity and thereby situate our understanding of the Copernican 
Revolution. 
Space and the Copernican Revolution. 
In an article entitled 'The Meaning of "Space" in Kant'S Ivor Leclerc 
presents an historical analysis of the term I space I (or, part icularly, 
, spati uJIt and 'der RauJIt ). The Sixteenth, Seventeenth and early Eighteenth 
century uses of the term(s), in accordance wi th Aristotelian tradi tion, 
centred upon the equation of space with place ('locus'). Such a notion of 
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spatiality, L~clerc explains, revolved around 'space' as a concrete noun; 
later Eighteenth and Nineteenth century notions, invol ved the use of the 
term 'space' as an abstract noun. Leclerc's project in this article, then, 
is to determine whether Kant's Critical use of 'der RauN was concrete or 
abstract. 
In using 'space' (etc.) as a concrete noun, that is in adhering to the 
Aristotelian definition of • place' , early Classical-Modern philosophers 
focussed their attentions upon bodies; for such a definition situated place 
as the "innermost bounding surface of the containing body - which of course 
coincided wi th the outer boundary of the contained body." (Leclerc, p.88) 
Leclerc identifies further, that early criticism of such a posi tion on 
space was aimed at this rigid tying of the doctrine of place to bodies; in 
such a vein, Leclerc ci tes Scaliger: "Thus place is not the encompassing 
surface of the exterior of the body: but it is what· is contained wi thin 
this surface." (ibid.) Hence the notions of space (as place) became ones 
which defined it in terms of the area within boudaries, rather than with 
the surfaces of bodies. Leclerc explains: 
To put the emphasis on this internal event or room as 
opposed to the boundary, the word spatiu~ i.e. extent 
or extended area, room, came gradually into use with 
the meaning, in this context, of 'the extent or room in 
which a body is or might be as the place of the 
body' . . .. In general, because this use of the term 
spatium was new, it was common to explicate it by the 
phrase .. ' spatium vel locus internus'. (Leclerc, p.89) 
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Descartes disturbed the identific~tion of spatium with locus by writing (in 
Principle XIV of his Principles of Philosophy, quoted by Leclerc on p.90) 
that whereas place indicated situation, space had more to do with magnitude 
or figure. 6 And so, the abstraction of space begins. Leibniz took the 
notion further: he identified such a spatium not only wi th all places in 
their totality, but also the abstracted order of all such places. So, we 
can see that two moves towards abstraction have been performed: by 
Descartes, on the one ha~d (a formalisation), and by Leibniz on the other 
(an abstracted totalisation). It is into this arena that Kant brings his 
idea of space. We shall see that if, at first, it looks extremely like that 
of these two thinkers - or even something of an incongruent counterpart to 
them - Kant's space soon turns into something quite peculiar. 
In his 1768 treatise, 'Concerning the ul timate foundation of the 
differentiation of regions in space'7, Kant is wholly preoccupied wi th 
questions of relative size. and shape. The problem he identifies, and 
endeavours to solve, is one of "incongruent counterparts"; that is, it 
concerns the question: how is it that two identical bodies cannot occupy 
.each other's space? Kant writes: 
the figure of a body can be completely similar to that 
of another, and that the size of the extension can be, 
in both, exactly the same; and that yet, however, an 
internal difference remains: namely, that the surface 
that includes the one could not possibly include the 
other. (Kant, p.42) 
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This, then, provides Kant's (pre-Critical) opposition to the Aristotelian 
notion of spatium/locus identified above, in accordance with Leclerc. That 
is, if space is to be understood merely in terms of the relative surfaces 
of containing/contained bodies, then how is it that, in some cases,s two 
identical bodies cannot fill the same space? Kant's proposal for overcoming 
such a problem - simultaneously providing himself with a notion of space -
is one which specifically argues against the teachings of Leibniz ("If one 
accepts the concept of modern, in particular, German philosophers, that 
space only consists of the external relations of parts of matter ... It Kant, 
p.43). Kant's answer, then, is intimated in the following passage: 
As the surface limiting the bodily space of the one 
cannot serve as a limit for the other, twist and turn 
it how one will, this [internal] difference must, 
therefore, be such as rests on an inner principle. 
(Kant, p.42. My emphasis) 
It is an answer which wears its pre-Cri tical heart on its sleeve; for 
space, as that which organises the differentiation of bodies, is a mode of 
differentiation which is determined wholly upon an internal principle 
governing those bodies. That Kant's spatial theory is articulated as 
follows, seems almost superfluous: 
[S1 ince absol ute space is not an obj ect of external 
sensation, but rather a fund1mental concept which makes 
all these sensations possible in the first place, we 
can only perceive through the relation to other bodies 
that which, in the form of a body, p~rely concerns its 
relation to pure space. (Kant, p.43) 
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For pre-Critical Kant "absolute and original space" is that which is 
connected "purely" to the differences between things. Such a notion is 
overturned within two years by the time he writes the 'Inaugural 
Dissertation' (1770). For in this text Kant is beginning to touch the space 
of the First Critique, insofar as now he writes that space is not something 
which comes from things <in themselves), but is, rather, a subjective mode 
of orderi ng the obj ects of perception. I am here not concerned wi th the 
merits of the argument about incongruent counterparts <as D. E. Walford is 
in his introduction to the translation of the 1768 treatise) but merely 
with the orientation of the argument about space with respect to the First 
Critique and its revolutionary stance. 
On a superficial level one can see, almost immediately, that the striking 
difference there is between the 1768 text and the Critical stance induced 
by the 1770 Dissertation, is.one revolving around the objective-subjective 
dichotomy. (That Kant rej ects the idea that space is a property of the 
thing in itself, rests upon such a move.) Thus, we could say that the 
Copernican Revolution stands in space, as evinced by looking at the texts 
already mentioned. Indeed, this is all that the Copernican Revolution 
claims to be: the subjectification of epistemological-metaphysical 
concerns. Yet there is a resemblance between the relative notions of space 
that is as striking as the difference:. namely. that "space" articulates 
that which organises and co-ordinates relative differences between objects. 
Space equals organisation and co-ordination whether objectively or 
subJecti vely oriented. We have seen that in the treatise 'Concerning the 
ul tiJDate foundation of the differentiation of regions in space', Kant 
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wri tes that "absolute space is not an obj ect of external sensation, but 
rather a fundemental concept which makes all these sensations possible in 
the first place," (Kant. p. 43). This assertion is not far from those made 
in the 'Transcendental £Sthetic' and the 'Refutation of Idealism' regarding 
the primacy of the ordering outer sense. 
What, then, is the import of the idea of the Copernican Revol ution wi th 
respect to Kant's views an space? This question will be answered more fully 
in the concluding section, below; suffice it to say now, that Kant's notion 
of space does nat really change, except to undergo its awn spatial 
·displacement from objects to subjects. 
The SUbject of the Copernican Revolution. 
In his Treatise Of HUman Nature (Book One) [1739]9, David Hume writes the 
following, concerning the question of personal identity: 
For my part, when I, enter mast intimately into what I 
call myself, I always stumble upon some particular 
perception or ather, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and can never 
observe anything but the perception. (Hume, pp. 301-302. 
Hume's emphases) 
and further: 
... I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that 
they are nothing but a bundle ar collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
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inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement. (Hume, p.302) 
To this analysis, Hume appends the following passage: 
The mind is a kind of a theatre. where several 
perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, 
repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety 
of postures and situations. There is properly no 
simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in 
different, whatever natural propension we may have to 
imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of 
the theatre must not mislead us. They are the 
successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; 
nor have we the most distant notion of the place where 
these scenes are represented, or of the materials of 
which it is composed. <Hume, p.302. Hume's emphases) 
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Nowhere, at least before Nietzsche
'
°, is the fluidity of the subject either 
more apparent or more emphasised. All that subj ecti vi ty is, for Hume, is 
the habitual concatenation of a myriad of pulsating impressions, ideas and 
perceptions; with neither necessary connection or identity, nor one 
overseeing perception of the <concatenating> self. Possibly the most 
unfortunate aspect of Hume's account of subjectivity, is his use of the 
term "bundle". Not only does it beg the question of the connecting of 
perceptions to form the self, but it also leads to the traditional - and in 
my view misguided - rejoinder: Hume says that the self is merely a bundle 
of perceptions, however he provides no account of the string which ties 
such a bundle together, and this is where ~ant· s analys~s is better. 
However, Hume's analysis, like Kant's, is one which recognises the active 
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power of the imagination in the production of an idea of the self (see 
Hume, pp. 308-312). I have mentioned Hume's misuse of the term "bundle" ; it 
seems to me that he should have used a term like "jumble", for such a word 
adequately accentuates the disparate and diverse nature of the perceptions 
it seeks to describe. A "bundle", then, is merely that which consti tutes 
the self fDr a subject and does not explain that from which the subject is 
ordered. 
We have seen that, for Kant, the subj ect is the name we give to the 
production, and the producer, of knowledge/experience. We can now see that 
Kant's view adds very little - apart from its mode of articulation - to 
Hume's. For both, the subject is a post-production addendum to the process 
of experiencing; for both, there can be no experience of a thing we call 
the subject, and such a thing can thus either be called a "fiction" (Hume, 
p.308) or an "idea" (Kant, Critique of Pyre Reasqn, passim). What we can 
see in both, is the subjectification of the imaginative ordering process by 
either Humean Habit or Kantian Rationality. It seems, then, that the 
Cri tical Subj ect - that upon 'which the revolutionary aspect of the system 
resides - is very much like Hume's. The results of such a comparison will 
be explained in the following, concluding section. 
Conclusion. 
We have seen how the Subject is instigated by Kant as the site of Knowledge 
and Rationality; "and, insofar as Kant's Critical position is one of the 
primacy of the subjective over the objective, then - along with the 
qualification "Copernican" - we can say, with Bencivenga, that such a move 
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identifies a conceptual revolution. Yet, in keeping with the stipulations 
upon the use of the term "revolution" that I gave above, such a paradigm 
shift already has. its roots in earlier philosophical views. Kant's 
subjective move, then, is not one made in total, messianic isolation. I 
hope to have shown not only how Kant's Revolutionary, Critical space is one 
whose germs can be found in his own pre-Critical work (even if the force of 
the earlier theory has a different, if not opposing, direction), but also 
how his views on the constitution and construction of the subject have an 
important predecessor. 
But, to recap in more detail: we have seen how Kant produced a theory of 
spatiality which provided the ground upon which the Critical subject could 
be constructed. This subject was not merely the ordinary subject of 
philosophy - one whose reflexive awareness provided the parameters of The 
Self - but was the subject upon which all epistemological and metaphysical 
concerns could be balanced, like the world on the shoulders of Atlas. The 
Copernican Revolution announces more than the conventional understanding of 
it - as the subj ectification of philosophical matters; it epitomises the 
inextricable link that must now exist between spatial and subjective 
concerns. 
This, I feel, is the primary importance of an analysis of Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason; and, indeed, this assertion provides the motive force for 
this thesis as a whole. However, two considerations must be attended to, 
When adopting and' expanding upon the Kantian contention of the necessary 
I ink between space and the subj ect: the first concerns Kant's space, and 
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has been mentioned briefly, in the opening section of this chapter; the 
second concerns his subject. 
Kant's space is still an old space. It is the dusty, old arena which only 
allows of formalisation, of co-ordination, and of ordering. Space is only 
that which makes things be arranged in proper distinction, this spa?e is 
empty, because all it does is to denote the differentiation of things with 
respect to each other. (It is interesting to note that the edifice most 
valorised by other Romantic figures, Caspar Friedrich and William 
Wordsworth for example, is the ruin.) Kant's critical exegeses on space, 
provide subjective foundations that are full of holes. To build a subject 
upon Kant's space is like trying to build a sandcastle on a cattle-grid. It 
is this space, and the corresponding subject, that have dominated 
philosophical and cultural thought for the past two hundred years. I do not 
wish to endorse the Bencivengan view by placing Kant at the spring of this 
type of thought - my views on the role of the 'individual' philosopher 
within a cultural milieu are well documented in this chapter. However, the 
types of late-Enlightenment, early-Romantic/Xodernist space and 
subjectivity, articulated so well by Kant in his Critique Of Pure Rpason, 
have been those which have informed the capitalist condition in which we...: 
are now so well entrenched. The subject we have inherited, then, has been 
tightly ordered, ranged and co-ordinated, making it as solid as possible, 
in order that it can be more easily a subject. Is it any wonder that the 
Subject has recently been pronounced Dead? 
To turn now to our second consideration, Kant's notion of the construction 
of the unified subject can be undermined by other philosophical concerns; 
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namely, his awn 83sthetic theory. Briefly, in the Third Cri tique, Kant 
explains that upon contemplation of the Beautiful, its intui tion ei ther, 
cannot be brought into synthesis with a concept. or, can be brought into 
synthesis only temporarily - whereupon the intui tion pulsates around the 
imagination unable. to be unified. In bath cases this mental state is 
termed: Free-Play of the Imagination. Now, if the Kantian subject - upon 
which so much in the Critical system depends - is that which signifies, and 
is signified by, the synthetic unification of intui tions wi th concepts, 
what happens to it when such a synthesis is impossible? Any attempt to 
subjectify the imagination under free-play, obviously requires stronger 
oppressi ve tactics than are normally employed. (Kant's" oppressi ve tactics" 
were the ones readily available given the precepts not only of his awn 
Critical System, but of the Enlightenment tradition tao, those of Reason.) 
The concerns of the rest of this thesis, then, push further the slight 
opening in the analysis of the subject given to us by Kant's 83sthetics. I 
will explore the ways in which a nation of subjectivity can be discussed 
wi thout entailing its oppressive control, thereby opening out the 
possibilities of its multiplicitous expansion. Combined with this is a 
revivifying of space - along the lines depicted at the outset of this 
chapter - which seeks to close the door an Kant's derelict roam and present 
another, mare inspiring prospect. The mutual understanding of both a new 
space and a new subjectivity, will also contain the proposal for a 
particular type of critical practice. 
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PART ONE. 
'FORM' . 
This, the first part of my thesis, will consist of two chapters. The first 
will elucidate the notion of Cartography that I have mentioned already. It 
will do so by reading closely the opening "plateau" of Deleuze and 
Guattari 's Hille Plateaux. As I will make clear in the course of this 
chapter, my project is merely to set the scenes under which a Cartography 
will work, and, indeed, what necessitates its usage. 
The second chapter of this part performs a similar function, but the object 
of study this time is Bachelard's notion of Tapa-analysis. This chapter, 
rather than further delimiting the boundaries of Cartography, or expanding 
our knowledge of Cartography by showing it at work, makes a lateral move, 
so to speak, which, . by analysing another notion, will allow our move into 
the work-space of Cartography to be much smoother. 
In both cases, therefore, the thrust of the first part of this thesis is to 
determine the method accordi ng to which the proj ect of the thesis wi 11 
made. hence "form ... ". the material space is inferred, it exists throughout 
these chapters as the result and desire of charting, only later will it be 
described. Thus, only later will the· distinction between "form" and 
"content" of a material space be seen as not only arbitrary, but it will 
represent a serious attack upon that space. 
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CHAPTER ONE. 
, CARTOGRAPHY. ' 
Introduction. 
We left the preceding chapter with a brief glance away from the fetid space 
of Kant's subject, towards the fecund space of ... something else. This 
'something else' had been described as another room, a space capable of 
working against the oppressive organisation dictated by Kant's 
epistemological/metaphysical system. The description of such a space was 
left, deliberately, vague. Our task is, paradoxically, made clearer by such 
opaci ty; for all we have to do now, is to push open the door we have 
noticed is slightly ajar, walk into the space we find and describe it. 
It seems so easy. But the motive force taking us from one space to another, 
the pressure needed to force our way from one place to another, even the 
strength needed to look around and describe the situation, all this 
,requires more than the narrative used to explain it shows. There is a way 
of characterising the force, strength, or pressure of motivation and 
description which, in fact, does more in the end than merely describe. This 
force of desire can be called • Cartography'. Cartography not only charts 
(and, I hope to show, thereby creates) the, so far, unknown space we have 
intimated, but it articulates the way of moving from one to another. 
What is Cartography'? This is the first question I deal wi th in this 
chapter. In order to provide an account of it I look at Deleuze and 
Chapter One 34 
Guattari's opening section of Kille Plateaux (1980) [A Thqusand Plateaus 
(1987)]'; for they are two of very few contemporary thinkers, who take the 
problem of space seriously. This text is the second part of their 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes, and deals more lyrically and 
positively, than the first volume, with the relationships between 
subjectivity, signification, capital, family and society. Next, I pose the 
question: What sort of space does Cartography chart/create? This question 
is not so much answered as more finely asked. For the possibility of 
dealing wi th the creation of another type of space will come in a later 
chapter. In this section, however, I will show that cartography has a 
double movement of charting and creating. The final question to be posed is 
this: How does cartography work/how can it be used? How can we answer this 
question? For in order to do so, we would have to see Cartography at work, 
and such a programme covers the scope of this thesis as a whole. Suffice it 
to say now, that this question will come closer to being answered, in a 
later chapter called 'Subjectification', which deals wi th the notion of 
subjectivities as given in Felix Guattari's Les trois ecologies (1989) 
[ 'The Three Ecologies' (1989)] 2, together with his own characterisation of 
Cartography. This chapter, then, will be restricted to the areas covered by 
the first two questions, given above. 
Once all this has been completed, we will not only know how to move from~ 
one space to another, but we will have an idea of the desire which is 
articulated by the movement, and the methods, which will allow us to talk 
about the other space. 
So, then, what is Cartography?. t 
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lapping Deleuze+Guattari. 
In the work of Deleuze and Guattari one of the most sustained uses to which 
the related notions of mapping, tracing and cartography are put, is in the 
introductory .. plateau" (a ward Deleuze and Guattari use to get away from 
the organisational concept of 'the chapter') of their A Thousand Plat~aus, 
entitled 'Introduction: Rhizome'. In order to understand the importance of 
such interrelated notions, I will endeavour to examine this Rhizome plateau 
in same detail. 
Deleuze and Guattari identify twa terms which farm the axes upon which all 
organisation3 takes place: signifiation4 and subjectification. A quotation 
from a later plateau shows the alliance of these terms: 
You will be organised, you will be an organism, you 
will articulate your body otherwise you're just 
depraved. You will be signifier and signified, 
interpreter and interpreted - otherwise you're just a 
deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a 
subj ect of enunciation recoi led into a subj ect of the 
statement - otherwise you're just a tramp. (A Thousand 
Plateaus, p.159)S 
Here, a rational authority is firing/launching imperatives at a cowering 
subject. Upon the axes already mentioned, the subject, soul, mind &c. is 
pinned down like a dead animal in an exhi bi tion of dissection. Like a 
Super-ego described by Freud, this rational authority ascribes ethical 
import to its commands for order so that its organisational "demands will 
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have a stronger hold. Deleuze and Guattari articulate such a scenario in 
terms of space. 
Think of a vast expanse of space: an arctic or antarctic tundra; the 
rolling, shifting dunes and ripples of sand; the softly undulating grasses 
of wild meadows. Over this space, these spaces, flows - what Deleuze and 
Guattari call - the plane of consistency, the plane upon which a myriad of 
different flows can form, and flee; taking flight in whatever direction 
they choose. Over this space pours all the matter that is necessary for 
life; there are no intrinsic hierarchies and, especially, no rigidity of 
organisation. yet .... This territory has, however, been organised. 
Descartes made a thorough job of it, not only with his innovations in co-
ordinate geometry, but also - and probably more importantly for my thesis -
wi th his cogi to. Such an organisation, or "reterri torialisation," I have 
already examined with respect to Kant. I have characterised Kant's space as 
co-ordinated and co-ordinating, Deleuze and Guattari would describe the 
same feature as "stratified" and "striating". Upon this organised space all 
hierarchical co-ordinations take place, its axes are subjectification and 
signifiation. According to these axes, obedient, properly speaking, 
subjects are organised. Any type of bodily flow is properly channelled, 
whether it's a desire, a scream, a grab or a think. A bit like potty-
. training. Another formation Deleuze and Guattari have of the plane of 
consistency is the Body without Organs. Such an assemblage obtains its 
initial characterisation in Anti-OEdipus (1984)6, the first volume of the 
Capitalism and Schizqphrenia collection.. Here, Deleuze and Guattari make no 
secret of their .debt to Artaud; he wrote, liThe body is the body/it is 
alone/it has no need of organs/the body is never an organism/organisms are 
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the enemies of bodies." [ , Le the~tre de 1a cruaute', p. 287; my 
translation] 7 For Artaud the organisation of the body was a superfluous 
oppressive imposition; for Deleuze and Guattari the production of the Body 
without Organs8 is necessary in order to revitalise the smooth space of the 
plane of consistenc'y, to deterri torialise the reterri torialisations 
performed upon it. 
Deleuze and Guattari begin A Thousand Plateays by writing about writing, by 
writing about how 'the book' fits into their schizoanalytical project. The 
book, they wri te, is an "assemblage" (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.4) [an 
,II agence111ent machinlque", NJ.11e Plateaux, pp.9-10] whose faces can turn 
ei ther towards the strata of organisation, or the Body wi thout Organs. 
Turned towards strata, the book comprises a uni ty, a totality which is 
connected not only to the Author as Subject but to the World as Signified. 
The Body without Organs, towards which another of the assemblage's sides 
may be turned, 
is constantly dismantling the organism, causing 
asignifying particles or pure intensi ties to pass or 
circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it 
leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an 
intensity. (A Thqusand Plateaus, p.4)9 
The book either tends towards the unity of the organon, or passes endlessly 
Over a plane whose organisation has been disrupted by the Body wi thout 
Organs (in which case it cannot be said to exist as such). The book as 
Unity, then, has twa disguises: the root-book; and the radicle-, or, 
faSCicular root-, book (cf. p.5 [pp. 11-12] ). In both cases the book has a 
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definite relationship with the world and the author-subject as its 
producer: ei ther the genetic, hierarchised uni ty of the Realist book; or 
the fragmentary, multiple unity of the Romantic, or (Post-)Modernist book. 
Rhizomatic writing, however, doesn't even try to produce a book. 
All we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and 
segmentari ties, lines of flight and intensities, 
machinic assemblages and their various types, bodies 
wi thout organs and their construction and selection, 
the plane of conSistency, and in each case the units of 
measure. Stratometers, deleometers, BwO uni ts of 
densl ty, BwO uni ts of convergence: Not only do these 
constitute a quantification of writing, but they define 
writing as always the measure of something else. 
Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do 
wi th surveying, mapping, even 
came. (A Thousand Plateaus, 
Guattari's emphasis.)lO 
realms that are yet to 
pp.4-5; Deleuze and 
As Deleuze and Guattari wri te, rhizomatic writing has nothing to do wi th 
any farm of signifying structure. It has nothing to do with the production 
of a unity, an homogeneous whole, finding its meaning in a graded relation-
structure with the world/subject. Writing becomes, nat merely the 
simulacrum of the rhizome, but rather a particular formation of the 
rhizome. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari give a list noting 
Six characteristics of the rhizome; these are:· 1. & 2. Principles of 
Connection and Heterogeneity; 3. PrinCiple of Multiplicity; 4. Principle of 
ASignifying Rupture; 5. & 6. Principles of Cartography and Decalcomania. 
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The principles of connection and heterogenei ty11 shaw that a rhizome can, 
at any of its paints, be connected to any ather rhizome; and that in so 
doing, it can perform so many decentrings, so many dissolutions, that 
either it or that which it is studying, can never be self-enclosed. There 
is no structure to a rhizome/rhizomatic. Structuration is a function, 
Deleuze and Guattari contend, of "arboreal" or root-thought. 
The principle of multiplicity states that a multiplicity has, 
neither subject nor abject, only determinations, 
magnitude and dimensions that cannot increase in number 
wi thout the mul tiplici ty changing in nature (the laws 
of combination therefore increase in number as the 
multiplicity grows). (A Thousand Plateaus, p.8)12 
The rhizome as multiplicity operates one step ahead of that which seeks to 
unify it. The production of any type of a uni ty which will always be 
supplementary to any mul tipl lci ty, Deleuze and Guattari call "overcoding" 
[surcodage]; the paint about a rhizome/multiplicity, they say, is that it 
never admits of overcoding in any farm. Furthermore, 
All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they 
fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we wil,l 
therefore speak of a plane of consistency of 
multiplicities, even though the dimensions of the 
• plane' increase wi th the number of connections that 
are made on it. (A Thqusand Plateaus. p.9; Deleuze and 
Guattari~, s emphasis.) 13 
The multiplicitous rhizome spreads across the space it occupies; if/when it 
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transgresses its dimensions. its nature changes. In order to spread. the 
rhizome must access (in computerate terms) multiple paints of mul tiple 
connections: always moving. always heterogeneous. 
The principle of asignifying rupture acts as a correlate to that of 
connection. It states that the rhizome can, at any point, shatter and 
either restart along an old line (a line being that which describes a 
segment of the rhizome) or start an a new line. This nation introduces a 
rhizomatic motif that is of recurring interest: the line of flight [la 
11gne de fultel. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the line of flight 
constitutes the 'outside' of a multiplicity: for it is via such a line of 
flight that the multiplicity can change, flee, swarm. In the paragraph 
dealing with the principle of multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari write: 
The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite 
number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively 
fills; the impassibility of a supplementary dimension, 
unless the mul tiplici ty is transformed by the line of 
flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all 
of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency 
or exteriority, regardless of their number of 
dimensions. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.g) 
So. each line of flight occurs at the breaking of the rhizome - the 
rupturing of its movement - and thus articulates, simultaneously, the area 
upon which the multiplicity will move, and the flattening of the 
mul tiplici ty into the plane of consistency. Lines of flight, then, can 
enact ~ny farm of territorialisation: not only can it deterritorialise, but 
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it can reterritorialise, subjectify, signify and stratify too. The 
rhizomatic movement includes wi thin the sum of all its possi bili ties the 
possibility of its turning back into the root, the possibility af its 
arborialisation. Even though multiplicities do nat admit of overcoding, it 
is quite possible for strata, boundaries, limits to be drawn upon the plane 
of consistency, in the hope of producing a nexus of organisation which aims 
at the control of all the particular flows which animate the rhizome. In 
the Introductory chapter to this thesis, we saw Kant produce a Subj ect, 
which was a conglomeration of multiple particles upon a plane of 
consistency he called, the imagination. If the various intuition/concept 
configurations are read as rhizomatic flows (the kind of movement Kant 
makes in his c.esthetic theory)16 then his imposition of a subject can be 
seen as a recoding of, or reterritorialisation af, the fluctuating space. 
Subjectification, and signifiation, are both investments of specific lines 
of flight, whose only profit is the restriction of the heterogeneous into a 
controllable whole. Nevertheless, lines of flight, being what they are, 
will always incorporate a way out of the reterri torialised configuration. 
(It is these questions of territorialisation etc. - especially with respect 
to smooth and striated space - that will form Chapter Three of this 
thesis. ) 
The rhizome, to recap, is that which ruptures to spread; fleeing along any 
line that appears along with any break, connecting, changing, and rupturing 
as it goes. Deleuze and Guattari impeach us:' "Write, form a rhizome, 
increase your territory by deterritorialisation, .extend the li~e of flight 
to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane 
of consistency." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.ll)'6 
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In order to describe the farm rhizomatic writing takes, Deleuze and 
Guattari ease us into the final twa principles: of cartography and 
decalcomania. They begin, 
a rhizome is nat subject to any structural or 
generati ve model. It is a stranger to any idea of 
genetic axis or deep structure. A genetic axis is like 
an objective pivotal unity upon which successive stages 
are organised, a deep structure is mare like a base 
sequence that can be broken down into immediate 
consti tuents, while the unity of the product passes 
into another, transformational and subjective, 
dimension. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.12. translation 
modified. ) 17 
Evolution, genealogy and structuralism all subscribe to (are under written 
by) tree-logic. As such, the rhizome has no form of exchange with them. 
Furthermore, for Deleuze and Guattari the genetic axis and deep structure 
are bath articulations of tracing (le calque] 19. The logic of the trace-
structure is that of the tree-root system, and of reproduction; in the same 
way that the root-, radicle-book imitated the world via the subjectivity of 
the author. So, tracing provides the co-ordinates according to which the 
processes of reproduction and imitation are drawn in reteri torrialised 
space. If a line of flight is used for overcodingand reterritorialisation, 
then it is with the help of, or under the command of, the practice of 
tracing. Against - and we will see later why it is nat strictly adequate to 
use the term • against' - tracing Deleuze and Guattari place mapping, 
cartography. "The rhizome is al together different" a map and not a tracing. 
Make a map, nat a tracing." (A Thousand Plateaus, p. 12; Deleuze and 
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Guattari's emphasis.) 19 The map does not reproduce, it does not imi tate. 
The map does not outline; it charts. The map constructs the field it covers 
as it charts. 
It fosters connections between fields, the removal of 
blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening 
of bodies without organs onto the plane of consistency. 
It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and 
connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, 
reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It 
can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, 
reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. 
It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of 
art, constructed as a political action or as a 
meditation. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.12)20 
I have already noted the rhizome's characteristic of mul tiple possible 
ruptures, exi ts and regroupings; so too does the map - insofar as it 
shadows the rhizomic-multipli~ity as to become indistinguishable from it -
have multiple entryways. A map can be accessed at any point, and at each 
new entry a new charting can be undertaken, unlike tracing "which always 
comes back to 'the same'." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.12) [" qui revient 
toujours (( au ~me ». II (111.11e Plateaux, p.20)] Mapping, or cartography, is 
undifferentiable from the movement of the rhizome, its ruptures and 
subsequent lines of flight, and the plane of consistency in its 
multiplicity. Tracing outlines, and therefore is necessarily bound up with 
the organisational axes of subjectification and signifiation and the need 
for unification. "The map has to do wi th performance, whereas the tracing 
always involves an alleged 'competence'." (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.12-13)21 
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It was this type of performance t.hat Artaud envisaged for his theatre. A 
performance which was not confined to the conventions. or outlines of 
discursive drama. but one which flowed along the lines of flight that 
burgeoned from the ruptured body politic. Like the plague that attacked 
those to whom it was susceptible. Artaud' s theatre would perform in the 
running sores of society. He was adamant that it was not necessary for 
society to change in order for his theatre to be set up; equally so. nor 
was it necessary that the mati ve force for change would come from his 
theatre. Artaud's cruel theatre was not bound up in such crude schematisms 
linking performance and the world. The theatre doubled society/the world. 
It was not an imitation or a reproduction. nor was it an outlining. But as 
a mapping. the theatre exacerbated ruptures on the plane of consistency 
<like the plague) and dismantled the bonds placed by the double movement of 
signifiance and subj ectification. "Now I say that the present state of 
society is iniqui tous and fi t for destruction. If concern wi th this is a 
characteristic of the theatre, it is even more that of machine-guns. II <1& 
tbe~tre et son double. p.50)22 
But are we. following Deleuze and Guattari. not merely presupposing ~nother 
dichotomy - mapping/tracing, rhizome/root - thereby retri torial1sing our 
own discourse back within ancient philosophical organisations? Deleuze and 
Guattari pose the following rhetorical questions: 
Does not a map contain phenomena of redundancy that are 
already like tracings of its own? Does not a 
mul tiplici ty have strata upon which unifications and 
totalisations. massifications, mimetic mechanisms, 
signifying power takeovers, and subjective attributions 
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take root? Do not even lines of flight, ~_._!9~_their 
eventual divergence,· reproduce the very formations 
'-thel~ ··i~-n·~ti~n·i t ·was---to dismantle or outflank? (A. 
_._ ..... _--_._._ ... ,.--...... - .- .... --..... -.. -----
Thousand Plateaus, p.13)23 
45 
In short, the fluxes on the plane of consistency, the movements of the 
rhizome, are always in danger of transforming into the processes ·which 
amount to their repression. This has already been mentioned by Deleuze and 
Guattari, with respect to the formation of the lines of flight: 
There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary 
lines explode into a line of flight but the line of 
flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie 
back to one another. That is why one can never posit a 
dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of 
the good and the bad. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.9)24 
It is always possible for any given line of flight to take the path of 
reterritorialisation. it is always possible for a rhizome to become rooted, 
for a mul tiplici ty to become bounded or a map merely to start tracing. 
These possibilities exist only because of the performatory nature of the 
rhizome, map, etc. That is, if the plane of consistency was not 
mul tiplici tous in its openings, if the rhizome was already stratified, 
organised and limited, then there would never be any possibility of change, 
even for the worse. Moreover, tracings, roots and trees may also disrupt 
into maps or rhizomes. Indeed, if it is true, Deleuze and Guattari write, 
that.maps etc. hav~ multifar~us entrances, then it is possible for them to 
be entered by way of tracings, roots etc.,. "assuming the necessary 
precautions are taken ... " (A Thousand Plateays, p.14) ["compte tenu des 
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precautions necessaires . .. " (Xllle Plateaux, p. 23)] • 
Roots and branches may break into rhiz~mes; rhizomes may be organised into 
roots and trees. There is no final, authoritarian and idealistic structure 
that calls itself "Dichotomy", or "Dualism", that co-ordinates the 
relationship between the two assemblages. If there is anything that orders 
the relation between the two, it is merely a point of flux that is itself 
rhizomorphous. "To be rhizomorphous is to produce stems and filaments that 
seem to be roots, or better yet connect with them by penetrating the trunk, 
but put them to strange new uses." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.15)25 
The important point is that the root-tree and canal-
rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates 
as a transcendent model and tracing, even if it 
engenders its own escape; the second operates as an 
immanent process that overturns the model and sketches 
a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even 
if it gi ves rise to a despotic channel. It is a 
question of a model that is perpetually in construction 
or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually 
prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again. 
(A Thousand Plateaus, p.20)26 
The important point is that there is no point at which one can look down 
upon this agonism and name it, or organise it (which amounts to the same 
thing). Mapping contra Tracing - does not serve as a transcendentally ideal 
form according to" which various and particular. flows can b~ organised. 
Rather, it serves as a pragmatic making-of-a-diagramme which seeks, itself, 
to construct mapping; especially if the mapping begins as that of 
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hierarchies, roots, trees and tracings... which is precicely the pOint. 
Traces etc. are ripe for mapping, just as Artaud's society was/is ripe for 
plaguing/theatrification. Which is why I have chosen to provide a 
cartography of subjectification; not in order to jump on the post-
structuralist bandwagon, announcing with glee the advent of the Subject's 
death. But, rather, to follow the blockages which abound in the production 
of the subject, in order that they can be ruptured. Deleuze and Guattari 
wri te, in the opening paragraph of ' introduction: Rhizome', a sentence 
which appears to me to sum up the project27 of my thesis: "To reach, not 
the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer ~ 
of any importance whether one says I." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.3)29 
Such, then, is Deleuze and Guattari's characterisation of the rhizome; from 
this characterisation we have noticed the part played by mapping, or 
cartography. It is necessary, now, to investigate in more detail, the types 
of space that a cartography creates simultaneously with its movement of 
charting. 
Xaking Space lapping. 
Kant's space was the space of the subj ect, organised, ranged and co-
ordinated. To give Kant his due, though, we must say that at least he 
emphasised the space-subject link. Yet that's all he left us, a linkage, a 
distri bution of points of tethering, which identified the subj ect' as it 
described a space. 'This much is not new to us. De.leuze and Gua~tari, as we 
have seen from all that has gone before, have also examined such a link. 
They, however, affirm that it is only a certain type of space in which, or 
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according to which, a subject can be made. Subjectification happens along 
the roots and branches of the tree, it is outlined by a tracing, and stands 
upright in its hierarchised space. This type of space Deleuze and Guattari 
call "striated space". to this, and the related movements of 
terri torialisation, deterri toria1isation and reterri torialisation, I will 
return in a later chapter. So, the fact that Kant's subject is ordered, 
organised etc. is not merely because that is the type of subject that met 
his epistemological, metaphysical and ethical requirements, it is also 
because there was no choice given the kind of space Kant - and the rest of 
the late Eighteenth Century - was in. And we are still in it. 
Cartography does not merely outline what it finds sitting on the surface, 
it does not trace; if it did either of these, Cartography would articulate 
nothing more than another method of organisation, which I've shown -
following Deleuze and Guattari - to be alien to it. Cartography fills, 
feels, the space it moves in ... It ties up no loose ends, and constructs no 
ultimate frames. Cartography glides over the surface it maps, slithers and 
slides across the contours of a space which does not order the movement of 
the mapping. The space that allows mapping is therefore articulated as much 
by the movement of such a mapping, as the Cartography is by the surface 
Over which it works. Even if its original surface is one which is 
oppressive and co-ordinating, cartography will act as that which transforms 
space into what Deleuze and Guattari call "smooth" space. Cartography 
eliminates blockages and announces breaks in the movement of the rhizome. 
Cartography establishes lines of flight. 
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The classic comic line, "Walk this way ... " is thus a cartography: flee and 
create. Do not merely imi tate, but articulate - according to your own 
rhizomic movement - a line of flight I am mapping. 
There was a point in Kant's critical system where such an announcement was 
made, we have seen that this point was in his resthetic writings. To refer 
to an image I used earlier, he opened the door and entreated us to "Walk 
this way ... ". A rhizome was formed and a line of flight created. Kant 
near 1y became a cartographer. I write "nearly" because the rhizome was 
blocked, the line of flight stifled. To recap on his 
£sthetic/ePiste~lOgiCal system: an intuition either, can never be 
subsumable under any given concept, or is presented to a concept, and the 
concept proving inadequate is cast aside in favour of another, which also 
proves inadequate ... and so on; when this happens, Kant said, the 
, 
i magi na t1 on and the cogn't1 ve f acu 1 t1 es are in" free-pI a yoo. The syn the t1 c 
uni ty of consciousness, typified in Kant' s First Cri tique by the work of 
, oJ: 
the imagination, is - ~ the least - rocked, or - at the most - destroyed 
during this free-play. The overt structuration of the sensibility-
imagination-understanding system, becomes slightly deranged., When 
experiencing free-play, the subject finds the boundaries that identify 
itself as such, begin to dissol ve, rapidly, into the movement of the 
experience, 2' So, Kant appears to offer salvation from subjective 
oppression via his resthetic theory, Reappears to provide the rhizomic 
derangement of his archetectonic. But the Cartography is short lived. For 
no sooner is the line of flight announced, than .it is directe~ back into 
the original, hierarchical system. The deterri torialisation of the 
imaginative (and, therefore, subjective field) is soon reterritorialised by 
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the invocation of the tfsthetic Idea. In his Critique Of Judgement, 30 Kant 
explains tfsthetic Ideas thus: 
by an resthetic idea I mean that representation of the 
imagination which induces much thought, yet without the 
possibility of any definite thought Whatever, i.e. 
concept, being adequate to it,.... It is easily seen, 
that an ~thetic idea is the counterpart <pendant) of a 
rational idea, which, conversely is a concept, to which 
no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be 
adequate. (Critique Of Judgement, pp.175-176: Kant's 
emphases. ) 
Now, it seems, that what once went under the name "free-play of the 
imagination" is now restricted by the name "resthetic idea". (It is ironic 
that the text wi th which I replaced ellipses in the quotation above, 
specifically mentioned' the inability of language to "render completely 
intelligible" and thereby get "on level terms with" imaginative free-play, 
and yet such a process is subsumed under the epistemological structure 
announced by the First Cri tique, merely by gi ving it the name "eesthetic 
idea". Kant opens the door and slams it in our face, in the same movement.) 
The possibility of an ~thetic mapping is re-traced according to the 
outline already presented by the sensibllity-imagination-understanding-
reason hierarchy. 
It has already been mentioned that a line of flight always carries .within 
.. 
its projection the possibility of its reterritorialisation into an arboreal 
system. Where any tree or branch or root can break out into a rhizome, so 
too can any rhizome plant itself in the root-space; maps, too, can become 
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tracings. This is why Deleuze and Guattari warned us to be careful when 
map-making, to take the necessary precautions when mapping from a tracing, 
or breaking a rhizome from a root. 
That Kant nearly produced a cartography along the lines of resthetic 
experience, does not necessarily imply that cartographies are, in all 
cases, to be dri ven according to tESthetic desires. Nor is the 
identification of such an almost-becoming-cartography of the Kantian 
archetectonic subsumable under a Derridian-type deconstruction. Such a 
deconstruction, as I understand it, examines a text, pulling at its loose 
threads in order to allow it to unravel. It, however, never allows the text 
to be dislocated from the space in which it works, nor does it chart a 
different space upon which the text could move. The Derridian move is one 
of tracing, of outlining the paradigms according to which a text fails to 
work as it wishes. This leaves us either abandoning a text which has been 
unpicked and no longer functions as it hoped. or congratulating ourselves 
on a particularly fine outlining. There is no outside to any text; there is 
no escape from any system of subjectification or signifiation to another 
place. 
Cartography follows the articulation of a line of flight, it operates 
according to the movement of the rhizome. It glides over the smooth 
contours of a space it opens up as it, charts. Deconstruction has the 
appearance of cartography, but is merely a tracing, or re-tracing; it seems 
to cause breaks or 'rhizomes, but always only outlines. The con~ervativism 
of deconstruction,could be the subject of the following passage from ~ 
Plateaux: 
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It [the tracing] has.generated, structuralised the 
rhizome, and when it thinks it is reproducing something 
else it is in fact only reproducing itself. That is why 
the tracing is so dangerous. It injects redundancies 
and propagates them. What th~. tracing reproduces of the 
map or rhizome are only the impasses, blockages, 
incipient taproots, or points of structuration. (~ 
Thousand Plateaus, p.13)31 
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Heidegger's work on language sought only to get back to where it started. 32 
Its journey appeared to flow along a myriad of paths, but only ever 
announce the direction of a single way: one that allowed the traveller to 
find his/her way through the language-wood, back to the journey's starting 
pOint. Deconstruction makes a similar move. It performs a critique of a 
text which outlines a journey, through the various wooded wildernesses the 
text has constructed (accidentally or otherwise), only to cut a neat path, 
trace a way, which allows us back to the beginning of the text. So when the 
text, as trace-structure, has been re-tracedl deconstructed, we are left 
with a nice~y unravelled/unravellable bundle of threads still operating in 
the same space. Cartography's first move, however, is to wrench a text aut 
of its normal space, and then thrust it into overdrive to see what rhizomes 
can be made from its breaks. As these breaks occur, Cartography maps them; 
as a map is made, so the possibility of further breaks is apparent. In this 
way, tao, a new space is made. Mapping, and making a new space, are 
simultaneous. 
As I have already said, I will enter into more ~etail about .the type of 
space Cartography charts/makes in a later chapter, wherein I will discuss 
smooth and striated space and the relative movements of territorialisation, 
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reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation. Nevertheless, it remains to 
be seen in what ways such a notion of Cartography can be used, or maybe, 
how it can be made to work. But, I ike the hackneyed reply gi ven to the 
question, "How do you define philosoph~?" - that, to define it is to do it 
- I will say that the best description of how Cartography works, is to do 
it. Therefore, I will postpone, for now, the description/doing of 
cartography; and note that this doing, will be the Cartography of 
Subjectification itself. 
Conclusion. 
So far, then, we have been given a guided tour of the spatial parts of 
Kant's First Critique, and we have seen that there are spaces - as yet 
uncharted - which could provide an antidote (or a plague) to Kant's. We 
have also been shown the various growths sprawling over Deleuze and 
Guattari' s A Thousand Plateaus. These growths - Bodies wi thout Organs, 
Rhizomes and Maps - have erupted from the space that was bequeathed us by 
Kant, and spread towards the other space that is now becoming-charted. I 
hope to have shown the way in which the movement towards Cartography is 
simul taneous with, if not indistinct from, the realisation of the foetid 
nature of the space (and its subject) we have been left with. The 
presentation of Cartography has, however, been rather passive; that is, the 
power of Cartography as a critical tool has hardly been mentioned. In order 
to develop this aspect of Cartography, I think it is necessary to examine 
Bachelard's critical tool, 'Tapa-analysis', as exp~unded in his .La PoBtique 
~e l'espace (4th edition, 1964).33 As we will see, Bache1ard ' s Topoana1ysis 
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operates in the same way as Deleuze and Guattari's Cartography, and as such 
I think it will aid us towards making a Cartography of Subjectification. 
. . . 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
, TOPO- ANALYS IS' , 
Introduction. 
In 1957 Gaston Bachelard published the first edi tion of La FaBtique de 
l'espace' (the fourth edition came seven years later, two years after his 
death). This text is more widely known in the English speaking world 
either, as a French exponent of a late-Fifties brand of literary 
theory/criticism called New Criticism; or, as essential reading for 
archi tecture students; as, therefore, merely a work on Ii terature/poetry 
for those hoping to criticise it, or one on the importance of lived-in-
spaces for those hoping to design them. In english philosophy, Bachelard's 
work - that of a professor of philosophy and science at the University of 
Dijon and the College de France, and honorary professor at the Sorbonne -
is very rarely read as philosophy. Whether, or not, such a feat will be 
accomplished here, is not for me to say - the question of whether a reading 
is philosophical, or produces philosophy, just because it comes in an.essay 
submi tted for examination to a Philosophy Department of an educational 
insti tution, lies beyond the scope of this thesis. My project concerning 
Bachelard's The Poetics Of Space (1969), however, is to provide a reading 
of it that will 'add to' our understanding of the role of Cartography, 
alrea~y adduced. I have placed 'add to' in inverted commas: I do not want 
to infer that we will have made a progression, dialectically or. otherwise, 
from one notion to another; I would rather think of this process of 
addi tiori as one would a grafting on a plant, or the exacerbation of a 
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disease. Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic movement could describe the 
relationship between Cartography and what happens in The Poetics of Space. 
An addi tion that does not necessarily destroy or surpass what has been 
added to - although, of course, it cou~d - but proposes the possibility of 
another direction, or, wealth of directions. 
I should add, that the one particular notion upon which I will focus in 
reading The Poetics Of Space, is that of topo-analysis ... as the title of 
this chapter suggests. So, the 'addition' problem - if indeed it is one -
becomes one of the relationship between Cartography and Topa-analysis. 
Hopefully. this relationship. and my purpose for suggesting it, will become 
clearer by the time I reach this chapter's concluding section. 
In essays that are constructed around the exegesis of a particular work, it 
is usual for the reading to be gi "len fairly and relati vely uncritically, 
the maj ori ty of the cri ticism of the work and thought of the text under 
review to be given in concluding sections. I will, on the other hand, 
provide my criticism of Bachelard's approach in this introduction. In order 
that this can be undertaken, it is necessary for me to begin with 
Bachelard's 'Introduction' to The Poetics Of Space. 
More than the word "tapa-analysis", more even than .the word "space", is the 
phrase "phenomenology of the imagination" ·used in Bachelard's introduction. 
He explains, for example, that: 
In order to clarify the problem of the poetic image 
philosophically, we shall have to have recourse to a 
phenomenology of the imagination. By this should be 
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understood a study of the phenomenon of the poetic 
image when it emerges into the consciousness as a 
direct product of the heart, soul and being of man, 
apprehended in its actuality. (The Poetics of Space, 
p.xiv)2 
57 
The poetic image will be the object of Bachelard's study. From this, he 
believes, he will be able to experience the productive nature of the 
imagination as it produces; and in so doing , he will be able to witness 
consciousness in action. But what is it that Bachelard understands by both 
"phenomenology" and "imagination", let alone "consciousness"? 
In Phenomenology Bachelard sees a practice whereby one can strip from the 
object of study all historicism, all notions of cause and progress, in an 
attempt to experience the obj ect of study in its purity. 3 Gi ven that 
Bachelard's obj ect of study - and we really should not use the term 
'object' here, but rather 'object and subject' - is the poetic image, not 
any author or Ii terary movement in particular, it is understandable why 
Bachelard adopts such an approach. To Phenomenology Bachelard opposes 
Psychology and Psychoanalysis; both of which, he says, involve strict 
causal structures under which their objects of study are subsumed, both of 
which he had gi ven critical weight in some of his earlier works.4 These. 
critical practices carry their interpretive systems with them like a 
gladiator carried his net - the outcome of such practices can only be 
stifled or dead. Bachelard's phenomenology will be a method which allows 
the poetic image to "resonate"6 in the mind of the· reader, thereby showing 
that the reading6 of poetry is as imaginatively productive as its writing, 
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and provides the same account of consciousness (this will be made clearer 
below) . 
As we have seen, Bachelard priori tises the producti ve imagination over a 
merely reproductive one. Such a move is a classic one in the history of the 
philosophy of the imagination; it has its roots in Kant, and the Romantics, 
finding its most well known English articulation in Coleridge's Biographia 
Literaria7 • For Bachelard, this imagination has direct links with, what he 
calls, the soul, and what we can therefore understand as the Subject. The 
production of an image, the creation of a poetic image, is the outpouring 
of a resonance of the poetic-subject; the reading of such an image, is the 
production-again of the image, the re-resonation of it in the subj ect-
reader. This is the basic schematisation of Bachelard's "phenomenology" and 
"imagination"; yet, there is mare to be done, for both i.deas come together 
in the person of the subject. Bachelard's nation of the subject9 will be 
elucidated below, during this· introductory section and after, but at the 
"phenomenology of the imagination" we must look just a little closer. 
Bachelard explains the method, "phenomenology of the imagination", more 
elaborately in his later work, La PoBtique de 1a r~veri~. In its 
'Introduction' he writes that the benefit of the phenomenological approach 
"lies ,in the complete illumination of the awareness of a subject who is 
struck with wander by poetic images. II '(The Poetics of Reyerie, p. 1) 10 
Pheno.~no1ogy shines a spotlight upon the poetic image as it is bathed in 
.. 
emotion by the reading/imagining-subject; and as ,such, the subject in its 
purity is identified. But the poetic image is a fluid beast (coupled with 
daydreaming - the idle sport of leisure - as Bachelard does in The Poetics 
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of Space and more overtly in The Poetics of Reyerie) it therefore proves 
too vapid an object for a concrete phenomenology based upon a paring away 
of that which takes root in (and thereby constructs) consciousness. 
Bachelard is not interested in the common consciousness analysed by run of 
the mill p~hOanalysts. psychologists and phenomenologists; he has nothing 
to do with the consciousness which operates according to the apprehe~sion 
of ordinary, everyday objects. His project he explains as follows: 
And thus it is that I have chosen phenomenology in 
hopes of re-examining in a new light the fai thfully 
beloved images which are so solidly fixed in my memory 
that I no longer know whether I am remembering or 
imagining them when I come across them in my reveries. 
(The Poetics Of Reyerie, p.2)11 
The poetic images which, for Bachelard, articulate subjectivity in itself, 
are those which trigger, or are accompanied by (Bachelard is not interested 
in bickering over psychic cause and effect), emotions: wonder, awe, 
love .... The interest Bachelard has in phenomenology, is that in a method 
which allows him to examine images alone, 
it returns to putting the accent on their original 
quality, grasping the very essence of their originality 
and thus taking advantage of the remarkable psychic 
productivity of the imagination. (The Poetics of 
Reyerie, p.3)'2 
The problem he has wi th other philosophical atti tudes - whi,ch we have 
already come across - he details thus: 
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A philosopher remains, as they say, "in a philosophical 
situation"; occasionally he pretends to begin 
everything at the beginning, but, alas! he continues . 
. . . He has read so many books of philosophy! Under the 
pretext of studying and teaching them, he has deformed 
so many "systems!" And when evening has come and he is 
no longer teaching, he believes he has the right to 
shut himself up in the system of his choice. <Ille. 
Poetics Of Reyerie, p.2)13 
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Against this will to systematise Bachelardproposes a way of reading that 
allows him constant movement: movement from one image to another, movement 
/ 
acrosy./ the otherwise unsurmountable, boundaries of authorship, Cultural 
Values, disciplines .... This is the beauty phenomenology has for him; it 
allows (maybe even constructs) a critical attitude animated by fluidity of 
movement and the ability to dissolve boundaries. 
The gain from such poetic, phenomenological wanderings, is the isolation of 
the image - as such - in every act' of poetic production, thus displaying 
for Bachelard, the imaginative consciousness in all its productive 
essentiality. In this respect, Bachelard has a lot in common with Kant. We 
have seen Kant's philosophy articulate a synthesising, 
knowledge/experience-producing, Subject-constructing imaginationj an 
imagination which fuses the raw data of perceptual representation with the 
forms of thought in general. Bachelard, then, adopts premises which could 
thus be called Kantian; for him, the productive imagination provides the 
site for, and the content of, his notion of subje,ctivity/consci.ousness. As 
we have seen, he,reaches these premises via the back way, so to speak, via 
the poetic image and the day-dream, rather than either consciousness of 
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empirical objects, or awareness of rational cogitation. I will quote a long 
passage from The Poetics of Reyerie, which sums up all that has gone 
before: 
In our view any awareness is an increment to 
consciousness, an added light, a reinforcement of 
psychic coherence. Its swiftness or instantenei ty can 
hide this growth from us. But there is a growth of 
being in every instance of awareness. Consciousness is 
in itself an act, the human act. It is a lively, full 
act. Even if the action which fallows, which aught to 
have followed, remains in suspense, the consciousness-
as-act is still completely positive or kinetic. In the 
present essay we shall study this act only in the realm 
of language and more precisely yet in poetic language 
when the imaginative consciousness creates and lives 
the poetic i~ge. (The Poetics of Reyerie, p. 5) 14 
Bachelard's consciouness is an expanding, dynamic one. it is never stagnant 
or stable. Reverie shows it at its mast wandering and leisurely, and 
therefore in its Bachelardian essentiali ty. It is here that Bachelard can 
appear at once fresh and jaded. His adoption of phenomenology as a method 
capable of outmanoeuvring all traditional philosophical quagmire:;, to us 
seems naIve. The same could be said for his valorisation of poetry and the 
image. It is, therefore, easy to say that Bachelard's phenomenological 
method enacts the same imposition of systematisation that he criticises in 
other· methods. Bachelard still adopts the traditional, rationalist concepts 
.. 
of the unity of consciousness, and the poetic genius as the well-spring of 
poetic thought, that have been upended by philosophical fashions that 
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have followed him. This is .. why reading Bachelard sometimes leaves 
something like a fUllny taste in our mouths; we sigh patronisingly, look 
aside at our image of nalve Bachelard eagerly writing his easy-going books, 
and say "its a very nice idea Gaston, but I'm afraid we can't be doing with 
any of that nonsense any more". 
What is the point of using Bachelard's work, if my criticism of the unified 
subject has already been put with respect to Kant? Why mention him at all 
if all he provides is another dusty old phenomenology, far which we can go 
to Heidegger anyway? 
I think that Bachelard has provided an irreplacable text in the 
philosophical history of the spaced-subject. It is this move into space, 
with the aid of his Tapa-analysis, that I now want to examine more closely. 
Hopefully, too, we will be able to elucidate those Bachelardian notions of 
space which will help us explode his otherwise uncri tical acceptance of 
traditional philosophical themes, and allow us to map the idiosyncracies of 
his II phenomenology" in such a way that we are forced to acknowledge the 
lines of flight which transgress the limits placed upon our understanding 
of his work by such an epithet. 
Topoanalysis ••. 
It is. important for Bachelard that the subj ect of productive imagination 
.. 
exists in space, in the spaces it inhabits in its productive capacity. In 
order to flesh-out such a claim, I will quote a few lines from Bachelard's 
'Introduction' to The Poetics Of Space: 
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Indeed, the images I want to examine are the quite 
simple images of happy space. In this orientation, 
these investigations would deserve to be called 
topophi 1 ia. They seem to determine the human value of 
the sorts of space that may be grasped, that may be 
defended against adverse forces, the space we love. For 
di verse reasons, and wi th the differences entai led by 
poetic shading, this is eulogised space. (The Poetics 
of Space, p.xxxi; Bachelard's emphasis; translation 
modified. ) 16 
We have seen that anything imagined is productive of consciousness for 
Bachelard, and also, that the day-dreaming subject provides the best 
paradigm of subjectvity in general. Insofar as particular spaces are 
instrumental in allowing subjectivity to be constructed - that is, when 
subj ecti vi ty becomes the product of imaginative space - any subj ecti ve 
power that once existed over objects etc. is undermined. Whereas 
traditional phenomenology validates the reciprocal importance of object and 
consciousness in the construction of consciousness, when the space of the 
Bachelardian dreamer is acknowledged to permeate the "consciousness of ... " 
dialectic, then the biuni vocali ty of that relationship is dispersed. The 
Kantian type ~irprchY that Bachelard seemed, at first, to endorse: 
SUbject-imaginafi~-poetic image-space; is now inverted, if not exploded. 
Bachelard's phenomenology has now become a vehicle for riding across the 
mul tiplici tous spaces that are valorised in poetry/Ii terature. It, itself, 
becomes decentred in that space and flattened across a wider plane than at 
first appeared ... and is renamed "topo-analysis". 
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Apart from a brief mention in the 'Introduction'. tapa-analysis gets its 
first, and only, extensive description in Chapter One, 'The House. From 
Cellar to Garret. The Significance of the Hut.' It will only be with 
respect to the image of the house, as Bachelard presents it, that the full 
force of tapa-analysis will be felt. However, with the hope of being able 
to defer comprehensibility to a later section, I will now attempt to 
outline the basic movements of Bachelard's tapa-analysis. 
We have seen that Bachelard's object of study is the poetic image; and we 
have seen that he takes this object as worthy of study because it 
designates the essential workings of the productive imagination (and 
therefore. the Subject). Bachelard then shows that the imagination - in its 
productivity - is also always already ordered according to space; that is. 
the'site of the synthesising. or poeticising, subject is constituitive of 
the subject. This is the basic Kantianism that we encountered above (and 
will be more fully explored' in Bachelardian terms, wi th reference to 
particular images, below). In keeping wi th his proj ect to examine images 
which are imbued with emotion, Bachelard says that his The Poetics of Space 
will be oriented towards studying images of "happy space" (quoted above). 
'I ----S_e~ing as subjective-images (in all senses of the phrase) are always 
- .. ---
localised, Bachelard believes that the psychoanalyst, for example (in 
dealing with memories, images etc.) should be constantly respectful of the 
He gives "to this auxilliary of 
Psycho~nalysis" (The Poetics Of Space, p.8; cf. La Paetique de l' espace, 
p.27) the name: Tapa-analysis. Tapa-analysis names that 
philosophical/psychoanalytical method which not only takes account of the 
spatialisation of our thoughts (memories or images) but insists upon such 
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an importance of space. In the fallowing, lengthy, passage Bachelard 
explains the role of tapa-analysis and the importance of space in the 
construction of subjectivity: 
Topoanalysis, then, would be the systematic 
psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives. 
In the theatre of the past that is constructed by 
memory, the stage setting maintains the characters in 
their dominant roles. At times we think we know 
ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of 
fixations in the spaces of the being' s stability - a 
being who does nat want to melt away, and who, even in 
the past, when he sets out in search of things past, 
wants time to II suspend" its flight. In its countless 
alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what 
space is for. (The Poetics of Space, p. 8) 16 
If the mast important factor in an examination of the construction of 
subjectivity is space, then such an examination, Bachelard contends, must 
be a tapa-analysis. 
One of the many striking elements in this passage, is the assumption of the 
fluidity of the subject. It is with the complicity of space, Bachelard 
says, that the subject situates itself, stops itself from melting away. 
This propensity to dissolution is assumed to be a basic characteristic of 
subj ecti vi ty, and as such, comes from the nature of space itself. The 
sorts. of space Bachelard 8 over are themselves fluid; the myriad 
topophilic spaces of as many different poets. spa~es in which ~emories of 
childhood, adoles~ence ... or whatever, flaw and return, in any order and at 
any time. The journey in search of times past, and of things that have 
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passed, is a flowing wandering at the behest of unification. But 
Bachelard's text never seems to give in to unification, even though it 
often proposes it; his words themsel ves flow in and out of quotation, 
sometimes acknowledged, and at other t~mes just slipped in to his own text. 
The very page lets itself become fluid, even when it is trying to impose a 
si ngle, simple subj ect. Bachelard also flows between methods and 
disciplines; he seems to write psychologies and psychoanalyses; his method 
is supposedly a phenomenology, yet he gives it another name, tapa-analysis: 
"Descriptive psychology, depth psychology, psychoanalysis and phenomenology 
could consti tute, wi th the hause, the corpus of doctrines that I have 
designated by the name of tapa-analysis." <The Poetics Of Space, p.xxxii)17 
If spatial considerations are of primary importance in the construction of 
subjectivity, and one wants to define the unity of the subject, then the 
imposi tion of an ordered space is necessary; this descri bes what we have 
seen at work in the Kantian system. It could be said that tapa-analysis is 
therefore a method which, in subsuming others under its system, is 
unificatory, and thereby provides organised spaces; but the contrary is the 
case. Tapa-analysis is a method that allows others either to be picked up 
or rejected, it moves according to its own desires, and it certainly never 
geometrises. 
We have, however, approached a point in our examination of The Poetics of 
~, at which the dichotomisation of spaces is implied: either a 
geometric, co-ordinated, striated space, loving and beloved of unification 
and identification; or a fluid, disorganised, smooth space which allows 
constant movement. This implici t dichotomisation becomes more explici t in 
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Bachelard's later sections dealing with the dialectics of inside and 
outside, to which I will return below. 
Topo-analysis is a method which not only allows various types of 
psychology, psychoanalysis and phenomenology to be done, as the quotation 
above shows, it also incorporates "the house". It seems, then, that topo-
analysis designates the name of a method according to which one can 
approach and cri ticise various texts, or even various spaces themsel ves, 
and articulates a method through which the spaces of subj ecti vi ty can be 
created. At first topo-analysis merely traced the meanderings of the poetic 
image of space, in order to construct a system whereby the happy spaces-of 
our intimacy could be examined. It could only feel the soft reverberations 
of the poetic-subject as they faded - like a kind of fall-out. Now, on the 
other hand, topo-analysis produces its own resonances, insofar as it 
constructs the spaces which, in turn, construct subjects. We can see this 
at work in Bachelard's first chapter . 
•.. and the House .•. 
Why does the house - its image in poetry and remembered in the course of 
our lives - occupy such an importa~Place in Bachelard's work? Why devote 
two chapters to the study of its images? Bachelard explains: 
On whatever theoretical horizon we examine it, the 
house image would appear to have become the topography 
of our intimate being. .,' Not only our memories, but 
the things we have forgotten are "housed" , Our 
unconscious is "housed", Our soul is an abode. <I.h.e.. 
Chapter Two 
Poetics of Space, 
modified) 19 
pp. xXXii, 
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xxxiii. translation 
The house not only mirrors but orders the construction of subjectivity. 
Without it, Bachelard writes, "man would be a dispersed being" <Ihe. 
Poetics of Space, p.7) ["l'ho111l11e serait un ~tre disperse." (La PoBtique de 
l'espace, p.26)] In our remembering and in our dreaming 19 , in both as they 
are articulated in poetry/literature. the house allows a subject to be 
safely constructed. In fact, as the preceding quotation shows, for 
Bachelard the house becomes our selves: the soul, the unconscious, the 
sites of our intimate being are houses. This takes us a stage further from 
Kant in the history of the spaced-subject. for in a more material way than 
we saw in Kant's system is the space-subject relation constructed. But we 
are jumping ahead, this discussion has its own place a little further on in 
this thesis. 
Bachelard's tone~ however, is a semi-mystical one - par for the course, it 
seems, if a phenomenology is to be done it approaches t~ 
Heidegger's, when mentioning dwelling, Being etc. But whereas Heidegger's 
mystical dwelling is the Greek Temple bringing together the Fourfold. 
Bachelard's is a little more homely. Bachelard seeks to explore the 
resonances of various existentially valorised spaces; as we have seen, his 
project in this text, revolves around happy space. <Bachelard. does 
acknowledge the equal importance of antagonistic space, though reserves 
such a project for another book - a book he never wrote.) As well as the 
image of space, Bachelard valorises day-dreaming in The Poetics of Space 
Chapter Two 69 
(even more so in The Poetics of Reyerie). The space of the dreamer is the 
space in which poetic, productive imagination is in effect. But this only 
mentions half of Bachelard's proposals for dreaming. We have seen him 
~oniVther philosophers and their oppressive philosophical systems, 
this approbation is coupled wi th the advocacy of dreaming. If one is. to 
appreciate the existential importance of the house in particular, of ?pace 
in general, Bachelard says that we must dream; the philosophers II who 
discover a universe by means of the dialectical game of the I and the non-
I" (The Poetics of Space, pp.4-5) ["qui trouvent un univers par 1e jeu 
dia1ectique du moi et du non-moi" (La PaBtique de l'espace, p.24)] and fail 
to dream, or even read poetry, will be too stiff to resonate. At the end of 
the chapter dealing with corners, Bachelard writes one of the best passages 
in the book, it runs as follows: 
To go upstairs in the word house, is to withdraw, step 
by step; while to go down into the cel~ is to dream, 
it is losing oneself in the distant corridors of an 
obscure etymology, looking for treasures that cannot be 
found in words. To climb and to descend in the words 
themselves - this is the poet's life. To climb too high 
or descend too low, is allowed in the case of poets .... 
Must the philosopher alone be condemned by his peers 
always to live on the ground floor'? (The Poetics of 
~, p.147; translation modified.)20 
Throughout the book Bachelard implores the philosopher to dream, to read 
poetry, to break out of the restricting dialectics of systems, to be 
topophilic and tapa-analyse. 
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So far, tapa-analysis has moved through houses delimiting their boundaries 
in . an effort to unify the subject; this is the subject of repose, the 
subject at rest. Tapa-analysis eccr~ a further use when Bachelard moves 
aut of the house. Furthermore, Bachelard makes such a move in analysing 
those spaces which announce this move. He wri tes that up till now topo-
analysis has moved through the house as the space of happiness, of rest; 
psychoanalysis, he continues, in its salutary role, encourages movement 
outside. "To accompany psychoanalysis in its salutary action, we should 
have to undertake a tapa-analysis of all the space that has invited us to 
come out of ourselves." (The Poetics of Space, p.11)21 So if at first the 
subj ect valorised by Bachelard seemed to be that which exists in/as a 
house, that which is unified by Bachelard with the use of walls, roofs and 
doors, then insofar as we now see this subject being called outside we can 
see another validation taking place. Tapa-analysis moves not only up and 
dawn the storeys of repose, but in and aut of the spaces of movement. 
Bachelard wri tes: "Each one of us, then, should speak of his roads, his 
crass-roads, his roadside benches; each one of us should make a surveyor's 
map of his lost fields and meadows. Thoreau said that he had the map of his 
fields engraved in his soul." (The Poetics Of Space, p.11)22 
Tapa-analysis becomes a practice which involves wider-reading. It maps 
these lost countries and houses; with tapa-anal ysis the phi losopher can 
dream, can not only cease to be confined on the ground-floor, but can 
explode the limits of the house itself. 
By the close of h.is first chapter, Bachelard has done what his introduction 
set ou~ for him to do. He has examined, through the reading of 
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poetic/literary images, those ins~ances of topophilia, those happy spaces 
of our memory. Through the workings of tapa-analysis we have seen the 
different types of subject that space can allow. One the one hand, we saw 
the same old Kantian subjects: fixed in space, centralised, stable, static 
between the cellar and the roof of an immobile structure. Is it any wonder 
that Kant's own image for the structure of his critical project 
especially wi th reference to the CritiQue Of Pure Reason was 
"architectonic"? that which gives the outlines for the safe-housing of the 
subject. Space is important, but it must be stagnant. Bachelard's 
phenomenology appears at first just to outline the primal prison of 
subjectification. The house = the house of incarceration, of correction. 
On the other hand, Bachelard provides the contrary reading. A tapa-analysis 
moves through the spaces of the house, it encounters many different 
emotions dreamed and imagined in as many different places. Then topo-
analysiS moved outside, thus showing that the walls of the house of the 
subject are, supple, if not liquid. To tapa-analyse is to enhance this 
liquification of the house, while moving through it and recognising its 
importance. This movement is so far only hinted at. 23 
His second chapter, 'Ha,lson et Uni vers', examines this movement in more 
detail; Bachelard writes: "At whatever dialectical pole the dreamer stands, 
whether in the house or in the universe, ·the dialectics becomes dynamiC. 
House and space are not merely two juxtaposed elements of space." (~ 
Poetics Of Space, p:43)24 For Bachelard the term ~dialectics" signifies a 
unifying movement in one direction only; but when one considers the 
subject's relationship to the house and the universe - from whatever 
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pas"! tion one stands - any dialectical relation begins to resonate. It 
reverberates in many directions. What had seemed a dialectical relationship 
which upheld unity now begins to be pushed in many directions at once. 
Deleuze and Guattari, in their Anti OEdipus, wri te of machines. in some 
instances these machines are revved-up to the point of breakdown. Topo-
analysis revs the dialectical-machine, mentioned in the quotation above, to 
the point of breakdown, to the paint where its juxtaposition and 
delimitation of different spaces is seen as inadequate. 
From Bachelard's talk of the house as the symbol of the resonance of being, 
of the house as the site for the upsurge of singular phusis, his 
description moves to one which identifies it as a particular locus for the 
cathecting of multiplicitous energies of desire; he explains: 
Come what may the house helps us to say: I will be an 
inhabi tant of the world, in spi te of the world. The 
problem is not only one of being, it is also a problem 
of energy and, consequently, of counter-energy. 
In this dynamic rivalry between house and universe, 
we are far removed from any reference to simple 
geometrical forms. A house that has been experienced is 
not an inert box. Inhabited space transcends 
geometrical space. (The Poetics Of Space, pp.46-47) 
It is ironic that Bachelard should wri te. that inhabi ted space transcends 
geometrical space, since it has been thought that geometry - as a priori -
is itself a discipline that is already transcendent. It would have been 
'--~--------.-.... -.--,.-.,. ...•. " .... -_ ......... .. 
clearer had Bachelard written, "Inhabited space has no need of geometrical 
space, and therefore our tapa-analysis will dispense with its 
1 
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organisation." When the problem, .. as Bachelard constructs it, admits of 
multiplicitous energies - for we have seen that there are as many ways of 
imaginati vely val idating space as there are spaces to love - the earl ier 
positing of a unified and unifying being, thrusting to dwell in its purity, 
becomes redundant. If the only guarantor of unity is the house, then once 
we have dispensed with its geometrical organisation as a mode of orienting 
our subjects to it, then the unified subject dissolves along with the walls 
and ceilings of the house. The house was the abode of the soulj now that 
the house has a dynamic relationship with what was ordered as its outside, 
the abode, and its occupant, becomes dissipated. With this in mind, 
Bachelard explains, liThe house really is an instrument of topo-analysisj it 
is even an effective instrument, for the very reason that it is hard to 
use." (The Poetics Of Space, p.47)26 And why is tapa-analysis thus 
difficul t to use? because the house is always moving .into what was its 
outside! The house appears geometric, it is philosophically safe, it is 
easily given to rationalisation, philosophers, poets and others can be 
freed or condemned according to its structure. But if we can dream, 
Bachelard says, if we can desire topophilia, then tapa-analysis should 
followj he quotes Georges Spyridaki, as follows: 
My house ... is diaphanous, but it is not of glass. It is 
more the nature of vapour. Its walls contract and 
expand as I desire. At times, I draw them close about 
me like protective armour ... But at others, I let the 
walls of my house blossom out in their own space, which 
is infinitely extensible. (The Poetics of Space, 
p.51)27 
Spyridaki obviously knows how to tapa-analyse. A couple of pages further on 
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Bachelard writes, what can be seen as, a commentary upon this passage: "The 
space we love is unwilling to remain permanently closed. It deploys and 
appears to move elsewhere wi thout difficulty: into ather times, and an 
different planes of dream and memory." (The Poetics of Space, p.53)28 Now 
we see the true extent of Bachelard's topo-analysis. It is not that which 
enforces uni ty in the building of an archetype (the house) i it nei ther 
produces just the outlines of a structure, like a geometrician, nor is its 
product the closed-in cell of perpetual organisation. Tapa-analysis 
dissol ves the boundaries of the house that it sets up, in producing the 
dream-house for analysis. It moves. It fragments unities and upholds 
multiplicities. "But my commentary is becoming far too precise." Bachelard 
explains, "Concerning the different characteristics of the house, it is 
inclined to be hospi table to fragmentary dialectics, and if I were to 
pursue it, I should destroy the uni ty of the archetype." (The Poetics of 
~, p. 53)2~ Bachelard cannot help but break archetypes during topo-
analysis, he cannot help but precisely map the house(-image) to the point 
of fragmentation. 
Our tapa-analysis now becomes easier to use as it has become more supple. 
But the images, of intensity, intimacy, even outside and inside, that have 
entered our text need to be examined further . 
••• and trees, outsides and insides. 
Bachelard's eighth chapter of The Poetics of Space, he names I Intimate 
Immensi ty'. In it he deals wi th day-dreamed images of immensi ty, in order 
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to provide a direct phenomenology of the imagination; for. he explains. 
immensity not being an object of thought or perception. puts u~ in touch 
with the imagining consciousness in itself. Superficially. such a thesis 
appears to be a re-working (if that) of the late-Eighteenth/early-
Nineteenth Century treatises an the Sublime - Edmund Burke's and Kant's. to 
name the two most well known. But. whereas Burke's subl ime was merely 
thought of something big without any significant subjective consequences. 
and Kant's was subsumed undeer the Faculty of Reason. whose subj ecti ve 
consequences invol ved the further restriction of the Subj ect under the 
diktat of Reason; Bachelard's, however, intimates something else. 
He writes: "It then becomes clear that works of art are by-products of this 
existentialism of the imagining being. In this direction of daydreams of 
immensity, the real product is consciousness of enlargement." (The Poetics 
of Space, p.169; Bachelard's emphases. )30 For Bachelard, apprehension of 
immensi ty - it is interesting- that he is not moved to call it "sublime", 
thereby involving a whole moral/religious schema - is the transgression of 
the normal boundaries of the self. If the real product of imagining the 
immense is consciousness of enlargement, rather. than consciousness of 
something that is large or being enlarged. then immensity has the result -
a most intimate resul t - of expanding the limi ts of the self. One of 
Bachelard's favourite images of intenity is the. forest. Now die-hard 
Deleuze-and-Guattarians will scream (in a mul tiplici ty of voices) "Aha. 
trees, arboriali ty ... we've done that one to death. II But they would be 
.. 
missing some interesting intensities. 
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Bachelard talks about trees. He talks well of trees: in order to experience 
an intensity of grandeur and immensity of being, contemplate - poetically, 
of course - trees. Trees, he says, are completed beings [there you are!], 
he continues, "a tree is always destined for grandeur, and, in fact, it 
propagates this destiny by magnifying everything that surrounds it," and he 
quotes Rilke, "These trees are magnificent, but even more magnificent is 
the sublime and moving space between them, as though' with their growth it 
too increased." (The Poetics of Space, p.201)31 At the moment, the Deleuze-
and-Guattarians are nodding their heads in satisfaction. We have already 
seen what types of space arboreality induces: organisation, oppression and 
'order. Yet, is this the force of Bachelard' s text? His powerful, vast, 
tree-images initially seem to be in concordance with those that Deleuze and 
Guattari criticise. The tree puts us in our places - next to it we mimic 
its homogeneous, unified, singularity. 
But it isn't that, simple. Bachelard's trees begin to perform another 
function. First, our primitive arboreal-reaction of signifiation and 
subjectification - as announced by the tree's assertion of subject/object 
positions -~eXPloded: "whenever space is a value - there is no greater 
value than intimacy - it has magnifying properties. Valorised space is a 
verb, and never, either inside or outside us, is grandeur an object." (I..b..e. 
Poetics of Space, p.202)32 The intense space, the space of existential 
" 
validation, with which Bachelard is dealing does not allow itself to be 
posi ti,oned or pinned down. Immensity and grandeur move; if an outside or 
inside to 'us' can be posited, then intimacy and grandeur occupy both, and 
in so doing they must be said to move, like a verb. Bachelard's desired, 
validated space extends in all directions ("magnifies", "reverberates") it 
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is constantly in motion. So even the tree's grandeur begins to destroy its 
upright boundaries when we tapa-analyse it. 
Second, such a space Bachelard describes with a quotation from Joe 
Bousquet: "Space is nowhere. Space is inside it [the tree] like honey in a 
hive." (The Poetics of Space, p.202) ["L'espace n'est nulle part. L'espace 
est en lui C0111111e le miel dans la ruche." (La poetique de 1 'espace, p.183)] 
When honey is inside, it is never just 'inside'. Honey always oozes; when 
it is inside the hive, it always has the possibility of oozing out. A topo-
analysis of honey would show its movement through cracks and fissures in 
the containing body, thus showing that it at once articulates and 
transgresses the boundaries of its container. Space is honey, Bousquet 
says. Especially the 'inner' space of the tree. The grandeur of the tree 
allows the honeyed space 'within' ooze out of every crack in the craggy 
bark; to grow - that is, to spatially validate its surroundings, to become 
a verb - is to ooze through every branch and twig, out of every leaf and 
root. Bachelard's immense tree is that which would move as a becoming-
rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari. The eruption of lines of flight upon the 
organised body of the trunk, is the oozing of honey-space in the immense 
intensity of a Bachelardian tree. It is a becoming that must be encouraged. 
Bachelard writes: 
Even a philosopher of space starts to dream. And if we 
like words of composed metaphysics, one might say that 
here Joe Bousquet has shown us a space-substance, 
honey-space or space-honey. Mayall matter be given its 
individual place, all sub-stances their ex-stance. And 
may all matter achieve conquest of its space, its power 
of expansion over and beyond the surfaces by means of 
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which a geometrician would like to define it. (Ihf=.. 
Poetics of Space, pp.202-203)33 
Bachelard here seems to use two notions of space. One insists upon the 
materiality, oozing, honey-ness of spac"e; a space which does not only allow 
dreams/images to flow through it, but urges them forth. The other space is 
that of the geometrician, well-defined, cold, empty, co-ordinated. This is 
the space that Bachelard says must be conquered. Deleuze and Guattari said 
that one can make mappings from tracings, and force rhizomes from roots; in 
the same way, Bachelard has topo-analysed a material space from a tree. 
Where, then, does Bachelard turn when he has finished wi th the tree? or, 
rather, when he has announced the materiality of space? He turns to the 
plain and the plateau! In order to map various reactions to images of 
immensi ty, in the shape of plains/plateaus, Bachelard proposes a "plains 
test". The two poles of which he describes as follows. 
The first, is typified by a quotation from Rilke: "The plain is the 
sentiment that exalts us." (The Poetics of Space, p.203) ["La plaine est 1e 
sentiment qui ,nous grandi t." (quoted, La Poetique de l' espace, p.184) 
Bachelard's commentary on this sentence proceeds as follows: 
This theorem of cesthetlc anthropology is so clearly 
stated that it suggests a correlatl ve theorem which 
could be expressed in the following terms: any 
sentiment that exalts us makes our situation in the 
world smoother. (The Poetics of Space, p",203)34 
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In this case, the plain is that type of space - smooth space - which 
encourages such feelings of exaltation, that our corresponding intensity 
flows out across the space, validating it. 
The second pole, is typified by a quotation from Henri Bosco: On the plain, 
"I am always elsewhere, in an elsewhere that is floating, fluid. Bei~g for 
a long time absent from myself, and nowhere present, I am too inclined to 
attri bute the inconsistency of my daydreams to the wide open spaces that 
induce them." (The Poetics of Space, p.203)36 Bosco knows that the smooth 
space induced by the plain, flows through him, dissolving and dispersing 
all organised notions of unified subjectivity. The relations between here 
and elsewhere become nonsensical on a plain which will not allow the co-
ordinations of the geometrician. 
These two poles of the plains test are, it should be added, as mobile and 
untetherable as the here and there of Bosco's reverie. We can see that this 
intensity of immenSity, that happens with the image-movement of the plain, 
is commensurable with the oozings announced in Bosco's daydream and in 
Bachelard's honey-space. We have seen Bachelard's space, itself, begin to 
move - like a verb - so far in this section. We have also seen it destroy 
our traditional concepts of outside and inside, subj ect and obj ect, here 
and there. These concepts are dealt with in more detail in Bachelard's 
ninth chapter, 'The Dialectics of Outside and Inside'. 
The opening section of this ninth chapter expre~ses many of t.he problems 
wi th which we have already dealt - both in and out of our encounter wi th 
Bachelard. Outside and inside: these, for Bachelard, constitute two poles 
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of a dialectical organisation which is "cancerous" to philosophical 
thought. It is on the basis of this metaphysical opposition - this co-
ordinated, organisational opposition - that geometricians/metaphysicians 
seek to determine philosophical knowledge. And yet it is an oppostion that 
is bound up in spatiality: "The most profound metaphysics is rooted in an 
implicit geometry which - whether we will or no - confers spatiality upon 
thought; if a metaphysician could not draw, what would he think?" (TIle. 
Poetics of Space, p.212)36 Such an analysis brings us very close, again, to 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. in that Bachelard's depiction of the formal 
nature of space/spatiali ty is as a sort of pre-organising function which 
allows thought to become knowledge. Bachelard continues: 
The dialectics of here and there has been promoted to 
the rank of an absolutism according to which these 
unfortunate adverbs of place are endowed with 
unsupervised 
metaphysical 
philosophy, 
philosophical 
powers of ontological determination. Many 
systems would need mapping. But in 
all short cuts are costly, and 
knowledge cannot advance from schematised 
experiences. (The Poetics Of Space, p.212. Bachelard's 
emphases. translation modified.)37 
This is a crammed, and opaque, passage. In the beginning, we seem to know 
where we are: the unsubtle transcendental idealism of the terms 'here' and 
'there' in <Bachelard's) contemporary philosophy, has weakened philosophy's 
relationship with experience - especially, and ironically. at a time when 
such a relationship is seen as most important. This is where the term 
'spatiality' enters notice, I do nat use 'space' here. Spatiality 
describes exactly that which ontologically orders. organises. co-ordinates. 
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in order that we are left with a si te for possible knowledge/experience. 
This is what Kant did, and what Bachelard rail~ aginst, as we can see from 
his conclusion, "philosophical knowledge cannot advance from schematised 
experiences [experiences]." But what is the force of the middle six-word 
sentence, "Many metaphysical systems would need mapping"? Is a cartography 
necessary to be able to read such spatialised metaphysics; or, is a 
cartography necessary to diffuse these metaphysics? Whether Bachelard 
emphasises one over the other, is not clear - if, indeed, the twa readings 
are mutually exclusive - and I am sure that it does nat matter how we read 
it. Nevertheless, what remains interestingly unclear - in the context of 
.this passage in particular, and the whale chapter in general - is the 
question of the role and outcome of this cartography. But it is this 
. question we have been answering all along, for this method is topo-
analysis. 
The above passage ended the first section of Bachelard's chapter; the next 
section begins thus, "I should like to examine a little mare closely, this 
geometrical cancerisation of the linguistic tissue of contemporary 
philosophy." (The Poetics Of Space, p.213)38 Bachelard shows exactly what 
he thinks of the spatialisation of dialectics-metaphysics; and he does this 
by criticising the term "being-there" ["~tre-l~"]. For him, anything that 
can be called being cannot be given a spatial localisation, either here or 
there. As we have seen, his valorisation 'of the Hause, and its images, is 
no such determination of being - Bachelard never imagines an "~tre-maisDn". 
For the spatial co-ordination of the subject is contrary to everything he 
____ ._ -.. _____ . ______ ---------0--
wants to propound. It was shawn above, that the image of the house is one 
which not only serves to produce a flUid subject, but it is itself moving. 
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As was the honey-space which was eventually emitted by the tree. The 
dialectics of outside and inside have no bearing on the plane/plateau 
images already mapped. Indeed, topo-analysis is an anathema to 
outside/inside thought; it just moves over whatever space it wants. 
Bachelard wants to mul tiply images, not restrict them to outside and 
inside; but, wherever! everywhere! 
The problem with outside/inside, is that it is a biunivocal expression of 
unification which only allows of the production of singularity. Bachelard 
goes on to say: so we do sometimes still use images of outside and inside, 
even in topo-analysis; what we should do, then is mul tiply these images. 
amplify them. 39 If singularities are made. then make sure that they don't 
stay in one place, make them move. make them occupy different positions or 
the same position any position. If movement is allowed, if 
reverberation/resonance is forced form these images. then their geometrism 
will collapse. the outside-inside relation will become smoother, more 
fluid. Bachelard says that poets do this; it is a constantly emphasised 
entreaty of Bachelard's. that philosophers should do it too. Following a 
quotation from Henri Michaux's prose-poem. L'espace aux ambres,40 Bachelard 
comments: 
If we examine closely the lesson in philosophy the poet 
gives us. we shall find in this passage a spirit that 
has lost its "being-there", one that has so declined as 
to fall from the being of its shade and mingle with the 
8urs of being, in the form of a meaningless noise, 
of a confused hum that cannot be locate~ (The Poetics 
Of Space. p.217; Bachelard's emphases)41 
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and, "What Michaux gives us as an a priori of being is the entire space-
time of ambiguous being. In this ambiguous space, the mind has last its 
geometrical homeland and the spiri t is drifting." (The Poetics Of Space, 
p.218)42 These poetic thoughts, Bachelard says, confer a darker, shadier 
realm& being than what is left to us by the "philosophers of anguish". By 
way of an aside, it is interesting to note that for Bachelard, the 
production of the image of the anguish-of-being (in keeping with his 
beliefs about the relation of imaginative production to consciousness, 
already shawn) is the simultaneous manifestation of that anguish. Not a 
very original thought; but Bachelard continues his analysis thus: 
What strikes us here is that the metaphysical aspect 
originates an the very level of the image, an the level 
of an image which disturbs the nations of spatiality 
commonly considered to be able to reduce these 
disturbances and restore the mind to a statute of 
indifference to space that does nat have to localise 
dramatic events. (The Poetics Of Space, p.219)43 
Again Bachelard exemplifies that which goes against classic philosophical 
thought on space. As well as the quotations Bachelard gi ves from Henri 
Michaux, he quotes, Jules Superveille and Rilke. All these passages 
incorporate images of space which derange the outide/inside dialectic. 
Bachelard' s tapa-analysis has came a lang way. It has shown us constantly 
moving subjects, oozing in space, skimming along the surfaces of their 
constitution, muddying the spacial distinctions according to which 
geometric thought seeks to rigidify: 
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For it is dangerous, in expressing oneself, to be "all 
roots. II 
The phenomenology of the poetic imagination allows us 
to explore the being of man .. considered as the being of 
a surface, ... (The Poetics Of Space, p.222; Bachelard's 
emphasis) 44 
Conclusion. 
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It is here that we must leave this part of my ~7iS. First of all, we 
watched Deleuze and Guattari map a Cartography. Its movement announced the 
desire for an escape from spatiality, from a space that was ordering and 
organised, to a space that was smooth. Its movement articulated the 
description of those spaces in the same movement as it constructed the 
latter. Bachelard's topo-analysis we have seen perform a similar function. 
Although it was couched in terms which seemed to hold it back in the space 
of order - so that it could nat be anything ather than a tracing - it soan 
moved away, onto another plateau. 
That Bachelard began with a "phenomenology of the imagination" and ended 
with a tapa-analysis of the spaces of subjectivity, is useful (for me) but 
nat particularly amazing. We should nat see in Bachelard I s work merely a 
pre-run of Deleuze and Guattari's, or even my awn. It is noticable, when 
reading a text like The Poetics Of Space, that it can be put to many 
different contemporary philosophical uses. A modern phenomenologist, 
deconstructionist, literary theorist/critic, psychoanalyst, or whoever, can 
find a fruitful branch an which to graft their awn texts. Indeed, there are 
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many points at which The Poetics Of Space falls into such outmoded 
assumptions, that one could cry: when, for example, Bachelard eulogises 
over the sanctity of the poetic image, and the power of the poet. Maybe, 
though, this proves that Bachelard ' s .' The Poetics of Space is rhizomatic 
writing, of the kind advocated by Deleuze and Guattari. It is a text whose 
tubers, and feelers twist and turn allover its appOinted area of study, 
and as we have seen, they can take flight into many other areas. 
The line of flight I have pursued is one which has begun its journey with 
Deleuze and Guattari's Cartography, and broken away with Bachelard's topo-
analysis. Throughout the course of the study, we have reached impasses and 
deferrals. Nevertheless, the grafting of tapa-analysis onto Cartography has 
been one which has, itself, produced the possibilities of new lines of 
flight. The first chapter of the next part of this thesis, will examine 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of territorialities, in an attempt to chart, 
or topoanalyse, the honeyed ooz1ngs of a material space. 
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PART 2. 
CONTENT. 
As the title of this part suggests, the two chapters it contains will seek 
to explore the ways in which a notion of a material space will affect our 
understanding of subject-making. In the previous chapters we saw the ways 
in which cartography works, the critical promises a cartography makes and 
the relationship it had with other practices. Now, we will be shown in more 
'detail, the types of space that a cartography charts. 
First, Chapter Three - 'Spaces' - examines the territories discussed by 
Deleuze and Guattari in their Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes; most 
notably their differentiation between smooth and striated space as made in 
A Thqusand Plateaus., Secondly,' Chapter Four - 'Subjectification' - provides 
an acount .of Guattari's The Three Ecologies, relating our previous 
methodological discussions with questions of subjectivity, in order that a 
Cartograp~y of Subjectivity can - finally - be undertaken. 
Where the former chapter maps a material space in the abstract terms 
gleaned from the discussion of the Deleuze and Guattari texts, the latter's 
description of a material space will articulate such notions more 
concretely. The project of this part of the thesis, then, is to refine our 
understanding of a possible material space so that we can reorient our 
accepted notions of what it takes to make subjectivity, in order to pave 
the way for a criticism of contemporary critiques of the subject. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
'SPACES' , 
Introduction. 
We were introduced to many terms, in the previous chapter dealing wi th 
Deleuze and Guattari, which abound in their philosophy: plane of 
consistency, multiplicities, lines of flight, to name a few. The 
introductory section of the present chapter will re-articulate these ideas, 
in such a way as to provide a brief account of Deleuze and Guattari' s 
notions concerning territorialisation, reterritorialisation and 
deterritorialisation. This chapter will then proceed to make an account of 
the types of space constructed according to these movements - the smooth 
and the striated. It must be emphasised, however, that though I will be 
taking account of these spatially oriented movements, an account which 
necessarily relies upon a reading of Chapter Three, 'Savages, Barbarians, 
Civilised Men', of Deleuze and Guattari' s L' Anti OEdipe,1 I will be" unable 
to follow the intricacies of this chapter. This chapter is over one hundred 
and twenty pages long and notoriously complicated; the intricate 
fluctuations of its many plots and sub-plots (anthropological, political, 
spatial, psychological ... ) would necessitate an examination longer than 
this. thesis as a whole. Nevertheless, given the paradigms in which this 
thesis is working, the notions borrowed from this text of 'Deleuze and 
Guattari's, should not appear either out of place or obscure. 
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Towards the beginning of Chapter One above, we were entreatied to think of 
a vast expanse of space - an arctic tundra or shifting desert; this space 
flows according to what Deleuze and Guattari term the plane of consistency. 
The plane of consistency is mati vated "by the various flows of desire that 
consti tute it, in such a way that the flows of desire and the plane· of 
consistency cease to be differentiable. Upon this plane, in, across or 
through this space, there is no need of organisation, no restriction or 
delimitation of the directions taken by the particular flows, and no 
hierarchisation. This much we have already encountered with respect to the 
discussion of Rhizomes and Cartographies, and even witnessed at work in the 
honeyed oozings of Bachelard's material space of Topoanalysis. Now, 
however, we can provide a further articulation of such a plane of 
consistency, in terms which relate to the direction taken by this chapter. 
In Chapter One, we referred to the example of Cartesian philosophy -
especially his geometry and cogito - in an attempt to illustrate systematic 
blockages on the plane of consi tstency and the prevention of lines of 
flight erupting from an organism, that this philosophy promoted in order to 
give structure and hierarchy to questions of subjectification. In just the 
same way <though not necessarily according to the same means) this 
plane/space can be organised in terms relating directly to the surfaces of 
the earth. The production of a Terri tory, a terri torialisation, comes 
about when the various flows on the plane of consistency are organised into 
the body of the earth. This does not equate with the apportioning of land 
in administrative terms, but rather is constituted. by the inscription, upon 
the plane, of hierarchies of those that live on it, or flow across it. For 
Deleuze h and Guattari, it is at this point that social and spatial 
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formations intertwine. 2 If we refer to the language already used wi th 
respect to Deleuze and Guattari, i.e. that of the rhizome, we can see that 
the movement of terri torialisation is equi valent to the spreading of a 
root-structure, or the growing of an arboreal system. Blockages are 
enforced and stock taken of the spaces thus inscribed. The desired outcome 
of such a process is increased order. This is precisely the way Kant 
organised the construction of his subj ect; the spatial element of its 
constitution was important as a territorialisation, as that which promoted 
the safe construction and constriction of a unified Subject. The subject 
may have been cultivated as the centrepiece of the Kantian critical system, 
but its growth was as tightly arranged as the ornamental garden viewed by 
Bachelard. 
Deterritorialisation, quite simply, describes the dissolution of these 
territorial growths. To deterritorialise is to disrupt the general movement 
towards terri torialisation in. such a way as to promote the free-flowing 
nature of the plane of consistency that had been hitherto constrained. The 
eruption of a line of flight from the arboreal structure, or the breaking 
out of a rhizome from a root, are movements of deterritorialisation. 
Similarly, reterritorialisation is the making root of a rhizome, or the 
turning back onto the organised structure of the Territory of a line, or 
lines, of flight. 
Territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are 
therefore movements" of great importance in the pr:-oduction of organisation 
and subjectifiation on the plane of consistency. They can be seen as 
operations upon vectors (the importance of this 'vector' terminology will 
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became apparent in the following chapter), thus determining their 
directions and their productions. It is according to these 
movements/operations that the plane of consistency flows or freezes. 
Furthermore, the relation between the .. movements of terri torialisation etc. 
and lines of flight/rhizomes is indicative of the types of movements 
thereby described. Though I have here used the language of the rhizome to 
describe the operation of territorialisation etc., it should not be 
inferred that these terms operate wi th respect to a system of general 
equivalence - to do so would involve the positing of an hierarchical, 
mimetic structure according to which one can order one's own understanding 
of the terms. Such a mimetic structure is what is promoted by the forces of 
re/territorialisation to enhance and enforce the boundaries of their 
hierarchical social formations. The relation between these two types of 
discourse, however, is one of mapping, not of traCing .. I have endeavoured 
to describe terri torialisation etc. using familiar terminology as a map; 
indeed, in the same way that we saw the map/thing mapped distinction 
disappear in earlier chapters, we will see the distinctions between the 
terms used dissolve. Mapping, rhizomes and deterritorialisations will all 
flow into, and out of, each other when we encounter smooth and striated 
spaces. What is needed now, however, is a short exposition of the relations 
that Deleuze and Guattari identify between their discussions of the 
occupation and understanding of space - territririalisation etc. - the 
formation of Capitalism and the role of the State. 
Throughout their works Deleuze and Guattari articulate many types of flows. 
Furthermore, many types of machine are described providing for the 
divertlon, consummation and speeding up of fluctuation of these flows; yet, 
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in all cases they can be called: desiring-machines. We can say, therefore, 
that the movements of territorialisation etc., as well as those of 
rhizomatisation, arborealisation, cartography and representation, are all 
machinic functions operating on the myriad flows on the plane of 
consistency. The plane of consistency invoked not only at the beginning· of 
this chapter, but at the outset of the previous one which deal t wi th 
Deleuze and Guattari, has yet another characterisation: the flows that 
pervade the plane of consistency are also those of Capital. 
Capi talism, then, refers to a particular way of relating to the general 
flow of capital: on the whole, capitalism tries to slow down this~w, ·1 
these flows, in order to agglomerate, congeal, order capital in the hope of 
maximising, or realising its awn ends. Though the Capitalist Machine 
appropriates the organisations of the machines that have already worked at 
the codification of these flows an the plane of consistency, it adds its 
own organisation by redefining their processes. The Capitalist Machine 
deterri torialises and decodes what were merely terri torialised, coded as 
the body of the earth by the Primitive Territorial Machine, or overcoded as 
the body of the despot by the Barbarian Despotic Machine. Now the 
capitalist decoding of the flaws of/as capital becomes the pure space 
constitutive of capitalism; the decoding of flaws on the plane of 
consistency provides the territory of capitalism as the full body of 
capi tal. 
This, however, is only part of the story. If it wasn't, and capitalism was 
purely a motor of deterritorialisation and the decoding of flows, then it 
would be nothing mare than commensurate wi th the plane of consistency 
Chapter Three 92 
itself. Capi talism would equal the full body of capi tal and be nothing 
ather than another schizophrenia. But there is mare to this story. Inasmuch 
as it decodes and deterri torialises, the Capitalist Machine overlays an 
axiomatic whereby the full body of capital is penned in, organised as its 
inner limit. Deleuze and Guattari explain it as follows: "The flaws are 
decoded and axiomatised by capitalism at the same time. Hence schizophrenia 
is nat the identity of capitalism, but an the contrary its difference, its 
divergence, and its death." (Anti-OEdipus, p.246; Deleuze and Guattari ' s 
emphasis)3 It is thus that the Capitalist Machine reterritorialises, 
remarks its internal organisation in an attempt to constrain those farces 
which lead only to its dissolution upon the general flaws of the plane of 
consistency. 
Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior 
1imi t of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its 
deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions an 
condi tion that it inhi bi t this tendency, or that it 
push back or displace this limit I by substi tuting for 
it its own immanent relative limits, which continually 
reproduces an a wider scale. It axiomatises with one 
hand what it decades with the ather. (Anti-OEdipus, 
p.246j De1euze and Guattari's emphases)4 
We should now be able to understand De1euze and Guattari's characterisation 
of the formation, propagation and continual upkeep of the Capitalist 
Machine, in the terms with which we are familiar. If we are to incorporate 
an understanding of the role and formation of the State , in this analysis 
of the Capitalist Machine, we must take the following points into 
consideration. The State is not capitalist by definition. In the myriad of 
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concepts introduced by Deleuzeand Guattari into the chapter from An.ti.::. 
OEdipus with which we have been dealing, that of the State occupies many 
posi tions. On the whole, its primary formation - the Urstaat - has links 
with the Barbarian Despotic Machine. The State Machine, then, is set to the 
overcoding of flows into the body of the despot or Imperial formation. 
Insofar as the Capi talist Machine decodes the flows of the Despotic, it 
also deterritorialises the territory of the State. However, as it 
increasingly reterri torialises this terri tory, and axiomatises the full 
body of capital. so the State formationjsqueez;d back into the service of 
the Capitalist Machine. Thus, we cannot ~cribe the characterisation 
.Deleuze and Guattari offer as a mere history of the development of 
capitalism, having passed through various temporally prior stages. There is 
evidence of many, more primitive, social structures in the workings of the 
Capitalist Machine than a stagist view will allow. Furthermore, the State 
apparatus is particularly helpful to the axiomatisation of the Capitalist 
Machine because it has a ready-made organisational structures of police and 
army. As Dt:7leuze and Guattari write, "The State is thus induced to play an 
increasingly important role in the regulation of the axiomatized flows, 
with regard to production and its planning, the economy and its 
'monetarization,' and surplus value and its absorption (by the State 
apparatus itself)." (Anti-OEdipus, p.253)4a We shall see these particular 
structures become important in the following discussion of the Nomads' 
relation to smooth and striated space. 
Spaces Smooth and Striated. 
To recap: We will remember that a rhizome could break along any point of 
Chapter Three 94 
its progression and flow in any direction it desired. Furthermore, an 
arboreal structure could itself break and form a rhizome. If we regard the 
growth of the arboreal structure in .the terms I have descri bed above, we 
shall see that its movement is one of general terri torialisation . and 
reterri torialisation. Insofar as a branch forms, or a root advances, it 
does so in order to code (or overcode) ~t the territory in which it grows: 
structuring and organising as it goes. (The same goes for the production of 
a trace/tracing.) Now, whenever a branch or root becomes a rhizome, or 
tracing starts to map, we can say that a deterri torialisation is taking 
place, or that the previous codifications are being decoded. If, however, 
this deterritorialisation (whether as the breaking of arboreal movement, or 
as the acceleration of the rhizomatic) tends back towards organisation, 
structuration or root-thought, we can see that it has reterritorialised. 
The main obj ect texts for study throughout this section, are the two 
"plateaus" from Deleuze and Guattari's Hille Plateau+'t<> entitled, '1227 -
Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine,' and '1440 - The Smooth and the 
Striated.' These two sections of the book are two of the longe:5t and I am 
not endeavouring to provide a detailed account of the theses adopted 
therein. As I have stated above, my project is to provide an account of the 
ways in which we can construct a material space; in order to do so, it is 
necessary to map the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari detail their 
distinction between the smooth and the striated. (Again, as we saw with the 
'distinction' between the root and the rhizome, ~e will come to see why the 
assertion of a 'distinction' between the smooth and the striated is, at the 
best misleading, and at the worst reactive.) 
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In a long quotation from '1440 -·the Smooth and the Striated', Deleuze and 
Guattari detail three distinctions between smooth space and striated space, 
as follows: 
The smooth and the striated are distinguished first 'of 
all by an inverse relation between the point and the 
line (in the case of the striated, the line is between 
two points, while in the smooth, the point is between 
two lines); and second, by the nature of the line 
(smooth-directional, open intervals; dimensional-
striated, closed intervals). Finally, there is a third 
difference, concerning the surface or space. In 
striated space, one closes off a surface and 
"allocates" it according to determinate intervals, 
assigned breaks; in the smooth, one "distributes" 
oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and 
in the course of one's crossings (logos and nomos). (A. 
Thousand Plateaus, pp. 480-481)6 
Straight away we can see that· the space Deleuze and Guattari call striated 
corresponds to that which I have called co-ordinated, via Kant and 
following Bachelard. It is a space of boundaries and ranges, limi ts and 
allotments, and is cross-hatched like graph paper for ease of co-
ordination. Striated, metric, space - Deleuze and Guattari explain with a 
quotation from Pierre Boulez - "is counted in order to be occupied," (A. 
Thousand Plateaus, p.362) ("on 1e compte pour l'occuper" (mlle Plateaux, 
p.447)]. Territorialisation and reterritorialisation, coding and 
overcoding, are movements which establish the power of organisation by the 
occupation of space; indeed, successful organisation is concordant wi th 
successful occupation. 
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We have seen the Capitalist social formation produce, and repress, the very 
forces capable of destroying it (indeed, Deleuze and Guattari often refer 
to these deterritorialisations, in Anti-OEdipus, as "schizophrenisations") 
through the axiomatisation of the decoded flows of ,capital that constitute 
its formative space. These "dark forces" of deterritorialisationand 
decoding. lurk at its perimeters like wild animals outside an encampmen~. In 
A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari articulate this schematisation 
further, with reference to the State's relationship to Nomads. To use 
another crude dichotomisation: the State is articulated on grounds of the 
validation of interiority and the construction of subjects; the Nomadic (or 
Nomad War Machine) is articulated on exteriori ty and speed. In a way 
similar to that we have encountered in defining striated space, the State 
promotes a general tendency towards secrecy and closetedness - and like 
Bachelard's geometric space, relishes its use of the inside-outside 
dialectical system to these ends; whereas the Nomadic promUlgates a 
constant movement into the 'outside', disorganising any prior 
stratification in order to promote the constant production of its awn 
flows. Nomads ooze. 
It is in this way that we can understand some of the rather cryptic terms 
used by Deleuze and Guattari in making their simple distinctions between 
smooth and striated space, especially in the passage cited above. The space 
of the Nomad is always fluid; if a nomadic movement is described in terms 
of points and paths (or lines), then the attainment of a point does not 
mark the end of a line, but the possibility of further paths to take. Such 
a movement also describes the lines of flight discussed in an earlier 
chapter: So, the lines of smooth space are not point-directed, they are 
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open to take any possible direction. Smooth space is Nomad space. "The 
nomadic trajectory ... distributes, people (or animals) in an open space, one 
that is indefinite and noncommunicating. ... The nomad distributes itself 
in a smooth space; it occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is its 
territorial principle." (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.380, 381; Deleuzeand 
Guattari's emphasis; translation modified.)7 The nomad rides space like 
surfers ride waves; or rather, like skateboarders ride pavements - their 
speed and movement being in a proportional relation to the making fluid of 
the environment by the occupants. Sedentary space (1. e. not Nomad space), 
Deleuze and Guattari explain, "is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads 
between enclosures, It (A Thousand Plateaus, p.381) (" est stria, par des 
murs, des clotures et des chemins entre les clotures," (}[J,lle Plateaux, 
p.472)]. This is also the space of the State; whose 'join-the-dots' mode of 
organisation delimits the occupied space, closing itself within boundaries 
and making the fear of an 'outside' into a vocation. S 
What, then, is the relationship between the occupants of a (type of) space 
and that space? Do the occupants forge their lived-in space, or are they 
only capable of living in a space that they find receptive? That· is, is 
their relationship to space active or passive? 
The answer to these questions - though, in part, already alluded to - could 
be said to be the motor for this thesis as a whole. Nevertheless, an answer 
gi ven in terms that relate directly to those deal t wi th in this chapter, 
should also clear up any problems we may have with our adoption of - what I 
have called - crude distinctions. (For it could, rightly, be argued that a 
piece "of work that purports to be a cartography, by promoting such 
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dichotomies and announcing their factual rigidity, is indulging in the type 
of tracing that it condemns as arboreal, or striated, or co-ordinated. ) 
To begin with, however, we must note that it is at this point that the 
introduction of the terms adumbrated at the outset of this chapter, become 
useful. Deleuze and Guattari write, "The smooth always possesses a greater 
power of deterri torialisation than the striated. It (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p.480) [" Le lisse dispose toujours d' une puissance de de terri torialisatioD 
superieure au strie. It (Hille Plateaux, p. 599) 1 The Nomadic movement over 
smooth space is one that decodes and deterritorialises its flows: 
If the nomad can be called the Deterri torialised par 
excellence, it is precisely because there is no 
reterri torialisation afterward as with the migrant, or 
upon something else as with the sedentary (the 
sedentary's relation with the earth is mediatised by 
something else, a property regime, a State apparatus). 
Wi th the nomad~ on the contrary, it is 
d~terri torialisation that constitutes the relation to 
the earth, to such a degree that the nomad 
reterritorialises on deterritorialisation itself. It is 
the earth that deterritorialises itself, in a way that 
provides the nomad with a territory. (A Thqusand 
Plateaus, p.381; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.)9 
The deterri torialising and decoding movement of the Capitalist Machine, 
especially insofar as it has co-opted the powers of the State formation, is 
one geared to the production of striated space; for it is according to this 
schema that the (decoded &c.) flows of capital constitute the co-ordinated 
formations according to which all organisation takes place. This is 
Chapter Three 99 
reterritorialisation par excellence. The Nomadic Machine reterritorialises 
nothing in the capitalist sense, for it has no prior axiomatisation of 
terri tory on which to fall; if it can be said to perform a 
reterritorialisation it is only upon the deterritorialising movement 
itself, as this quotation makes clear, and as such the term 
"reterritorialisation" is redundant. Nevertheless, it is also quite clear 
that the Nomad Machine can be appropriated and set to work by the State 
Apparatuses it opposes. We have seen that the deterritorialising flows can 
be recoded by the Capitalist Machine; such a fate can befall the Nomad 
Machine - the dis-organising forces of destruction and dissipation (those 
which smooth) can penetrate the State defences only to become overwhelmed 
and reworked by those very forces threatened by dissolution. The perfect 
example of such an occasion, is the movement of the mad/homeless. The edges 
of society - defined, so often, as mad or irrational - never cease to 
threaten that social structure. The village idiot has always been a source 
of fear and therefore fun; and has always been forced into a protective 
space. However, with contemporary 'care-in-the-community' programmes these 
• irrational' elements are again forced onto the streets of ci ties, where 
their destructive power is simultaneously exacerbated and neutralised. The 
movement onto the streets of the tramp smooths the otherwise rigid 
structure delineating society, and yet is plugged back into this structure 
through the invocation of charitable organisations/collective conscience. 
(Witness the contemporary role of the homeless of New York. In a city where 
recycling is almost forcibly encouraged, where every Coke can is worth 5¢ 
at the recycling depot, the homeless have been co-opted by' the State's 
environmental departments as a vast, transient can-collecting machine, 
whose constituent parts consist of a trolly and a black, plastic bin-
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liner.) In the end, the homeless and the mad occupy the same position as 
when they inhabited the hospital or the workhouse, it is just that the flow 
of capital underpinning this position enters from a different angle. The 
Capitalist Machine has a necessary relationship with the smooth. 
What such a discussion shows, is the mutual dependency of the machine and 
the space over which it moves. A machine is defined not only by the 
relative distribution of its parts (the distribution of particular flows on 
the plane of constistency) but also by its posi tion wi th respect to its 
production. The desire-producing Desiring machine, the map-making 
Cartography machine, or the Smooth space making Nomad War Machine. All of 
these assemblages on the plane of consistency do not exhibit a stultifying 
one way, or univocal, relationship between the machine and product: but 
rather they are articulated by, as well as articulate, the product. A 
nomad, then, is such because of the space over which it moves, and because 
it smooths the space over which it swarms. Therefore, the active-passive 
distinction crumbles alongside the others. 
There is another aspect of this relationship that must be examined. ·We are 
already aware of the types of space-production in which the smooth and the 
striated partake. Smooth space distributes its occupants over its surface; 
striated space is allocated by its occupants .. according to determinate 
intervals" (see the quotation from A Thqusand Plateaus, pp.480-481, above 
p.95)! We have also seen the results of various deterri torialisations and 
reterri torialisations, with respect to space construction. Qui te simply, 
then, we can say that: a nomadic movement can smooth a striated space, in 
the same way that a rhizome can break out from a branch or root; and, 
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similarly, a smooth space can be overrun and ordered to form a striated 
space. The Nomad Machine can be appropriated and worked by the State; the 
State can be overrun and smoothed by" the Nomads. No one space, or spatial 
organisation, exists independent of any other; each type of space - as with 
each type of machinic construction - has a necessary and consti tuti ve 
relation with an other. To believe otherwise would be idealist. Indeed, 
Deleuze and Guattari write (at the close of this plateau) that smooth space 
alone won't save us. But I shall return to this below. 
Deleuze and Guattari make this simple schematisation of the discussion of 
types of space much more complex. In the section of the "plateau" in which 
the smooth and the striated are related in terms of a mathematical model, 
Deleuze and Guattari write: 
We are always, however, brought back to a dissymetrical 
necessity to cross 'from the smooth to the striated, and 
from the striated to the smooth .... Translating is not 
a simple act: it is not enough to substitute the space 
traversed for the movement. a series of rich and 
complex operations is necessary.... Neither is 
translating a secondary act. It is an operation that 
undoubtedly consists in subjugating, overcoding, 
metrlclslng smooth space, in neutralising it, but also 
in giving it a milieu of propagation, extension, 
refraction, renewal, and impulse without which it would 
perhaps die of its own accord. (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p.486; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)10 
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Deleuze and Guattari explain that - in terms of the mathematical model they 
are using, at least - the translation of the smooth into the striated can 
result in the possibilities of creating openings, as often as it produces 
closure. And vice versa, of course .. ' Major, State science has need of the 
innovations and inspirations that come via minor, nomad sciencej and minor 
science, without the structure afforded by major, would not progress. 
"Perhaps we must say that all progress is made by and in striated space, 
but all becoming occurs in smooth space." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.486) 
[" Peut-~tre faut-i1 dire que tout progres se fait par et dans 1 'espace 
strie, mais tout devenir est dans 1 'espace 1i5se." (Hille Plateaux, p. 607)] 
It is not enough merely to equate the negative, or bad, with the striated 
and the positive, or good, with the smooth. Our description of the smooth-
striated distinction can say that, on the whole, that which striates does 
so in order to organise and oppress, and that which smooths does so in 
order to liberate and flow. Both formations, however, can use both methods 
in their creation of space. The movement between the smooth and the 
striated becomes far more complex than it was first proposed. Deleuze and 
Guattari write: 
In each instance, then, the simple opposition "smooth-
striated" gi ves rise to far more difficul t 
complications, alternations, and superpositions. But 
these complications basically confirm the distinction, 
precisely because they bring dissymetrical movements 
into play. For now it suffices to say that there are 
two kinds of voyage, distinguished by the respective 
role of the pOint, line, and space. (A Thqusand' 
Plateaus, pp.481-482)11 
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We are, thus, led down another line of flight. It has been stated 
throughout this chapter - in keeping with the common sense notion of the 
nomadic - that the nature of the Nomad Machine lies in its particular 
movement. Indeed, speed was said to be one of its characteristics. But 
Deleuze and Guattari articulate something different; they write: 
We can say of the nomads, following Toynbee IS 
suggestion: they do not move. They are nomads by dint 
of not moving, not migrating, of holding a smooth space 
that they refuse to leave, that they leave only in 
order to conquer and die. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.482; 
Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)12 
Throughout the "plateaus" with which we have been dealing, Deleuze and 
Guattari present us with nomadic images of fluctuation and movement. Nomads 
that swarm over the desert and the steppe, lining up one point of 
vegetation with another (vegetation that is as fluid as the nomad). But we 
are now assured, such nomadic voyaging is not really movement. Movement 
describes what the migrant does: the migrant leaves spaces ordered, 
organised according to the aim or end of its journey. It striates space by 
'reterritorialisation. Nomad points, we have seen, are always directional or 
vectoral; its pOints are not oriented towards another, fixe~ point. The 
smooth space the nomad makes, folds back onto the nomad and occupies it. 
The Nomad' s voyage is a sort of non-moving picaresque; 13 or, rather, the 
nomad has more to do wi th a mode of voyaging than wi th any movement-
destination axis. For Deleuze and Guattari this denotes a way of being in 
space - a way of being, a becoming, that constructs and is constructed by 
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that space. Deleuze and GuattarL further distinguish between movement and 
speed, thus: 
Movement designates the relative character of a body 
·considered as "one," and which goes from point to 
point; speed, on the contrary, constitutes the absolute 
character of a body whose irreduci bl e parts (a t01I1s) 
occupy or fill a smooth space in the manner of a 
vortex, with the possibility of springing up at any 
point. (A Thqusand Plateaus, p. 381; Deleuze and 
Guattari's emphasis. )14 
Considering that our reading of Deleuze and Guattari's "plateaus" operates 
as a cartography, it is possible for us to articulate the various 
complicated voyages that Deleuze and Guattari make, in~ a way that does 
not thereby force them under the auspices of another mode of discourse. 16 
Their territory appears at first simple, then more complex as the various 
dimensions of its surface are·mapped, then more simple again as the various 
and particular lines of flight recede into the distance. A cartography is 
the only way in which such spaces can be charted; for a mere tracing would 
structure the plateaus in such a way as to obfuscate, or even stifle, their 
intricate interlacings. And yet a cartography, such as this, itself 
provides ample example of the ways in which the smooth is infi 1 trated by 
the striated in order to be understood. This follows the problematic 
charted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, wherein the possibility 
of the revolutionary thinker (or writer, or whatever ... ) writing, and 
therefore identifying itself as revolutionar.y, something· new, was 
discussed. At that point I concluded that the revolutionary was not a 
visionaty - able to step out of his/her linguistic, social, cultural 
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milieu, in order to observe it,-criticise it and then press forward. Now, 
we can see that the forces that strive for change - the smooth spaced Nomad 
War Machine - will always have been articulated within the State system as 
organised by the Capitalist Machine. The various ways of proceeding 
interlock. Such a discussion, however, is preemptive of this thee 
conclusion. 
Conclusion. 
What we must consider now, is the effect this examination of Deleuze and 
Guattari's smooth and striated space has in furthering my own exposition of 
a material space. To begin with, we must chart the ways in which the fruits 
- or, maybe I should say, rhizomes - of the preceding discussion, lead our 
understanding of space to be a material one. 
Kan t 's space rema1 ned 1 dea 1;· ~u bj ecti ve 1 Y \ i deal. Moreover, we have see n 
that the positing of such a space and the concomitant positing of such a 
subject, produced!.. mutually. idealist outcome. I mentioned in an earlier 
chapter that Kant nearly became a cartographer with respect to his II free 
play of the cognitive faculties/imagination"; but I was led to conclude 
that Kant blocked the lines of flight his almost-energetic system started 
to take, and reterritorialised them all under the Faculty of Reason. He 
recoded all the possible flows back onto the "body" of the Idea. 
Cartographies, and Topo-analyses, we have seen produce something else. They 
follow - not trace - the flows on the plane of conSistency, they follow the 
voyages on the various plateaus and surfaces they become attached to. They 
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follow lines of flight wherever .they are produced - and may even encourage 
them. We saw, further, thatcartography/topo-analysis had a mutually 
constructi ve relationship with the spaces over which they moved. And now, 
we have seen that the movement of Cartography is concurrent with that of 
the Nomadic Machi ne. Both are product i ve of smooth space; both smash the 
blocks installed by the Capitalist Machine's organisation of striated 
space; and both can be overrun, and put back to work, by that very Machine. 
At this point we must take heed of the warning Deleu~e and Guattari make at 
the close of the 'Smooth and Striated' II plateau" . They write: "Never 
believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us." (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p.500) [" Ne pas croire qu' un espace lisse suffi t a nous sauver." (Kille 
Plateaux, p. 625)]. The proposition that merely a move into smooth space 
will allow us to free ourselves from the organisations and oppressions of, 
otherwise, everyday existence, is far too idealistic. It makes of smooth 
space something into which we can float during an "out-of-body-experience"; 
or, it makes smooth space into merely another astral plane, spiritualising 
it, and certainly ignoring its connections with the striated. 
In order to appreciate the value of smooth space, we must not ignore these 
connections, and interflows, with striated space. Indeed, it was precisely 
these that our discussion of rhizomes showed must be charted and smoothed. 
What does have the possibility of "saving us", however, is the active 
production of smooth spaces - by whatever means. 
Nevertheless, the space of the nomad is material space par excellence. It 
is not something which exists merely to be owned, nor is it something which 
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is empty until filled with its subject. For the nomad, space is that which 
permeates its very body - it is sucked, sipped, stroked and swum through. 
In a section of the "plateau" devoted to "nomad art", Deleuze and Guattari 
explain that the nomad-line (as opposed to the "rectilinear" line) 
is abstract in an entirely different sense [than that 
of the rectilinear, negatively motivated Egyptian line 
announced by iorringerl t precisely because it has a 
multiple orientation and passes between points, 
figures, and contours: it is positively motivated by 
the smooth space it draws, not by any striation it 
might perform to ward off anxiety and subordinate the 
smooth. The abstract line is the affect of smooth 
spaces, not a feeling of anxiety that calls forth 
striation. (A Thoysand Plateays, p.497. Deleuze and 
Guattari's emphasis)16 
The line the nomads take on their voyages is the "affect" of smooth spaces; 
for the nomad, space is as material as the desert wind that drives their 
wandering, or the watering holes through which they pass. The Nomad Line 
and the Nomad do not exist in a representational relation, but as part of 
the whole Nomad Machine - which also functions (or not) according to its 
connections with other types of machine - they are cartographic. The Nomad 
Machine is the Cartographic machine, just as nomad space is smooth space. 
And if, on the one hand, these machines parta~e of the materiali ty of 
space, then, on the other, we can see that the co-ordination and striation, 
organisation and geometrisation of space, is a machinic function which 
always idealises 'space. Therefore, to believe t~at smooth space alone will 
help us, insofar as it idealises the notion of smooth space, is to perform 
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a reterri torialisation on the plateau that will thereby cause it to be 
striated. 
So far, the notion of a material space has been one thas has been mapped 
using only the most abstract outlines. We have witnessed the meanderings of 
Rhizomes, Houses, Haney, Nomads as well as Cartographies and Tapa-analyses. 
What a material space now needs, is for the present analyses to be plugged 
back into a discussion concerning contemporary forms of subject-production. 
This, then, is the project of the following chapter: 'Subjectification'. 
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CHAPTER FOUR, 
'SUBJECTIFICATION', 
Introduction. 
Not since the introductory chapter and its discussion of Kant, has the 
question of subjectivity been raised in any detail - give or take a few 
references in 'Chapter Two', What is needed now, by way of preparing for 
our cartography of Guattari's Les trais ecal~ies,l is a recapitulation of 
all the forms of subjectification so far encountered. 
Kant's position on the construction and role of the. subj ect wi thin his 
critical system has been charted throughout every turn of this thesis. The 
conclusion we have drawn, can be summarised thus: Kant's spatial subject is 
the organised, oppressed subject par excellence. The possible escape from 
such oppression, wi thin the Kantian system - that is, the ramifications 
~sthetic experience has on the body of the subject - has also been outlined 
above. Nevertheless, we would now benefit from another explanation of the 
Kantian 'escape' precisely because ~thetic experience has an important 
role in what fallows with respect to Guattari's ecologies. 
It is in Judgement that Kant provides the thread connecting all the 
.. 
Facul ties wi thin his C~i tical System. 2 In the .First Cri tique, Judgement 
describes that act which can only be based upon the unity of synthesis and 
self-consciousness; that is, judgement links the Faculties of Sensibility 
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and Understanding. In the Second Critique, Judgement - moral judgement -
descri bes that which brings the idea of a final purpose to the realm of 
knowledge, thereby ordering subjects to realise their will to existence as 
moral beings; here Judgement links the Facul ties of Reason and 
Understanding. In the Third Critique, there are two characteristics of 
Judgement: ~thetic and Teleological. ~thetic Judgement is the one we have 
encountered more often in this thesis and describes that situation in which 
the Cognitive Faculties (Sensibility and Understanding) are in free-play. 
As we have seen, ~thetic experience (of which we can make ~thetic 
judgement) is not left as a melee of intuition and concept, mixing and 
separating at will and without order, for Kant introduces the resthetic idea 
- the mirror of the First Critique's rational idea - to keep the free-play 
on a tight reign. Of this jUdgement, he writes: 
The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, 
the harmony of which contains the ground of this 
pleasure, makes the' above concept [of the purposiveness 
of naturel fi t to be the mediating link between the 
realm of the natural concept of freedom in its effects, 
while at the same time it promotes the sensibility of 
the mind to moral feeling. (Kant, Critique of 
Judgement, 'Introduction' §vi.)3 
It is thus that Kant introduces the rational within the resthetic, the moral 
in art, and simultaneously shores up the leaks his highly organised, well-
wrought subject sprung while the cognitive faculties and the imagination 
were in free-play." This rational injection is ~oosted by hi~ account of 
Teleological Judgement; he wri tes, "the judgement teleologically employed 
furnishes conditions determinate1y under which something (i.e. an organised 
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body> is to be judged according -to the idea of a purpose of nature." <c.c.r., 
'Introduction' §viii, p.31) This type of judgement, then, is purely 
reflective; and though it adds nothing to the a priori understanding of an 
object, it provides for tighter control of the subjective conditions under 
which such understanding is made. Thus, Kant links the faculties of Reason 
and Sensibility. 
That Kant provided innovative ways of investigating and understanding the 
orientations of subject-construction, has never been doubted in this 
thesis. that he provided - in the same breath - the means with which to 
retrench such a revolution according to the philosophically hackneyed 
auspices of God, Reason and Ethics, has also been emphasised. Kant's 
subject may be spaced, but like the obsessive or the addict, it can only 
thrash around in a space that has been built to constrain it. 
Bachelard' s subj ect was also spaced. But for him the construction of the 
subject in a space was momentary and singular. Furthermore, the subject's 
validation of a space constituted such a moment in its construction. 
According to Bachelard, and in contradiction to the system propounded by 
Kant, neither subject nor space provides the organisational datum according 
to which either one or the other can be measured. New spaces equal new 
subjects - and if any thread is to made to tie various space-subjects 
together, the outcome is more like a map than a string of beads. The 
Bachelardian subject is as soft and oozing as the space it moves through, 
or, which moves through it. (It was this double. movement whic·h allowed us 
to connect the space-subject production in Bachelard, wi th the cri tical 
process of Cartography. as announced by Deleuze and Guattari.) Where Kant 
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plugged leaks in his subject, Bachelard let them flow. Bachelard's subject 
did not thus become so dissipated as to have disappeared entirely - such an 
outcome would presuppose an ordered whole. No, Bachelard's subject was 
already leaky; and being so is nat necessarily a negative situation. 
Bachelard and Kant begin at the same place - in the same space, almost. 
Bath realise the importance space has in the construction of subjectivity. 
But where Kant reacted by returning to the traditional bonds of the subject 
(rationali ty, morality and religion) Bachelard pushed the boundaries of 
space and the subj ect further. It could even be said that Bachelard' s 
accomplishment was to have exacerbated the disintegration of these 
boundaries. 
Unlike the philosophers already mentioned, Deleuze and Guattari provide no 
single, uninterrupted analysis of subjectivity in itself. What makes their 
texts particularly difficult to read, is their ability to condense a 
mul tiplici ty of theses into 'a single passage. This would probably account 
for the fact that (English) commentaries on their work are thin on the 
ground. However, in his short text Les trois ecologies, Guattari does 
provide bath a relentless critique of contemporary subj ecti vi ty' and an 
elucidation of a type of cartography. 
Guattari's text discusses, the impact of world· poli tical, economic and 
social systems upon subj ects and their cultural, "existential" space (s) . 
Ecology, thus defined, is more than merely loving trees, whales, deserts or 
badgers - such that, in an attempt to rid his project of associations with 
various pressure. groups, or small bands of nature lovers, Guattari often 
" 
employs the term "ecosophy"; though ecosophy, to be more precise, describes 
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that which provides the cure, whereas ecology often is that which describes 
the symptoms. However, to overcome - or even to preempt - any niggling 
questions concerning the prioritisation or denigration of one practice aver 
another, Guattari often mixes .. the terms together (or uses 
"schizoanalysis"), so that I shall sometimes refer to Guattari's practice 
as "ecology/ecosophy". 
In general. following the turns of ecology's etymology. ecology is the 
logics of the house, the natural milieu or habitat, the logics of the types 
of space that Bachelard called "happy" and those, 'more widespread - that he 
left out and that Guattari focusses upon - which can only be called 
"agonistic". The three ecologies that fall under Guattari's gaze are social 
ecology, mental ecology and environmental ecology; three ecologies that 
will provide him with - to use a phrase that serves as a title for another 
of his essays - a plan for the planet. In order to adumbrate such a plan 
(an analysiS that will be the result of identifying the moves Guattari 
makes not only in performing a critique of subjectivity, but in elucidating 
three ecologies too) it will be necessary for me to map each section of the 
book as it arises. This will be done in two sections; the first outlining 
the themes and methodology Guattari uses in this text; and the second 
analysing, in detail, the ways in which Guattari describes the three 
ecologies. A third section will examine the themes of resthetics and 
scientifici ty, raised during this discussion of Les trois ecologles. by 
remarking upon similar themes in Guattari's CartQgTaphies 
schizoanalvtlques. 4 
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Ecologies 1. The Theory. 
The current world si tuation, Guattari explains - a si tuation that is co-
ordinated along political, economic, .informational, and social parameters -
is one in which subjectivity is so tightly organised, so rigidly bound, so 
highly pressured that it has ossified. He writes, "The relationship of 
subj ecti vi ty with its exteriori ty - social, animal, vegetable, cosmic -
finds itself compromised in a kind of general movement of implosion and 
regressi ve infantil isation. Al teri ty tends to lose all harshness." <L..e.s. 
trois ecologies, p.12)6 The space and its subject have been so finely 
ordered, so firmly pushed in on themselves in the name of i ndi vidual ism, 
that like an asthmatic in a smog filled city, the subject lives an insular, 
striated, and oppressed life. The subject has lost any sort of edge, any 
abrasive surface against which it can rub and stick to any other. The 
reason for this is the space in which it is constructed. What can ecology 
define if not a habitat in which subjects can be constructed at ease and 
without any forms of oppression - self or ather? The current concern with 
ecology must take such subjectificationary questions into consideraton. 
Adding to these considerations, Guattari writes, "The only true response to 
ecological crisis will be on a planetary scale; with the condition that it 
operates an authentic political, social and cultural revolution, and 
reorients the objectives of the production of material and immaterial 
good~." (Les trois ecologies, pp.13-14)6 For Guattari, ecological we1l-
.. 
being will come about only through wide ranging change to the global 
economic, social and political structures. If it is space in which subjects 
are constructed, and it is ecology which identifies the condition of such 
( 
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spaces, then insofar as such structures order spaces on a global scale, 
only on the same global scale will the squashed subject be ecologically 
revivified. Guattari continues, "This revolution must not be concerned with 
the relations of visible forces on the grand scale alone, but equally with 
the molecular domains of sensibility, intelligence and desire." (Les trois 
ecalazies, p.14)7 Just as Bachelard's subject eschewed a dialectical 
relationship linking itself with a space, tying its psyche to a place and, 
on the contrary, promote~ the oozing of spatial considerations within the 
make up of the imagination itself, so too does Guattari not forget the 
importance of the particular construction of a subj ect. So far then, we 
have the outlines of what will become the social and mental ecologies. The 
responses to these critiques, Guattari explains thus: 
Social ecosophy will consist of the development of 
specific practices that tend to modify or reinvent 
those ways of being at the heart of the couple, at the 
heart of the family, the urban context, work etc. 
it will, literally be a question of reconstructing the 
set of modalities of 'group-being', not only by 
'communicational' interventions, but by existential 
mutations at the heart of subjectivity. (Les trois 
ecalqgies, pp.21-22)8 
On its side, mental ecosophy will be brought about to 
reinvent the relationship of the subject to the body. 
to fantasy, to the past, and to the 'mysteries' of life 
and death. It will be brought about to look for the 
antidote.s to mass-mediatic and telematic uniform! ty, to 
the conformism of fashion, to the 'manipulation 'of 
opinion by advertising, opinion-polls, etc. (Les trais 
ecologies. pp.22-23)9 
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Environmental ecology is not such a different matter. Indeed, Guattari 
always relates such environmental considerations in existential terms. He 
wri tes, .. The long term institution of immense zones of misery, famine and 
death, seem to be an integral part of the monstrous system of 'stimulaton' 
of Integrated World Capitalism." (Les trois ecologies, p.17)lO Capitalism, 
that finely honed system we encountered above wi th respect to 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, has strictly ordered the 
movements wi thin its boundaries (boundaries which, considering the whole 
face of the globe is so structured, can be said to be non-existent), has 
produced the areas of famine, drought, deforestation and displacement, all 
in response to increased reterri torialisation in terms of the flows of 
capi tal. Such deterri torialisations are not, however, restricted to the 
third world - one only has to witness the growth in· inner city poverty, 
homelessness and unemployment within the developed, industrial countries to 
notice this. 
We can see, then, that the three ecologies operate in many directions at 
once: inside and outside, social and political, cultural and environmental. 
Yet in all cases, subjectivity and space constitute the thrust, the themes 
and the aims of the discourse. 
introductory section by stating 
In fact, Guattari ends his explanatory, 
that the essay as a whole will study "a 
Ii t t Ie close r , the implications of such an ecosophic perspective on the 
conception of subjectivity." (Les trois ecalagies, p.23)11 
Having now glanced at Guattari's outline of his project in Les trois 
ecalagies, we are able to make a few observations upon it before we follow 
( 
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him into making a finer account. Guattari takes for granted the intimate 
relationship between space and subjectivity - a relationship I have sought 
to explain throughout this thesis - and makes it the starting point for his 
essay. Given such an intimacy, there is no wonder that an ecology must 
always have a mental, or psychological, vector; moreover, there is" even 
less wonder that an ecology will be socially oriented. (Indeed, these 
statements could be made in reverse order: given such intimacy, there is no 
wonder that any account of the pychological make up of any subject will be 
an ecology, and so on.) An ecology - and an ecosophy - becomes a critical 
project which splits the seams of one's ordinary understanding of the term, 
'ecology'. Furthermore, I think it is apparent that ecology and ecosophy 
will become critically indistinguishable from cartography, if not 
explicitly in Guattari' s text, then certainly in this one; the relation 
between these terms will become apparent as they are more thoroughly 
examined. 
Guattari begins his text proper (it is here that the translation provided 
in New Fqr"mat1qns12 begins) by stating that the subject is not as 
straightforward as Descartes thought it was. That is, Descartes was wrong 
to equate being with thinking, for such an account situates the subject 
firmly in its place as an individual, thinking thing. "We should perhaps 
not speak of subjects," Guattari explains, "but" rather of components of 
subjectification, each of which works more or less on its own account." 
('The Three Ecologies' p.131; my emphases.)13 Thfs would lead to an untying 
of the common sense link between subjectivity and an individual - a link 
that is emphasise4 in Descartes' account - and allow for the performance of 
an ecoiogy of the two; Guattari writes, 
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The individual would appear in his/her actual position. 
as a 'terminal' for processes involving human groups, 
socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines: a 
terminal through which. of course, not all the vectors 
of subjectification necessarily pass. Interiority would 
appear as a quality produced at the meeting-point of 
multiple components which are relatively mutually 
autonomous - in certain cases. openly discordant. ('The 
Three Ecologies' p.131; my emphasis) 14 
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The term subjectivity will announce that which contains a multitude of 
possi bili ties as to its formation and construction. It will be like a 
Hydra. arms flailing, at the end of which are plugs which can be hooked up 
to any kind of social, cultural or communal formation. In the end it will 
become impossible to identify a terminating point (the body of the Hydra) 
to these constructs; or, rather. if such an identification is made. it will 
be impossible to contain it within that simple space. for such a point will 
be merely another form of coupling the assemblage. Where subjectivi ty is 
concerned, a cartography or ecology will be that which charts these various 
vectors - and chart them free from the need for the result to be subsumed 
under a prevailing scientistic paradigm. 16 
The dominant scientific stricture within which subjectivity has been 
discussed throughout this century, Guattari argues, is Freudianism. Such a 
structure is not to be transcended, or superseded, however, but like the 
root-structure of arborealism it can be re-oriented and re-articulated. The 
natural breakage points of psychoanalysis (points which have arisen, often, 
in an .~ttempt to prove its foundation as a scientific practice), the places 
! 
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in which it is revved-up so that its motor gives aut, these are the paints 
at which the lines of flight· of the three ecologies will erupt. The 
cuI ti vation and maintenance of an archaic dogmatism ("like an ornamental 
garden") is nat the project that Les trois ecologies wishes to follow -
whether the archaism is philosophical, psychoanalytical or poli tical.· For 
Guattari any re-orientation of psychoanalysis (we could add, philosophy 
etc.) will be rhizomatic. 
Thus the necessary precondition for any regeneration of 
analysis - through schizoanalysis, for example - is to 
acknowledge the general principle that bath individual 
and collective subjective assemblages have the 
potential to develop and proliferate far beyond their 
ordinary state of eqUilibrium. By their very essence, 
analytical cartographies reach far beyond the 
existential territories to which they are. aSSigned. 
Like artists and writers, the cartographers of 
subjectivity should seek, then, with each concrete 
performance, to develop and innovate, to create new 
perspectives, without prior recourse to assured 
theoretical foundations or the authority of a group, 
school, conservatory or academy .... Work in progress! 
An end to psychoanalytical, behaviourist, or systemist 
catechisms! ('The Three Ecologies' p. 133)'6 
The three ecologies will proceed, as Guattari says a cartography of 
subjectivity should, steamed up on their own fuel, navigating according to 
their own - ever changing - paradigms, passing through paints which they 
feel are necessary at anyone time. In the face of all the i.nformational, 
computerate and syntactic revolutions, and in spite of the 
reterritorialisations demanded by various conceptual schemes 
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(psychoanalysis, etc.) but according to their deterritorialisations, this 
is the direction in which Guattari's three ecologies will go. 
Guattari sets out the area for his three ecologies as follows: 
If today, human relationships with the socius, the 
psyche, and 'nature' are increasingly deteriorating, 
then this is attributable not only to objective damage 
and pollution but to the ignorance and fatalistic 
passi vi ty wi th which those issues are confronted by 
individuals and responsible authorities. ('The Three 
Ecologies' p.134)17 
Furthermore, 
It is quite wrong to regard action on the psyche, the 
socius, and the environment as seprrate. Indeed, if we 
continue - as the media would have us do - to refuse 
squarely to confront the simul taneous degradation of 
these three areas, we will in effect be acquiescing in 
a general infantilisation of opinion, a destruction and 
neutralisation of democracy.... we need to apprehend 
the world through the interchangeable lenses of the 
three ecologies. ('The Three Ecologies' p.134)19 
These, then, are the parameters of Guattari's project. He proposes a 
reorientation of the fields according to which contemporary ecological 
deterioration has occurred; insofar as these (three) ecologies are 
interwoven, no action taken in the name of anyone of them alone will be 
effective. The replanting of a tree in a rainforest will not remove the 
machinery which caused the deforestation in the first place. The 
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apprehension of contemporary problems with respect to the three ecologies, 
and the subsequent changes made according to such analyses, will therefore 
have multi-oriented repercussions. For example: 
If we are to reorient the sciences and technology 
toward more human goals, we clearly need collective 
management and control not blind reliance on 
technocrats in the state apparatuses, in the hope that 
they will control developments and minimise risks in 
fields largely dominated by the pursuit of profit. 
('The Three Ecologies' p.134)19 
A re-ordering of the fields according to which subjectivities are 
constructed, needs to be undertaken not only on a worldwide scale, but' by 
those very groups whose subjectivities are at stake. An ecology's outcomes 
may be multi-oriented, but they are ones which will always involve -
somewhere along the line - intervention upon vectors of subjectification. 
It should be emphasised that scientific discourses are not essentially 
delimi ting (the points at which such things were touched upon in our 
discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's smooth and striated spaces, shows as 
much), they merely need their arboreal structures smoothing out. The result 
of this type of rhizomatisation will also lead to a redirecting of such 
discourses to more human goals. Furthermore, the.doing of Ecology/Ecosophy 
in Guattari's terms will break through the impasses currently 
exp~rienced by another form of scientific discourse. Guattari laments: 
There was a time when international solidarity was a 
major concern of trade unions and left parties. today 
it is the sole province of humanitarian associations. 
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Marx's wri tings remain of enormous value; but Marxist 
discourse has gone into qualitative decline. We 
live in a time when it is not only animal species that 
are disappearing; so too are the words, 
and gestures of human" solidarity. 
Ecologies' p.135)20 
expressions, 
(' The Three 
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We can begin to see the terri tory over which Guattari's text will move. 
Like the machine that generates smooth space, Guattari's Les trois 
BcolDS'ies skims many surfaces and outlines many vectors - thus orienting 
its own movement. The political and social concerns announced early on in 
the text have been bent to accomodate other, more personal, cuI tural and 
environmental concerns. Or, maybe it would be more accurate to say that, 
the political and social themes have had the personal, cultural and 
environmental within them highlighted. Whichever way we articulate it, we 
can see the network of areas with which Guattari is dealing. An ecology -
that critique which necessarily links the subjective with space - of 
contemporary existence, provides the critical motor for an examination not 
only of human situations but of the established methods of describing them 
too. For Guattari, once the Ecological/Ecosophical motor has been.started, 
there' will not be a single established, or traditional, mode of pra'viding 
contemporary critique that will escape its path. 
Guattari's next move is to describe the motor which drives his ecological 
practice; that is, to elucidate the logic according to which eco-logy 
works. The three ,. ecologies, he explains, "happen to be implied under a 
different lDgic than that which simul taneously governs ordinary 
communication between speakers and listeners, the intelligibility of 
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discursive sets and the interlocking of fields of signification." (~ 
trois ecolqgies, p.36; Guattari's emphasis; my trans1ation)21 Their logic 
is 
a logic of intensi ties, the logic of self-referential 
existential assemblages, engaging non-reversible 
duration; it is the logic, not of the tota1ised bodies 
of human subjects, but of part-obj ects in the 
psychoanalytical sense.... Whilst the logic of 
discursive sets seeks to delimit its objects, the logic 
of intensities - or eco-10gic - concerns itself solely 
with the movement and intensity of evo1utive processes. 
('The Three Ecologies' p.136)22 
This logic we have already seen at work with respect to rhizomes and lines 
of flight (in our discussion of Cartography) and to the movement of nomads 
(in our discussion of smooth and striated space). It is a logic that breaks 
subjectivity out of the systems and structures which order and organise it, 
and sets it to proliferate in many different directions. Directions which 
announce themselves at every turn of the Cartographic/Ecologic/Ecosophic 
process; directions which, like rhizomes and lines of flight, draw 
subjectivities outside of any unifying totality and with multiplicities and 
singularities. "Ecological praxes might, in this light, be defined as a 
search to identify in each partial locus of experience the potential 
vectors of subjectification and singu1arisation." (' The Three Ecologies' 
p.136)23 Such cartographies have an intimate relationship wi th the flows 
that deterritorialise, so that they begin at those points where, so-called, 
.norma1 processes of signification and subjectification break down (hence, 
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Deleuze and Guattari' s interest· in schizophrenia): "At the heart of all 
ecological praxes is an a-signifying rupture, in a context in which the 
catalyses of existential change are present, but lack expressive support 
from the enunciative assemblage which frames them." (' The Three Ecologies' 
p.136)2~ What could be a more precise explanation of deterritorialisation? 
Guattari explains this in more traditional psychoanalytic terms. Left to 
themselves, these processes towards aSignification/asubjectification, these 
processes which thrust subjects outside all normal structures of meaning 
and expression (structures which, ironically, have produced them), lead 
only to guilt, anxiety, neuroses etc. When cartographised, or 
schizoanalysed, or outlined ecologically/ecosophically, these processes can 
create new existential assemblages. Thus, again, we have a further 
articulation of the rhizomatic movement, or of the movement towards 
deterritorialisation. 
(Interestingly, given our earlier examination of Bachelard's concerns and 
our more recent revival of the ~thetic question, Guattari goes on to cite 
the "poetic text" as an example of a "catalytic segment" of these 
ecological processes/cartographies. However, our discussion of the 
relevance of ~thetics in Guattari's texts will come later.) 
Eco-Iogic pervades every existential territory imaginable; it can burgeon 
in every moment of subjectivity and in every, singular, vector of 
subjectification. Guattari continues the discussion thus: 
It is of course true that existential cartographies 
which assume certain existential ising ruptures of 
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meaning have always sought refuge in art and religion. 
But the subj ecti ve void produced today by the 
accelerating production of material and immaterial 
goods is both unprecedentedly absurd and increasingly 
irremediable; it threatens both indi vidual and group 
existential 
p.137)25 
territories. (' The Three Ecologies' 
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For example, the Death of the subject - in all possible ways - has produced 
this existentialisng rupture. The corresponding rise, and global 
entrenchment, of Capitalism has also produced this rupture. Yet the 
response of such capitalist formations has been to reterri torialise the 
ruptured flows back onto the hierarchical structures already in place. In 
so doing, the aged systems of organisation· only recreate (the condi tions 
for) dead subjects: "This resurgence of what might be called subjective 
conservatism is not simply attri butable to an intensification of social 
repression; it is connected, too, with a kind of existential rigidification 
of actors in the domain of the· social." (' The Three Ecologies' p.137)26 
Given this state of affairs, and given Guattari's earlier stated position 
with regard to intellectual archaisms (i.e. that they should be used and 
re-oriented, rather than merely followed), it is no wonder that he should 
encourage us to refer to the ways that early forms of capitalism worked, in 
order to better understand the present capitalist constructions. Unlike the 
Postmodern, post-Marxists, Guattari does not dismiss the importance to a 
contemporary analysis, of the relation between contemporary capitalism and 
capi talism at its birth (hence his insistence that the works of Marx are 
still of importance). He explains, 
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In a situation in which post-industrial capi talism -
which I myself prefer to call integrated world 
capitalism (IWC) - is tending to increasingly move its 
centres of power away from the production of goods and 
services, and towards structures of product i on . of 
signs, of syntax, and - by exercising control over the 
media. advertising. opinion-polls etc. of 
subjectivity, we would do well to examine the modes of 
operation of earlier forms of capitalism, since they 
show the same tendency towards the accumulation of 
subjective power, both at the level of the capitalist 
elites, and in the ranks of the proletariat. ('The 
Three Ecologies' p.137; Guattari's emphasis.)27 
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Guattari goes further to say that the ecological praxes he will outline, 
will also redefine the modes of production of subjectivity in renegotiating 
the link between capital and human acti vi ty: "Social ecology should never 
lose sight of the fact that capital ist power has become de-local ised, 
deterri torialised. both in 'extension - by extending its grasp over the 
whole social, economic and cultural life of the planet - and in 'intension' 
- by infiltrating the most unconscious levels of subjectivity." ('The Three 
Ecologies' p.138)29 Social ecology, then, should never forget that' it must 
operate hand in hand with a mental ecology. So in striving towards its aims 
(outlined by Guattari thus: "The hope "for the future is that the 
development of these three types of ecological' praxis ... will lead to a 
redefinition and refocussing of the goals of emancipatory struggles." ('The 
Three Ecologies' p.138]29) Ecology/Ecosophy should not merely set itself in 
opposi tion to the structures promoted by capi talism, but it should attack 
the subjective formations engendered through 1. W. C., by redefining all 
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forms of subjectificatory relation: conj ugal, ethical, 
individual, creative, etc. 
Capitalistic subjectivity, .. no matter in what dimension 
or by what means it is engendered, is manufactured to 
protect existence against any event intrusive enough to 
disturb and disrupt opinion. Singularity is either 
evaded, or entrapped within specialist apparatuses and 
frames of reference. The goal of capitalism is to 
manage the worlds of childhood, love and art: to 
control the last vestige of anxiety, madness, pain and 
death, or the sense of being lost in the cosmos. From 
the most personal - one might also say infra-personal -
existential data, integrated world capitalism forms 
massi ve subj ect i ve aggregates, which it hooks up to 
notions of race, nation, profession, sporting 
competition, dominating virility, mass media stardom. 
Capitalism seeks to gain power by controlling and 
neutralising the maximum possi ble number of 
subjectivity's existential refrains; capitalist 
subjectivity is intoxicated with and an~sthetised by a 
collective sense of pseudo-eterni ty. (' The Three 
Ecologies' pp.138-139)30 
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familial, 
However much any capitalistic movements may be seen to operate according to 
modes of deterritorialisation, such modes are always reactive in purpose, 
they always access a drive towards reterri torialisation, which is thus 
folded back within the original structure. The edges of capitalism - the 
worlds of art, madness etc - therefore contain vectors which point away 
.. 
form the capi talist structure (in which they are born) and· those which 
point back within it. Where capitalism creates subjects, its subjects, 
Guattari proposes that Ecology/Ecosophy activates singularities. 
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'Singularity' is an important term for Guattari; but should not be confused 
with 'individual'. If we remember the earlier passage from the opening to 
Guattari's text, we were presented with the subject being exploded into an 
assemblage having a myriad number of access/connection points, all 
described as vectors of subjectification. A singularity can be any ane of 
an accumulation of various vectors, with the built in possibility of its 
being able to change, to access other assemblages. So singulari ty and 
mul tiplici ty (as encountered elsewhere in this thesis) are conceptually 
linked. Guattari, then, does not advocate the subsumption of a multiplicity 
of singularities under the auspices of a unified banner; he does not 
advocate the homogeneity of all struggles. But rather their heterogeneity -
each process urging its own becoming in a struggle that does not have to 
conform to the paradigms of any other. "Our objective should be to nurture 
indi vidual cultures, while at the same time inventing new contracts of 
citizenship: to create an order of the state in which singularity, 
exceptions, and rarity coexist under the least oppressive possible 
condi tions." (' The Three Ecologies' p.139)31 Contrary to the dominant 
ideology of political/social struggle - which calls for a dialectical 
synthesis of opposites - Ecology/Ecosophy will call for the affirmation of 
a multiplicity of singular struggles while at the same time elucidating the 
widest possible space of/for struggle. (Guattari concurs, however, that 
there will occassionally be the need for particular strands to come 
together, to "set common objectives and act 'like little soldiers' - " 
[ 'The Three Ecologies' p.139] [se fixer des objectifs COIIl111uns et a se 
comporter (( comme des petits soldats » - (Les trois ecoiQgies, p.47)] 
Nevertheless, there will always come a time when such conglomerates will be 
broken by acts of re-singularisation.) 
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What we have been shown, so far. in this text, is: the relationship between 
space, subjectification and dominant political, social, cultural and 
economic constructs; the ways in which such constructs can be cri ticised; 
the ways the three ecologies - proposed by Guattari - relate to each other 
and to the themes in question; and the hopes Guattari has for· such 
analyses. Before I follow Guattari into making a detailed account of the 
three ecologies themselves, I will quote a passage summing up the nature of 
his project: 
The principle common to the three ecologies is 
therefore the following: each of the existential 
territories with which they confront us is not in and 
of itself [en s01l, closed in on itself, but as a 
precarious, finite, finitised entity for itself [pour 
s01l; it is singular and singularised; it may bifurcate 
into stratified and death-laden reiterations; or it may 
open, as process, into praxes that enable it to be 
rendered 'inhabitable' by human projects. ('The Three 
Ecologies' p.140)32 
Ecologies 2. The Detail. 
Guattari begins his detailed description of the ecologies under 
examination, by outlining Mental Ecology. He writes, "Specific to mental 
ecology is the principle that its approach to existential territories 
derives from a pre-objectal and pre-personal logic: a logic evocative of 
what Freud described as a 'primary process'." ('The Three Ecologies' 
. . 
pp.140-141)33 This is logic which imbues all objects in the territory with 
equal emotional vigour, a logic which cannot be compressed into a single, 
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indi vidual subj ect. As already stated, a cartographic desription of any 
mental/psychic event accentuates a framework that singularly articulates 
that event. There is no all encompassing story, no overriding interpretive 
sytem in mental ecology/cartography, that homogenises such events into a 
single subject (unlik~ that told in Kant's Critical System). An indivi~ual 
- and collections of individuals - must therefore be read as a particular 
aggregate of heterogeneous flows; not as the original spring of the 
production of such flows. "Xental ecology has the capacity to emerge at any 
given moment, beyond the boundaries of fully formed ensembles or within the 
bounds of individual or collective order. II ('The Three Ecologies' p.141)34 
Emphasis is laid, by Guattari, on ecology's respect of singularities -
unlike other disciplines, ecology does not subsume particularities under a 
unified mode of discourse. All existing brands of psychoanalysis, Guattari 
argues, involve the understanding of (psychic/mental) fragments in terms of 
a possible, unified whole. They certainly do not allow expression of the 
creative potential of such fragments. 
In a section not included in the New Formations translation of Les trois 
BcolQKies, Guattari explains that his proposed mental ecological praxis 
grafts new ways of proceeding within the terms laid down by psychoanalysis. 
It is not so much a question of taking account of this ecological practice 
in terms of scientific verifiability, but rather, "according to their 
resthetico-existential efficiency." [" en fonction de leur efflcace 
esthetico-exlstentlelle."] (Les trois ecologies, p.53) Furthermore, "The 
crucial obj ecti ve is the seizure of the points of asignifying 
rupture ... from which a certain number of semiotic chains put themselves to 
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work in the service of an effect of existential auto-reference." (Les trois 
ecolqgies, p.53)3S It is thanks to such breaking-points in chains of 
meaning <verbal, cultural, moral or political) that traditional 
psychoanalysis has been able to recognise symptoms of psychic illness, and 
in which Freudians have detected - along with objects like freces, sexual 
organs, the mother's breast - generators of "dissident" subjectivities. 
Guattari explains: 
But these objects generators of 'dissident' 
subjectivity - are conceived by them [Freudians] as 
remaining essentially adjacent to instinctual pulsions 
and a corporealised imaginary. Other institutional, 
architectural, economic and cosmic objects, equally 
support, by right, such a function of existential 
production. (Les trois ecolqgies, pp.53-54)36 
What Guattari regards as essential to his analytical logic/praxis is the 
importance placed on that ·which any representative, semiotic system of 
meaning-production finds it impossible to constrain. The most creative 
aspect of subject-production (or rather, the production of vectors of 
subjectification) is this excess, this break-dawn. Moreover, as· Guattari 
states in the passage quoted immediately above, the productive objects of 
such subjectivi ties are not solely the ones that psychoanalysis 
traditionally identifies. Existential production·operates on many levels -
only some of which are explored via traditional analytic methods. What 
Guattari endeavours to show throughout this se·ction, is that a mental-
ecological praxis maps terri tor1es of subject-production normally either 
left unknown or br,acketed as deviant by other practices. 
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A mental ecology raises many questions specially when conducted 
rhizomatically with respect to traditional psychoanalysis - and the answers 
it offers all move in the direction of singular creativity, rather than in 
that of stifling, moralistic superciliousness. An ecosophy accesses many 
territories for possible existential validation, rather than forcing 
subjects into easily manageable modes of existence. Given this, we should 
not forget that ecology/ecosophy is nat a universal panacea which 
automatically guarantees the destruction of the structures and institutions 
instantiated by I.W.C. - particularly when we remember the entreaty, at the 
end of Plateau 14 of MJlle Plateaux, that smooth space alone will not save 
tis .... "But it does seem to me," Guattari writes, "that a generalisation of 
the experiences of institutional analysis (in the hospital, the school, the 
urban environment ... ) could profoundly shift the terms of the problem of 
mental ecology." ('The Three Ecologies' p.142)37 
The terri tory under. examination now shifts slightly to introduce areas 
normally under the jurisdiction of, 'the social'. For Guattari the relation 
between society at large and the society of the mad is one that interacts 
on many levels. To an extent, and it seems rather tri te to state it, 
madness is a socially defined label that in turn names that society which 
uses it; moreover, the movement of flows on the surface of 1. W. C., are 
themselves productive of neuroses, anxieties etc., as described in the 
preceding chapter. Therefore, in providing an ecological cri tique of the 
realm of the mental - particularly those areas in which the 'normal' breaks 
down into the 'abnormal' - its paradigms of operation will continually be 
shifting into that of the social. Guattari continues, thus: 
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A fundamental reconstruction of social mechanisms is 
necessary if we are to confront the ravages produced by 
integrated world capi talism - a reconstruction which 
cannot be achieved by top-down reforms, laws, decrees 
or bureaucratic programmes. What it requires is the 
promotion of innovative practices; the proliferation of 
alternative experiments which both respect singularity. 
and work permanently at the production of a 
subjectivity that is simultaneously autonomous, yet 
articulates itself in relation to the rest of society. 
{'The Three Ecologies' p.142)38 
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Mental ecology is an important part of this process, insofar as it has an 
intensive relation with general drives towards singularity. Guattari next 
gives an account of social ecology. He writes, "The principle particular to 
social ecology is that of affective and pragmatic cathexis of human groups 
of various sizes. The 'group Eros' presents itself, not as an abstract 
quantity, but as a qualititively specific reorganisation of primary 
subjectivity as constituted in the order of mental ecology." {'The Three 
Ecologies' p.143)39 So the more simple subjective construction pointed to 
by mental ecology becomes complicated in terms of social ecology. In the 
closing stages of the description of mental ecology, it was mentioned that 
the social had an important role in the construction of vectors of 
subjectivity analysed by/in mental ecology; we will now see that this role 
takes shape as a remodelling of those vectors. 
Guattari explains that there are two types of social organisation of 
subjectivity: 
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1. the "personological triangulation in the I-YOU-HE, Father-Mother-Child 
mode"; 
2. the "consti tution in the forms of subject-groups open to the broader 
spectrum of the socius and the cosmos." (' The Three Ecologies' p.143. 
Guattari's emphasis; translation modified)40 
The former followed the tracks of the familiar, traditional psychoanalytic 
description of subjective formation - identifications and imitations. In 
the latter: 
identificatory systems are replaced by features of 
diagrammatic efficiency. In part at least, these allow 
the subject to escape semiologies of iconic modelling, 
and to engage instead with processual semiologies 
(which I will refrain from terming symbolic for fear of 
falling back into the bad old ways of structuralism). 
('The Three Ecologies' p.143)41 
The processes of subjective- formation are distinguished from each other, 
Guattari says, by their degrees of deterritorialisation. by their 
capacities to transcend their recognised subjective limits and follow their 
own lines of flight. Both of these types of the social organisation of 
subjectivity are at work in capitalist social formations. 
At a time when the technological advances made with respect to trans-global 
communication, the media - Guattari recognises - becomes a potent tool in 
the-constitution and construction of subjectivity. And insofar as the world 
is organised in capi talist terms, the connections between media and the 
contemporary construction of subj ecti vi ty can only follow the capi talist 
model. Both the forms of subject-production outlined above can be seen to 
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fit into this, more media biased, analysis. The techno-scientific advances 
made in the production/s of the media, constitute the deterritorialisations 
such practices effect within the capitalist system. Either greater or 
lesser deterri torialisation, and we ··have exhi bi ted the corresponding line 
of flight operated by the vectors of subjectification. But because we are 
working within the paradigms of integrated world capitalism, such 
deterritorialisations will be folded back within either the familial system 
of mimetic subject-production, or the group system of processual subject-
production. This type of reterritorialisation highlights the media's links 
wi th capitalism (a formation which has already been seen to exhi bi t the 
Deterritorialisation ~ Reterritorialisation movement, par excellence). 
(By way of emphasising this point, Guattari cites the relationship Third 
World contries have with 'post-industrial' technologies. Third World 
countries graft highly advanced, technological, ' post-industrial' systems 
on their "mediesval" subjectivities, which serves to contemporarise ancient 
ways of repression and reaction. All forces of deterritorialisation involve 
the risk of becoming reactive and reterri torialising: "we should remember 
that the fascism of the ayatollahs was introduced only on the back of a 
profoundly popular revolution in Iran." (' The Three Ecologies' p.145)42 
What should also be remembered, is that it is precisely this relation 
between advanced technology and ancient forms of subjective assemblage that 
Guattari is intent upon identifying in the whole world capitalist system. 
Capitalism reterritorialises on these "mediesval" subjectivit1es as a rule; 
the Thi~ World could, therefore, be seen as a microcosm of, the World in 
Full under Capitalism.) 
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Social and mental ecologies are subj ect to the same risk. "Spontaneous 
social ecology works towards the constitution of existential terri tories 
which substitute themselves. so far as they can. for the old reI igious 
zoning of the socius." (' The Three Ecologies' p. 145) ~3 Once. the subj ect 
announced the upsurge of an energy known. to the religious, as the soul, or 
to the capitalist as the individual; now this subject is distorted by the 
processes of social and mental ecology and set free of this zoning to ooze 
into its own space. But Ecologists and Cartographers must be careful that 
this praxis does not redraw the same old boundaries: "Clearly, then, social 
ecology must be opened up to the politically coherent collective praxes; if 
it is not. it will in the end always be dominated by reactionary 
nationalism. the oppression of women, children and minorities, and those 
hostile to innovation." (' The Three Ecologies' p.145; translation 
modified. )44 However strong the Capitalist deterritorialised flows are, 
their dri ves towards reterri torialisation are equally strong. The dead 
subject is a safe subject; the obsessional neurotic takes pains to validate 
its space by cleaning it. washing it with the detritus of its own neuroses, 
marking its terri tory with the musk of the repetition of the primary 
conditions of its illness. This space is hard to give up. This space is 
easier to defend against intrusions bent upon breaking up the ritualised 
moves that pass for existence. 
However, wherever deterri torialisation once was, there will always be a 
rhizome ready to ooze. Guattari is not an advocate of Fatalism - especially 
media fatalism: 
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Any social ecological programme will have to aim 
therefore to shift capitalist societies out of the era 
of mass media and into a post-media age in which the 
media will be reappropriated by a multitude of subject-
groups. This vision of a mass media culture redirected 
towards the goal of resingularisation may well seem far 
beyond our scope today; yet we should recognise that 
the current situation of maximal media-induced 
alienation is in no sense an intrinsic necessity. ('The 
Three Ecologies' p.144)45 
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However it is stated, ecology sets out to perform a critique of space; and 
if this space is one in whose construction the media has an important role, 
then this role can be overrun by the vectors produced by this critique. 
Deterri torialisation can be enhanced in the media ,as much as it can be 
enhanced anywhere. 
Guattari continues his discussion of social ecology by stating that it does 
not prioritise anyone system of values over any other, it does not 
champion a single cause under which all others have to be subsumed. Those 
modes of social, territorial struggle/praxis whereby a multipl~city of 
causes are subordinated to A Single Cause, are particularly rife within the 
capitalist mode of social organisation. He writes: 
We live now under a capitalist system of valorisation, 
in which value is based upon a general eqUivalent. What 
makes that system reprehensible is its crushing of all 
other modes of valorisation, which find themselves 
alienated from capitalist hegemony. That hegemony, 
however, can be challenged, or at least made to 
incorporate other methods of valorisation based on 
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existential productions, and determined neither in 
terms of abstract labour time, nor of expected 
capitalist profit. ('The Three Ecologies' p.146)·6 
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Guattari is constantly emphasising the multiplicitous nature of the praxis 
he is instantiating, free of universalisation and generalisation, free of 
subordination and subsumption under a unified doctrine. The analyses he 
, 
provides/ini tiates coverj a wide area of study and includet many ways of 
proceding; but this area and these procedures are never forced into a 
single analytic programme. Guattari's Ecology/Ecosophy, schizoanalysis, or 
even, Cartography merely describes that process of plugging-into a variety 
of territories. The capitalist system does not proceed in this way, as the 
quotation above shows. It forces flows to co-operate, rather than allow 
them to proliferate. Guattari's social and mental ecologies, are praxes 
which seek to engender heterogeneous modes of valorisation, based - as he 
explains - on "existential productions"; productions which necessarily 
involve the inter-relationship/inter-reliance of space and subjectivity. If 
we can, carefully, cartographise (provide mental and social 
ecologies/ecosophies) the shifting planes of subjectification, or the 
heterogeneous vectors productive of subjectivities, then those principles 
according to which such praxes would have proceeded will also have produced 
the deterritorialisation of capitalist modes of (subject) production. That 
is, this deterritorialisation will be performed without the 
reterri torialisation that capitalism requires. Insofar as a social/mental 
ecology accesses ,a mul tiplici ty of modes of valorisation, insofar as a 
cartography of subjectificat10n frees the subjective space from all 
const~aints, then the redirecting of the forces productive of 
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subjectivities will be an undoing of the bonds of capitalism. How, then, 
does this relate to the environment? 
The principle according to which environmental ecology wi~l operate is, 
that everything is possible, either the "worst catastrophes or developments 
in smoothness." (' The Three Ecologies' p.146) ["les pires catastrophes 
C01I1!Iles les evolutions en souplesse." (Les trois ecologies, p. 68)] In the 
same way that we saw during the description of the preceding ecologies. 
environmental ecology cannot be viewed in isolation. The problems of 
deforestaion, or of the imminent extinction of animal species. are to be 
solved not an a single issue basis. This would appear. at first glance. to 
contradict the earlier assertion of the singularity and mul tiplici ty of 
issues. incapable of being brought under a single. authoritarian discourse. 
This. however. is not the case. It is one thing to subsume movements under 
a whale in an attempt at unification; another to recognise the inter-
relation of issues/symptoms~ Social, mental and environmental ecologies all 
operate according to the same. eco-. logic; they are all instances of a 
particular assemblage of an' analytiC machine called, 'ecology'. That they 
can be discussed separately does not detract from their inter-rela~ion; nor 
should their singularities preclude us from interweaving their continuation 
and resolution. Guattari explains: 
Increasingly in future. the maintenance of natural 
equilibria will be dependent upon human intervention; 
the time will come. for example, when massive 
programmes will have to be set in train to regulate' the 
relationship between oxygen. ozone, and carbon dioxide 
in the earth's atmosphere. In this perspective, 
environmental ecology could equally well be renamed 
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'machinic ecology, ,- since both cosmic and human 
practice are nothing if not machinic.... (' The Three 
Ecologies' p.146)47 
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The subj ecti ve assemblage we saw constructed in the opening pages of ~ 
trois ecOl~ies, we can now see being plugged in to an eco-system of cosmic 
proportions. The vectors of subjectivity now have a component directed by 
the atmosphere of the planet. Any equation of subject with individual, 
appears increasingly arbitrary and forced. Environmental ecology, 
understood even in the most everyday sense, has become a practice that it 
is impossible to separate from the other two ecologies. 
In the concluding pages of the text (not included in the New Formations 
translation) Guattari brings together all the themes so far analysed, He 
writes, 
An ecosophy of the new type - at once practical and 
speculative, ethico-poli tical and /ESthetic - must, it 
seems to me, replace ancient forms of religious, 
political and associative engagement ... , It will be 
neither a discipline of withdrawal into interiority, 
nor a simple renovation of ancient forms of 
'militancy', Rather, it will be a question of a multi-
faceted movement deploying proceedings and mechanisJIlS 
simultaneously analytic and productive of subjectivity. 
(Les trois Bcolqgies, p.70; myemphasis.)4S 
What could provide a better answer to our probl.ems concerniD:g the possible 
contradiction between keeping a discourse/struggle singular, and 
recognising its inter-relatedness with respect to other 
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discourses/struggles? Guattari' s ecosophy will proceed along many fronts. 
covering many territories. It will not produce mind-numbing conformism, nor 
stifling uniformity. The mul tiplici tous struggles and cri tiques it 
accesses. will produce singular -- though connectable programmes of 
change. To approach environmental ecology. for example, without recognising 
its relation with other issues, is as blinkered as subsuming political, 
cultural and social issues under a single banner. Such philosophical/ 
poli tical praxes as the ones proposed by Guattari throughout this text, 
have the necessary conclusion of promoting a change in those paradigms that 
organise our notions of subjectivity: individual as well as collective; 
machinic as well as organic. scientific and resthetic; etc. In all cases 
ecological/ecosphical praxes disturb the comfortable articulative 
structures of traditional subject-construction; and in all cases it is done 
- as the name suggests - in space. Yet it seems somewhat hypocritical to 
identify only one ramification of such ecological/ecosophical praxes (viz. 
subjectification), when. throughout, we have been stressing the importance 
of the interdisciplinary effect of these praxes. Indeed, Guattari explains. 
the three ecologies must be conceived, simultaneously, 
as being a matter for a common ethico-~thetic 
discipline. and as distinct from the point of view of 
the practices which characterise them. Their registers 
come under what I have called a heterogenesis, that is. 
a continual process of re-singularisation. (Les trois 
ecolqgies, p72; Guattari's emphasis)49 
Though the link between all discourses announced by these e.cologies is a 
necessary one. and all such discourses have equal validity, my purpose in 
analysing this text has been to provide a cartography of modes of 
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subjectification. The three ecologies construct a multiplicity of singular 
vectors of subjectification, inclusive of solidarity and difference. 
Probably the most striking part of the three ecologies' praxes, is the 
insistence upon the formation of "creative" subjectivi ties, that is, what 
Guattari terms his ~~thetic edge (to which I will return below). The spaces 
mapped by Guattari provide the means by/through which singular 
subjectivities can forge their own stories. It is in this vein that 
Guattari concludes this text: 
The recovery of a degree of creative autonomy in a 
particular domain calls for other recoveries in other 
domains. Thus there is forged, step by step, the whole 
catalysiS of a renewal of the confi~Jhce of humanity in 
itself - sometimes from the smallest means. However 
little it may have been achieved, this essay hopes to 
arrest dullness and pervading passivity. (Les trois 
ecolagies, pp.72-73)SO 
If the main thrust of the three ecologies has been to provide a cartography 
of subjectification, then in so doing, we will have redefined the 
linguistic paths according to which the discourse of human solidarity can 
be reawakened; we will have reoriented the reliance such vectors of 
subjectification have on the environment. What I would like to do now is, 
wi th the aid of another of Guattari I s texts, re-examine the notions of 
~sthetics and scientificity announced in Les trais eca1agies in their 
relation to the analysis of mental ecology. 
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Ecologies 3. The Postscript. 
There is a section in another of Guattari's texts, Cartagraphies 
schizaanal ytiques - which was published contemporaneously h'i th 1es trois 
ecolqgies - which is titled, Les Cartographies de la subjectivite (pp.47-
52). This section covers, as we might expect given its title, a great deal 
of the same ground as we have already with respect to 1es trois ecolqgies. 
The main concern of Cartagraphies schizoanalytlques is to provide a 
detailed account of Guattari's proposed schizoanalysis, according to four 
points of reference: material and descriptive (or, Economies of) Flux; 
existential Territories; the abstract, machinic Phylum; and the incorporeal 
Universe. Though these four points are of particular importance to an 
understanding of the text as a whole, I propose to ignore them, in order to 
promote the themes relevant to my analysis of 1es trois ecolag1es. 
In a manner similar to that undertaken in his unfolding of the principles 
of mental ecology, Guattari explains the concerns of this section of 
Cartagraphies schizoanalytiques thus: 
Our principle worry, is the development of a conceptual 
frame that protects schizoanalysis from any temptation 
to abandon itself to an ideal of scientifici ty - an 
ideal which usually dOminates psychoanalytic domains 
like a super-ego. We will, rather, look for a 
foundation which allies schizoanalysis - through its 
mode of self-actual isation and its type of truth and 
logic with resthetic disciplines. (Cartqgraphies 
schizaanalytiques, p.47)61 
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Guattari, here, continues his assertion that his analytic praxes 
ecological or schizoanalytical, or, we could add, cartographic - should be 
free of the need to be subsumed under the constraints of being a science. 
He identifies three ways according to which psychoanalysts (specifically) 
seek to scientifically organise their discourse(s). The first he calls, the 
way of the ascetic. 
This way is distinguished by the image of the solitary scientist, striving 
to further the scientific boundaries he has been stricken with according to 
his times. This scientist is, therefore, set-up at the apex of his 
scientific discovery as an authority according to whom a whole procedure 
can be attributed. Guattari cites the psycho-physicist Fechner as the prime 
example of such a way (pp. 48-49), who has given his name to a law still 
referred to in texts books tOday. We can cite here the discussion we had in 
the 'Introduction' to this thesis, concerning the role of the revolutionary 
viz. Kant's Copernican Revolution. 
Of the second way, Guattari wri tes, II I have qualified the second way as 
hysterical identification, because it constists in a mimetic appropriation 
of scientificity, with little concern for 'sticking' to reproducible 
experimental procedures, or of relying (as Popper would have it) upon 
testable and falsifial ble theories. II (Cartozrapbies scbizoanal vti ques, 
p.49)S2 This way is exemplified by the system of psychoanalysis as a whole, 
Guattari argues. whose doctrines, and even the possibility 'for cure, can 
only be understood by the initiated, by those allowed within the hallowed 
circle. 
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Finally, "the third way, that of support [1 'etayage]," Guattari explains, 
"will make lateral use of science. Its utterances will either be 
characterised by an exteriori ty with relation to the discipline under 
, 
consideration, or will be used" only' under the name of metaphor." 
(cartagraphies schizaanalytiques, p.49)63 Guattari exemplifies such a 
practice, by citing Freud's reference to the principle of the Carnot Gycle 
in order to justify the economic system presented in his drives of Eros and 
Thanatos. These three modes of appropriation of scientificity, or of 
validation of one's own practice in the name of science, define the ways 
down which Guattari does not want schizoanalysis to go. Furthermore, in 
affirming that the schizoanalytic project will have nothing to do wi th 
scientific pretensions, Guattari provides another e against thfct: 
desires that do; he writes: 
In fact, these scientific methods are even less in a 
position to give. help to the analysis of the psyche. 
From the moment at which they engage themselves in a 
systematic putting-into-parentheses of questions 
relative to their enunciation, to idiosyncratic modes 
of self-actialisation, and thus to irreducibly singular 
processes - otherwise called, essential dimensions of 
subjectivity they only succeed in 'unsticking' 
themselves. (Cartqgraphies schizaanalytiques, p.50)S4 
When it comes to a question of subjectivity - or of the psyche (as it is, 
specifically noted here, in terms of psychoanalytic praxes) the 
scientific method neglects to come to terms with precisely those areas we 
have seen to be essential to it. "Not only do cartographies of subjectivity 
have, nothing to gain from mimicking SCience, but this one may have a lot to 
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attend to in the wake . the· problematics churns up. '! (Cartagraphles 
schlzaanalvttques, p.51)6S It will be in those areas that scientific 
psychoanalysis both marginalises, and tries to bend, stretch and twist 
material into its analytical structure, that a cartography w.ill be needed. 
Just as we saw with reference to the three ecologies, the required analysis 
will graft itself onto the point at which the other analyses break down. 
whether this breakdown comes from trying too hard to incorporate something 
within its own system of beliefs, or whether it comes form totally ignoring 
an issue. Such is the movement of the rhizome, and of unfettered 
deterritorialisation. 
Guattari now pushes further from a negative critique of science, into 
discussing his areas of interest. He begins by reintroducing the question 
of capitalism. However far various forms of religiosity have swept through 
contemporary cuI ture, Guattari explains, it is the capitalist notion of 
subjectivity which "persists in presenting itself as an historical 
accomplishment." [persiste a se presenter C0111111e un acco111plissement 
historique.] (Cartagrapbtes' schtzaanalytlques, p.51) And why shouldn't it 
have, considering all other recent historical accomplishments have been 
achieved according to the capi talist schema. (Indeed, it could be argued 
that even the forms of First World religiosity operate in upholding 
capitalist structures of power relations: television evangelists, and the 
'marginal' Unification Church - with its hold on media, news and other 
information systems -, come immediately to mind.> 
The relationship ·between integrated world capitalism and the contemporary 
production of subjects, has been well documented in our examination of ~ 
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trois ecolos1es. In Cart~raohies schizoanalytiques Guattari relates this 
whole discussion to that of science. Wherever science has confronted 
subjectivity, it has not questioned its position with respect to 
subj ecti vi ty' scapi talist context and origins. He explains further, .. The 
subjectivity at work in the heart of the most elaborate scientific 
paradigms still functions, for its part, in animist and transcendental-
abstractionist terms." (Cart~aphies schizoanalytiques, p.51)S6 It is 
according to these parameters that subjectivity has found itself, 
simultaneously, an object of science, and a capitalistic construct. 
For Guattari "the cartographies of unconscious subjectivity must become the 
indispensable complements of systems of rationality, having currency in the 
sciences, politics and all other regions of knowledge and human activity." 
(cartagraphies schizaanalvtiques, p.51)67 This is quite a different 
prospect than subsuming one discourse under the auspices of another. 
Earlier, we saw the subject exploded into vectors of subjectification, 
having multiple connections, and the individual placed as a mere - and 
fleeting - assemblage of such vectors, we can now see that a cartography 
can be connected into the sciences without·striving to be one. A line of 
flight can be forced from a root-structure, in just the same way as one can 
follow the rhizome. Any temptation to rationality will be constructed -
once a cartography has been started-up - in terms of that cartography. Any 
system calling itself rational will only be so if it has already allowed 
its boundaries to be permeated by what has traditionally been placed 
outside it. Deterritorialisation without Reterritorialisaiion; rational 
systems connected to irrational systems - this is what cartographies will 
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produce. If, however, the systems of rationality are not satisfied with the 
parasitical conjoining of the cartographic, then they will be destroyed. 
The logic governing this cartography will not be a logic that operates 
conventionally. Guattari says that the map he wants to make, loses its 
primary function of having to represent a terri tory. In a footnote he 
explains, .. As Alfred Korzybski has seen, not only does the map put itself 
to indefinite referral [return/suspension) with respect to its proper 
cartography, but the distinction between map and terri tory (the map and 
'the thing mapped') tends to disappear." (Cartagraphies schizaanalytiques, 
p.51 n.l; parenthesis in English in the original)69 This is exactly the 
same point that was made throughout Chapter One of this thesis. Guattari 
dismisses the mimetic relation between the map and a territory, a relation 
that was insisted upon by arboreal thought. He emphasises the creative 
aspect of cartography, its way of directing and constructing the spaces 
that it maps while it maps them. The ordinary relation between map and 
thing mapped is not merely inverted, but opened at both ends. Cartography's 
questioning and transformative nature is emphasised by Guattari, as it was 
emphasised in the chapter mentioned above. 
The posi tioning of singularities and of those processes which construct 
singularisation - this is the programme o'f cartography. Guattari further 
describes cartography as operating according to the zones of semiotisation 
that organise,.. construct, allow understanding of. and oppress 
subjectivities. Indeed, how can this not be the case? If a cartography of 
the processes, or vectors, of subjectification is to be made, then it will 
have to work - to begin with at least - within those paradigms which order 
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the Subject as we know it. But, like the disturbance of the relation 
between the map and the thing mapped already announced, this cartography 
soon begins to construct lines of flight disruptive of the organised 
subject. It will constitute a multt'plicity of vectors of subjectification 
which will ooze from the sores of the dying Subject. Where the zones of 
semiotisation operate on the functions of representation and denotation, 
Guattari's analysis will add a further function - existentialisation: 
At this stage, it is enough for me to emphasise that 
the intensive indexes, the diagrammatic operators -
implied by this existential function are nat 
characterised by universality; this will lead 
schizoanalysis to be distinguished, in spite of certain 
similarities, from the 'partial objects' of 
Kleinianism, and '1 'objet a' of Lacanianism. 
<eartqgraphies schizoanalytiques, p.52)69 
The vectors of subj e,ctification distinguished by cartography's addi tion of 
an existent~al function to those usual operators of subjectivity, are those 
which wrench it from the concomitant orders of organisation. 
This, then, announces the ~thetic aspect of the cartographic function. The 
emphasis placed upon the importance of space in identifying an 
existentialisation of the paradigms consti tui ti ve of subj ecti vi ty, is an 
emphasis of that which allows creative expansion of such subjectivity. When 
the religious, capitalistic and scientistic relationship between the 
Subject and the Individual has been torn asunder and all the co-ordinates 
productive of subjectivity have been multiplied beyond these restrictions, 
" 
then the space allowed for in/by Cartography will be that which encourages 
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the singularisation, the multiplication and the creation of an infini te 
variety of connections according to which vectors of subjectification can 
pass. The Subject may be dying a death it deserved - asphyxiated by 
obsessively binding itself tighter and tighter in the web of co-ordinates 
that produced it - but the lines of flight along which the vectors of 
subjectification can flow are, nevertheless, still being generated. An 
resthetic response, or assemblage, as used by Guattari in discussing the 
direction his analysis should take, is one which could describe the 
movement of ecologising, or cartographising, the Subject, itself. In a 
passage that was quoted above (see p. 114), Guattari explained that the 
cartographer of subjectivity should proceed like the artist or the writer, 
and "should seek ... with each concrete performance, to develop and innovate, 
to create new perspectives ... " ('The Three Ecologies', p.133). Furthermore, 
at the beginning of Les trois ecologies Guattari states that many of "the 
best cartographies of the psyche - or, if you will, the best psychoanalyses 
- are after all surely to be found in the work of Goethe, Proust, Joyce, 
Artaud and Beckett, rather than Freud, Jung, or Lacan." ('The Three 
Ecologies' p.132)60 
What I am left wi th, then, is to state the following: a cartography of 
subjectivity, or an ecology/ecosophy of the vectors of subjectification, or 
a schizoanalysis, operates upon the Subject· first, by analysing the 
terri tories over which it moves, by examining those areas, those spaces 
whereby its existential function is effective. It is then a question of 
mapping further expanses, of creating ·thereby, new vistas of 
existentialisation according to which extra vectors of subjectification can 
., 
be accessed. Like Kant's resthetic experience, the material constituitive of 
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subjectivity is set into motion, into perpetual fluctuation; the flows of 
this material are quickened by/in cartography. Unlike Kant's resthet1c 
experience, such flows are not trapped, tethered or unified into a whale, 
moral, rational and easily manageable Subject. Where resthetic escape from 
the pressures and pains of organised subjectivity have usually taken the 
form of a universalisation, or generalisation of experience, Guattar1 
offers only a widespread singularisation and mul tiplication. Cartography 
etc. does not have a necessarily artistic, or resthetic function; rather, it 
can assemble its maps in an artistic way, it can follow resthetic outlines. 
It is important to ensure that this restheticism does not became the 
equivalent of the scientistic super-ega we witnessed dominating the 
psychoanalytic domains above ... remember Deleuze and Guattari' s entreaty, 
with respect to the active burgeoning of rhizomes,· that "the necessary 
precautions are taken" (A Thousand Plateaus, p.14 [Nllle Plateaux, p. 23] ) 
to ensure that the new rhizomatic formations do not fall back under the 
command of an arboreal structure. 
In order to conclude this chapter, I will re-introduce the notion of a 
material space - discussing it in relation to the themes articulated not 
only within this chapter, but throughout the thesis as a whole. 
Conclusion. 
This chapter has concentrated upon the problem of the cansti tution of 
subjectivity in relation to a cartographiC programmej the question of the 
role, or even the more fundemental one of the construction, of a material 
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space has therefore been suspended. Throughout this chapter we have 
observed the factors prominent in the consti tution and organisation of 
subj ecti vi ty, and taken for granted the importance therein of sR~2JL (an 
,,~-. ~ --,-- -- .- . ~ .. ~-
importance examined at other intervals of this thesis). What we must 
examine now, in concluding this chapter, is the type of space left by the 
performance of cartographies themselves. 
Probably the most important factor to remember in providing such an 
account, is the cartographic interruption of the map-thing mapped 
dialectic. Both in the chapter of this thesis devoted to examining the role 
of cartography as a critical tool, and in the section above dealing with 
Guattari's reference to the dialectic, have we seen that the relation 
between cartography and its territory cannot be described as merely one of 
representation. We have seen that once the mimetic relation between map and 
thing-mapped has been broken, the act of creating a map also describes the 
act of creating the thing-·mapped. If, up till now, we have been reading 
such a relation insofar as it has a bearing upon a description of 
cartography, then we should now examine this relation insofar as it tells a 
story about space. 
Bache1ard gradually built a description of the space that interested him -
first by moving around the house and descri bing its insides; he then 
ventured immediately outside; then further still into fields, woods, 
deserts and oceans. In the end, Bache1ard could not help but to agree with 
Joe Bousquet's comment that space oozed like honey. 'The space of 
cartography is one that is filled, like a honeycomb is with honey, with 
that cartography's objects. This space has penetrated subjects and borne 
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the lines of flight that allow for the assemblage of vectors of 
subjectification. When a materialist account of the factors describing the 
construction of subjectivities uses, as its main drive, the relevance of 
~----------------------------
space in this construction, then that space must itself be materialised. 
When the distinction between the map and its terri tory was exploded, then 
the space according to which both were articulated became materialised in 
that moment of mutual creation. The space which oozes like honey from a 
beehive is precisely that material space through which lines of flight, 
rhizomes and vectors of subjectification move; they erupt from the forms of 
subjectivity already organised. That the dominant forms of subjectification 
can be dislocated according to a particular cri tical practice, we have 
already shown; that this practice also constitutes a material space cannot 
now be avoided. 
The space of cartography, of ecology/ecosophy, and of schizoanalysis, can 
only, therefore, be understood as a material one. At each instance when 
these praxes articulate the creation of a vector of subj ecti vi ty wi th 
reference to the importance thereto of space, then the concurrent creation 
of a new space has also been undertaken. Space can do nothing now' but ooze. 
It must be sipped like tea, stroked like fur or pinched like skin. Without 
this type of space, there would be nothing upon which the vectors of 
subjectivity could flow, there would be no 'wave for the subjective-
assemblage-surfer to ride. If the organisations of subjectivity are to be 
deterritorialised, then the relevant space cannot escape .. 
Kant's space was empty and fetid. Bachelard' s began to ooze out of its 
stringent co-ordinates. Deleuze and Guattar1's spaces striated and 
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smoothed, until a cartography came to materialise them. And now, with each 
cartographic turn establishing the possi bili ty of the creation of new 
rhizomes of subj ectification, we witness a viscous space permeating every 
crack and filling every subject with the possibility of making another 
cartographic turn, thus establishing the possibility of the creation of new 
rhizomes of subjectification and showing a viscous space permeating every 
crack and filling every subject with the possibility of making another 
cartographic turn ... 
( 
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CONCLUSION 
THE SUBJECT, THE POSTMQDERNS, SPACE AND BEYOND, 
Introduction. 
"We are about to redraw the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Such were the words 
of an officer in the irregular Serbian Xilitia, as quoted in 'The Guardian' 
(10/4/92). As the once YugoslaVian republics of Slovenia and Croatia before 
it, the newly independent republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is gripped with 
violent map-makers, eager to outline the boundaries of their respective 
national governments. "One of the causes of this conflict is that the 
frontiers heven't matched the people. Now the people are being made to 
match the frontiers." (BBC News, 17/5/92) Nothing gets in the way of these 
cartographers; not even the land, over which they fight, can escape the 
imposition of the will of myriad groups of mappers. The past few years have 
seen the most prolific cartographies, announced, halted, and revamped, that 
Europe has experienced since the end of the Second World War; the most 
violent reterritorialisations have occured in the Balkan region. 
Furthermore, these conflicts have rendered the territorialisations made in 
the years since the Second World War at least, and since the late 
nineteenth century at most, cartographically irrelevant. Whether this 
tension has only recently flared up, or whether it has only recently been 
worthy of reporting in the Western media, is o"f li ttle consequence to the 
fact that these reterri torialisations are made using the most virulent 
processes of desire. At the time of writing, bands of marauding gunmen are 
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roaming through Bosnia-Herzegovina, seeking to implement their own 
cartographies. So-called Serbian forces, regular and otherwise, have 
overrun many border villages villages normally containing Muslim 
majorities - and the coalition of Croatian and Muslim militias are busy 
fighting them. Yet this simplistic description has been complicated by the 
various groupings of the forces fighting for the control of the Bosnian 
capital Sarajevo. Here, the conflict appears to be between the town-
dwellers (Croat, Muslim and Serb) eager to fend off the imposition of 
'ethnic' boundaries upon the city by outsiders. The Hungarian majority in 
Transylvania are continuing their antipathy to being part of Romania - the 
change from Ceausescu' s reign to that of the Romanian Popular Front has 
made no difference to their struggle. The various republ ics that once 
constituted the U.S.S.R. now contain many different warring factions: 
Moldovan Rumanians and Russian speakers in the Dnestr region. Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis in Nagorny Karabakh. and the Georgians versus South Ossetians 
and Abkhazians. (These name only a few current conflicts; for a more 
thorough explanation of the territorial struggles in the area, see Tom 
Barber's article, 'Nations' battle for Moscow's lost empire,' in Iha 
Independent on Sunday [5/7/92].) Moreover, Russia and the Ukraine are 
beginning to squabble over the government of the Crimean region - not to 
mention various other, not so immediately obvious as territorial, claims to 
the Black Sea fleet. The territorial problems, ho'wever, are not confined to 
the central-eastern part of Europe, though these are - at the moment -
particularly violent. 
The most prominent use of cartography in contemporary society is by 
nationalist groups. Such an outcome was envisaged by Guattari in Les trois 
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ecolosles (1989); there he wri tes, "Clearly, then, social ecology must be 
opened up to politically coherent collective praxes; if it is not, it will 
in the end always be dominated by reactionary nationalism, the oppression 
of women, children and minorities, and those hostile to innovation." ('The 
Three Ecologies', p.145; translation modified.) I The cartographic process 
is important to the mili tiamen in the war-torn zones of Yugoslavia" for 
example. To redefine the boundaries of the state in such a way as to engulf 
the most prosperous, or merely the largest, portions of land for a 
particular nation is a process of cartographic dimensions. But it is 
cartography at the behest of a reactionary reterritorialisation. New spaces 
are being forged, according to which the inhabitants are being forced to 
redefine their lifestyles; in the countryside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in 
Slovenia and Croatia last year, this redefinition is articulated along the 
lines of flight of the refugee; in Sarajevo, the fight seems to be to fend 
off such a redefinition, in favour of the integrated cosmopolitanism they 
have enj oyed for centuries.- These new spaces, however - according to any 
territory distinguished along purely nationalist lines - are dead spaces of 
hatred. 
What could be more descriptive of the movement from deterritorialisation to 
reterritorialisation than the present situation in Yugoslavia? Maybe only 
the rise of reactionary nationalism throughout -the whole of Europe: from 
the neo-nazis burgeoning in the now unified Germany, to the Leagues of 
Northern Italy demanding their separation from the poorer southern regions, 
to the right-wing groups in Belgium, France and Scandinavia, and the so-
called leftist groups in Ireland and Spain. In all of these cases 
Guattari' s claim concerning social ecology (in particular, but we could 
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add, cartography, or the three ecologies, in general) is seen to be 
vindicated. 
Yet the problem of making a "politically coherent collective praxis" is one 
that has dogged contemporary thinkers, since the rise of postmodernism. It 
may be the case that the stranglehold that postmodernism has had on the 
cultural, social and political thought of recent times, has added fuel to 
the nationalists' cause (at worst) or to the reterritorialisation of 
deterritorialised flows (at best). Whatever outcome the fluctuation between 
these best and worst cases produces, it still appears necessary that we 
should take stock of the present condition of postmodernism. For the 
fragmentation of old orders, and the increased trend towards fragmentation 
of the new, could be viewed as practices defined well within the postmodern 
framework. Add to this the increased role of the media within these moments 
and movements of fragmentation - where we are shown refugees from the 
Serbian putsch through Bosnia-Herzegovena applauding the arrival of Western 
news-crews, because they are news-crews, or the Serbian recommendation that 
Radio Sarajevo plays more' pro-Serbian music and, it appears, that 
questions concerning the postmodern condition are not merely academic ones. 
Before I can return to the questions concerning cartographies and 
contemporary politics, I feel that it is necessary to take a detour through 
these problems of postmodernity. For once we have oriented our discussion 
of·. cartographies (and hence of space and subjectification) to, what is 
called, postmodernism, we shall find it easIer to embark upon making 
Guattarian type "politically coherent collective praxes". First, then, we 
shall refer to subjects and postmodernism. 
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The Subject and Its Death. 
Postmodernism has become the metaphysics of contemporary cultural theory. 
Such a statement may seem odd, seeing as postmodernism does not aim to 
provide an all encompassing, totalising structure according to which our 
particular position in the world can be understood ... at least, that is its 
claim. But if we take a brief look at the construction, and the function, 
of the terms 'postmodernism' and 'metaphysics,' we find a striking 
similarity between them. As is well known, the word 'metaphysics' was used 
~rAfistot0to designate the work in his corpus which followed that 
can-ed, 'Physics.' The 'metaphysics' described not only that which came 
after the 'physics' but also that which theoretically underpinned it. The 
term 'postmodernism' has had a similar genesis: literally descri bing a 
school of thought following that known as 'Modernism' (wherever the 
historical 1 imi ts of this practice may fall). Furthermore, postmodernism 
has sought to give. a more thorough description, than that provided by 
modernism, qf contemporary events and contemporary experience, even whilst 
theoretically advancing the impossibility of the universality of its 
conclusions. Such paradoxes, however, are the meat and drink of the 
postmodern resthetic (encompassed in the ti tIe of Hilary Lawson's book, 
Reflexiyity. The post-modern predicament, (1985)2). Ever since its 
inception, 'metaphysics' has felt the incessant wrath of philosophers 
throughout the ages; .that against 'postmodernism' seems to be just 
starting. 
The most concise and yet all-encompassing attempt to provide a critique of 
postmodernism as a theoretical structure and a cultural event, has been 
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made by David Harvey in his The Condition Of Postmodernity (1990)3. 
Harvey's account of the birth and life of this structure/event is 
particularly interesting <given the parameters of this thesis) in that he 
provides an assessment of the postmodern relation to space and time 
<though, wi th respect to the theme of postmodernism, space and Harvey's 
text, I would like to defer an analysis until later in my conclusion). In 
short Harvey's attitude to postmodernism, though open enough to provide an 
excellent analysis, is, in the end, not a sympathetic one. "There are some 
who would have us return to classicism and others who seek to tread the 
path of the moderns." Harvey concludes, "From the standpoint of the latter, 
every age is judged to attain 'the fullness of its time, not by being but 
by becoming.' I could not agree more." <Harvey, p.359) It is with respect 
to the relative merits of Being and Becoming that Harvey constitutes one of 
the paradigms for his critique of postmodernism and modernism. 
Harvey explains the relationship between postmodernism and modernism, being 
and becoming, as follows: Being = stasis, the a3sthetics of place and the 
politics of the fascist, and can be thought of as fitting into a postmodern 
schema, Becoming = ethics of time and space and the politics of change, and 
can be broadly described as modernist. Being is the static effect of a 
particular way of responding to contemporary culture, Becoming identifies a 
response which Harvey finds far more sui table for providing a~££.!£~..1_ 
~~.Cll1..st critique of contemporary ex~~st;~~ It is wi th Becoming, as the 
.... -~.----
above quotation shows, that Harvey "could not agree more." Towards the end 
of his book, Harvey offers a summation and expianation of these theses. He 
wri tes: 
Conclusion 
( 
Fordist modernity is far from homogeneous. There is 
much that is about relative fixity and permanence -
fixed capital in mass production, stable, standardised, 
and homogeneous markets, a fixed configuration of 
poli tical-economic influence and power, easily 
identifiable authority and meta-theories, secure 
grounding in materiality and technical-scientific 
rationality, and the like. But all of this is ranged 
around a social and economic project of Becoming, of 
growth and transformation of social relations, of 
auratic art and originality, of renewal and avant-
gardism. Postmodernist flexibility, on the other hand, 
is dominated by fiction, fantasy, the immaterial 
(particularly of money>, fictitious capital, images, 
ephemerality, chance, and flexibilty in production 
techniques, labour markets and consumption niches; yet 
it also embodies strang commitments to Being and place, 
a penchant for charismatic politics, concerns for 
ontology, and the stable institutions favoured by neo-
conservatism. (Harvey, pp.338-339) 
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Harvey's concluding point - describing the theoretical alliance between 
neo-conservatism and postmodernism - seems to articulate the same concerns 
I voiced at the outset to this chapter. Nevertheless, his romantic 
attachment to the authori ty a modernism now past would have afforded his 
discourse (unfortunate as he is to find himself articulated in a postmodern 
age), seems not only lacklustre but empty. On the face of it, Harvey's 
account of - and preference for - Becoming over Being also appears worth 
applauding. for at many points in this thesis have we positively accounted 
the merits of the nomad and even the chaotic subj ectification offered by 
Kant~s resthetic theory. In these cases constantly moving, shifting 
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(fragmented?) planes or vectors of subjectification have been advocated 
over a static, organised notion of Being-Subject. "Becoming" in this 
passage from Harvey's book, however, seems to owe much to. the concept of 
"dialectical progress"; a concept which has also, at various points of this 
thesis, been adversely cri ticised. I would prefer, then, to advocat~ the 
becomings described by Deleuze and Guattari in Hille Plateaux (1980),4 
whereby any attempt at linking becoming with progress, evolution, or even 
imitation, is thoroughly repudiated. They explain: 
Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or 
genealogical tree. Becoming is certainly not imitating, 
or identifying with something; neither is it 
regressing-progressing; neither is it corresponding, 
establishing corresponding relations; neither is it 
producing, producing a filiation, or producing through 
filiation. Becoming is a verb with a consistency all 
its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, 
"appearing, II "being, II "equalling," or II producing. II (A. 
Thousand Plateaus, p.239)S 
Harvey's becoming is precisely that .. classificatory or genealogical tree" 
Deleuze and Guattari say it should not be. For Harvey becoming brings order 
through the possibility of change; this change occurs hand in hand with the 
authority of an avant-garde. The becoming Harvey identifies as modernist, 
is that which identifies a unifying response to a world experienced as 
fragmentary and "disintegrating; and as Harvey adeptly shows throughout his 
book, the modernist response to such fragmentation <whether in 
archi tecture, literature or philosophy) is to butress it wi th ever more 
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sturdy rational systems. For Deleuze and Guattari becoming renounces such 
attempts at organisation and actively seeks to destroy not only the 
structures of authority, but also the moral high ground occupied solely by 
an avant-garde. Becoming is deterr"i torialisation; deterri torialisation is 
becoming. It could be said, then, that it is with Becoming that this thesis 
has been dealing all along. Cartography, ecologies/ecosophies, topo-
r---"·-, 
analyses and rhizomes have all been shown to "produce" the af:fects that we 
/ 
now see described as "becoming." 
Ve saw in Chapter One how the movement of the rhizome accessed 
mul tiplici tous lines of flight, simultaneously mapping and creating the 
plane of consistency; we saw in Chapter Three how the Nomadic hordes 
proliferated by deterritorialising multiplicitous flows, thereby mapping a 
smooth space which simultaneously provided for their"deterritorialisation. 
Given that these references have now been reactivated, notice the following 
passage from Deleuze and Guattari's "plateau" on becoming: 
A line of becoming is not defined by points that it 
connects, or by points that compose it; on the" 
contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through 
the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first 
perceived, transversally to the localisable relation to 
distant or contiguous points. (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p.293; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)6 
It .. was precisel~" in this way that Deleuze and Guattari descri bed smooth 
space, and "opposed" it to striated space; and the "movement" of the nomad 
against the stasis of the sedentary. Indeed, it is wi th respect to this 
type of "movement" that Deleuze and Guattari introduce the pack and the 
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swarm. For Deleuze and Guattari any becoming initially, but not 
primarily, a becoming-animal "always involves a pack, a band, a 
population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity." (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p.239)7 A swarm and a pack announce a becoming which cannot help but 
deterri torialise, cartographise, smoothe, disorganise and rhizomatise the 
space constituitive of, and constituted by, the swarm and the pack. 
Becoming operates in the same way as the vectors of subjectification of 
Chapter Four. And, if we remember Bachelard's account of a verb-producing 
space (as told in Chapter Two), we can see becoming burgeoning there too. 
,What does this digression into Deleuze and Guattari' s becoming tell us 
about the relation between modernism and postmodernism? Furthermore, where 
does it leave us wi th respect to the postmodern subject? Concerning the 
first of these questions, I think we can say that the becoming Harvey 
identifies as modernist is as productive of reaction and of oppressive 
organisation, as the Bein'g-Postmodernist he ranges against it. Harvey's 
becoming articulates a channeled response to contemporary capitalist 
fragmentations, a response which many thinkers now say is one accomodated 
well within the ranges of the capitalist system. s Deleuze and Guattari's 
becoming does not identify a Single-track system of change. The 
relationship between Deleuze and Guattari's becoming and postmodernism can 
be articulated by examining the schizophrenic, 'as found in their work and 
as crititcised by Harvey. Indeed, such an analysis should also provide us 
with the answer to the second question posed above. 
Harvey continually derides Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy: in general in 
terms of its status, that he describes, as postmodern; and in particular, 
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insofar as it includes an articulation of the contemporary subjective 
attitude that can be described as 'schizophrenic.' He writes: 
Deleuze and Guattari. .. , in their supposedly playful 
exposition Anti-Oedipus, hypothesize a relationship 
between schizophrenia and capi talism that prevails "at 
the deepest level of one and the same economy, one and 
the same production process," concluding that "our 
society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell 
shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that 
the schizos are not saleable. It [Anti-OEdipus, p. 245] 
(Harvey, p.53) 
The problem Harvey encounters with this formulation offered by Deleuze and 
Guattari can be described as follows: according to the current trend of 
postmodernism, the subject has been riven to shreds by the combined 
attentions of linguists, psychoanalysis and philosophers (and others no 
doubt), in such a way that the only possible subjective-construct we have 
today is one that is necessarily fragmentary, that is, schizophrenic. 
Deleuze and Guattari, Harvey says, identify this schizo production as a 
/~. 
fundemental part of contemporary capitalist production. He concludes that 
\ 
without a unified subject - which can thereby be described as alienated in 
the traditional Marxist sense - there can be no possibility of providing a 
base for change of this (capitalist) mode of production; therefore the 
postmodern schizo-subj ect as .. playfu lly" described through the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari, offers no solution to the oppression of individuals 
and groups by capitalism in contemporary society.9 It is at this point that 
the injection of a pair of sentences from Frederic Jameson's essay 
\ 
'Cogni ti ve Mapping'10 would suffice: 
Conclusion 
You should understand that I take such spatial 
peculiarities of postmodernism as symptoms and 
expressions of a new and historically original dilemma, 
one that involves our insertion as individual subjects 
into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous 
realities, whose frames range from the still surviving 
spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the 
unimaginable decentring of global capital itself. Not 
even Einsteinian relativity, or the multiple subjective 
worlds of the older modernists, is capable of gi ving 
any kind of adequate figuration to this process, which 
in lived experience makes itself felt by the so-called 
death of the subject, or, more exactly, the fragmented 
and schizophrenic decentring and dispersion of this 
last (which can no longer even serve the function of 
the Jamesian reverberator or "point of view"). 
(Jameson, p.351) 
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Here the terms "the death of the subject" and "the fragmented and 
schizophrenic decentring" of the subject, serve as signposts indicating the 
onset of a particularly postmodern way of looking at contemporary 
existence. In just the same way as was shown viz the claims made by Kant's 
Copernican Revolution, the postmodern realisation of the dead-subject 
attests to the production of a radically alternative, and more correct, way 
of reorienting contemporary thought. Unfortunately Jameson's, and Harvey's, 
historical analyses of the development of space discover nothing ather than 
such subj ecti ve facts; that is, their analyses of space produce nothing 
mare than the dead subject (it is to the relation between this subjective 
analysis and postmodern space that the fallowing section wili refer). This 
fragmented and decentred nation of subjectivity - especially insofar as it 
is designated as a Dead Subject - becomes the precise the site of what the 
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older modernists described as a point of view. The Dead Subj ect, and the 
Schizo are either valorised (Jameson) or d~ated (Harvey) in the name of 
"~.' the production of a unified and totalised critique of contemporary 
~api talism. We shall see that Deleuze and Guattari' s schizo propels us 
along another line of flight. 
That Deleuze and Guattari identify the production af schizos as the 
production of capitalism, par excellence, cannot be doubted - this aspect 
of Harvey's criticism appears correct. Schizophrenia is a condition whose 
status is articulated well wi thin the bounds of capi talism. Yet it is a 
condition which though produced by capitalism - is simultaneously 
suppressed by capitalism. At one level, as we saw in Chapter Three above, 
the movement of capital is one which must necessarily be described as 
schizophrenic itself. Capitalism defines that space which is constituted by 
the axiomatisation of flows of capital. As these flows are schizophrenic 
and therefore needful of i'ntense, well supervised organisation, we can see 
that capitalism's fear is that, untamed, these flows are likely to destroy 
capi talist organisation itself. (What could have mare of a traditional 
Marxist ring to it? "That which is produced by and constitutive of 
Capitalism, also articulates the means of (the possibility of) its own 
destruction ...... ) "Yet it would be a serious error," Deleuze and Guattari 
warn, "to consider the capitalist flows and 'the schizophrenic flDws as 
identical ... " (Anti-OEdipus, p.245; Deleuze and Guattari' s emphasis) ( .. Et 
pourtant ce serait une grande erreur d'identifier les flux capitalistes et 
les flux schizaphreniques ... " (L' Anti OEdipe, 'p. 291)] ... for' precices,ly the 
reason that the flows which can be called schizophrenic are those which 
have to be tamed, appropriated and organised by the Capi talist Machine. 
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"The flows are decoded and axiomatised by capitalism at the same time. 
Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary 
its difference, its divergence, and its death." (Anit-OEdipus, p.246; 
/Deleuze and Guattari' s emphasis) (" C'est en m~me temps que les flux sont 
~ 
decodes et axlomatlses par 1e caplta11sme. La sclzophrenle n'est donc pas 
l'identlte du caplta1isme, mals au contralre sa difference, son ecart et sa 
mort." (L'Anti OEdipe, p.293)] We have already come across a similar 
relationship of constitution-production-suppression in our reading of 
Kant's production and control of a rational subject; particularly insofar 
as this rational subject is threatened by the anti-production of the 
chaotic i£sthetic "subject." Furthermore we have also seen this process, viz 
Capi talism, defined in the Deleuze and Guattarian terms of 
territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Deleuze 
and Guattari' s valorisation of schizophrenic processes, is not a 
championing of the clinical schizophrenic as a universal panacea, or as a 
force for change. Rather,· it is a valorisation of a force (a force of 
desire), a flux which is necessarily disruptive of capi talism. It is only 
under the contemporary conditions of Integrated World Capitalism that these 
flows are repressed and become productive of a clinical condition. 11 
Harvey's citation <p.352) of a news report describing the mass murder, by a 
schizophrenic, of his family, seems rather nalve (or contradictory, given 
that in the prelude to the passage quoted above, he recognises that the 
schizophrenics the "postmoderns" identify, should not be understood in the 
.. narrow cl inical sense" [Harvey, p. 53] ). For Deleuze and Guattari - and, 
possibly, Guattari in particular - the liberation of those flows which are 
blocked in the formation of schizophrenics (a practice that describes the 
field of schizoanalysis), when applied to the cultural, social, political, 
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geographical (etc.) whole that is capitalism, is akin to the classical 
Marxist endeavour for the working class to break free of their chains and 
~ise up in revolutionary fervour. This, indeed, was the theme permeating 
Guattar1's Les trois ecolqgies (1989). Schizoanalysis, ecology/ecosophyand 
cartography all identify the ways in which the blockages in the schizo-
flows, or the reterr1torialisation of deterritorialised flows, undertaken 
under capi talism can be identified and destroyed. Deleuze and Guattari 
exemplify three responses that the schizophrenic - purely within the bounds 
of capitalism - can give. The first arrests the schizophrenic processes and 
'pours them into the mould of OEdipus. This amounts to a neuroticisation. 
Second, this neuroticisation by OEdipus is resisted, but nevertheless lays 
seige to the schizophrenic flows so that the schizo "is led to take itself 
as an end" (Anti-OEdipus, p.363) ("est a11lene a se prendre lui-11l~11le pour 
fin" (L'Anti OEdipe, p.435)]; and so a psychotic is produced. The final 
response is described as follows: 
the process sets to turning round in the void .. Since it 
is now a process of deterri torialization, it can no 
longer search for and create its new land. Confronted 
with OEdipal reterritorialization an archaic, 
residual, ludicrously restricted sphere - it will form 
still more artificial lands that, ba~ring an accident, 
accordate themselves in one way or another to the 
established order: the pervert. (Anti-OEdipus, 
p. 363) l1a 
In all cases the capitalist axiomatic is directing the flows of the 
sch~zophrenic. The true schizophrenic response, that which becomes-schizo, 
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is that which actively destroys the axiomatising powers of the Capitalist 
Machine, and directly harnesses the pure deterri torialising and decoding 
pu1sions. This will amount to the dismantling of the Capitalist Machine by 
f1the inter-oozing of its insides with its outsides. 
To reiterate, and redirect, the second of the questions asked above: what 
/,"1 
re1evence does the discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's becoming and L/ 
schizophrenic have with respect to our discussion of postmodernism and the 
subject? For Harvey, Deleuze and Guattari epitomise the postmodern approach 
to, and analysiS of, subjectivi ty under contemporary capi ta1ism. We have 
seen, however, that Deleuze and Guattari are not easily assimilable into 
the Being-Postmodern/Becoming-Modern distinction Harvey uses as a critical 
tool. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari's becoming appears to move outside the 
paradigms of modernity and postmodernity that Harvey constructs; or, given 
their own descriptions of such a movement, it moves through such a critical 
construct. De1euze and Guattari' s becoming has little to do with pOints, 
pOints of view, or the stasis of Being that is supposedly postmodern; and 
also with progress and avant-garde becoming that is supposedly modern. In 
terms of the becoming that they announce, the distinction that Harvey makes 
itself appears static. Becoming, schizoana1ysis, rhizomatics, ecologies, 
ecosophies and cartographies have little to do with Cultural Movements and 
more to do with the relative speeds and slownesses, the flows and the 
fluctuations which can be directed and organised to constitute these 
movements. Moreover, to identify the schizophrenic as a purely postmodern 
construct is to arborea1ise an otherWise rhiz6matic articulation; it is to 
forget the blockages and repressions used to form a particular subjective-
construct and particular spaces. 
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Space and Postmodernism. 
It should be emphasised at the outset, that the question of the 
~chitectural spaces postmodernism describes and prescribes, will not 
outline the area of study of this section. Such themes have been explored 
in great detail, and with greater ability than I could e'vince, in other 
works. 12 
The best way of mapping the areas of study of this section, is in the 
description of various definitions of postmodern space: to start with, who 
, 
better than Frederic Jameson? In his 'Cognitive Mapping' from which I have 
! 
already quoted, Jameson identifies three types of space, or, to be more 
precise, three stages of capitalist space: "I have tried to suggest that 
the three historical stages of capital have each generated a type of space 
unique to it,.... These three types of space I have in mind are all the 
result of discontinuous expansions or quantum leaps in the enlargement of 
capital, in the latt~r's penetration and colonization of hitherto 
uncommodified areas." (Jameson, p.348) The three stages of capi talism 
Jameson identifies are: classical, or market capitalism; the passage from 
market to monopoly capitalism, Lenin's "stage of imperialism" <p.349); and 
late capitalism. It is to this final capitalist category that postmodern 
space refers. Jameson, in two more massive'sentences, writes: 
I want to suggest that the new space [postmodern space] 
involves the suppression of distance ... and the 
relentless saturation of any remaining voids and 'empty 
places, to the point where the postmodern body -
whether wandering through a postmodern hotel, locked 
into rock sound by means of headphones, or undergoing 
Conclusion 
multiple shocks and-bombardments of the Vietnam War as 
:MIchael Herr conveys it to us - is now exposed to a 
perceptual barrage of inunediacy from which all 
sheltering layers have been removed. There are, of 
course, many other features of this space one would 
ideally want to conunent on ... but I think that the 
peculiar disorientation of the saturated space I have 
just mentioned will be the most useful guiding thread. 
(Jameson, p.351) 
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Postmodern space is characterised nat by a new conception of space as such, 
but by a new conception of the way space is filled. According to this 
passage of Jameson's the "new space" differs from the old space (a 
modernist space say) in that the elements that pass through it, or occupy 
it, are no longer orderly and evocative of rationality, but are disorderly 
and evocative of fragmental1~Y. Before I remark upon the Kantianism such a 
"'-....... ~ 
story resembles, I would like to insert a discussion of some of Harvey's 
findings viz postmodernism and space. For Harvey postmodernism identifies 
the process of 'Time-space compression ... ' - as the title one of the 
chapters of his The Condition Of Postmodernity (1990) puts it. Not 
dissimilar to Jameson's saturated space, this compressed space Harvey 
describes as follows: 
Disrupti ve spatiality triumphs aver the coherence of 
perspective and narrative in postmodern fiction, in 
exactly the same way that imparted beers coexist with 
local brews, local employment collapses under the 
weigh~, of foreign competition, and all the divergent 
spaces of the world are assembled nightly as a collage 
of images upon the television screen. (Harvey, p.302) 
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It is easy to see from where Harvey formulates his Being=Postmodernism, 
Becoming=Kodernism dichotomy. Using a cinematic metaphor, postmodern space 
provides the backdrop against which many types of image can be projected; 
~ Being, then, would describe the" backdrop as the only possibility for 
unification of these images, which is very postmodern and reflexive; 
whereas Harvey's Becoming would define the narrative structure (if there 
was one) of the images presented, and is thus very modernist. In any case, 
space is seen simply as an all pervading emptiness punctuated 
intermittantly by coagulations called "placeH • We may be able to understand 
this further, by referring to the space/place distinctions we encountered 
in the introductory chapter with respect to Kant. 
In that Chapter we followed Ivor Leclerc's article, 'The Meaning of "Space" 
in Kant,' 13!.chart the movement from a ·concrete" articulation of space, to 
an "abstract" one; a movement which was concurrent with the movement from 
Renaissance philosophy through the Enlightenment into the work of Kant (and 
beyond). We saw that the sixteenth, seventeenth and early-eighteenth 
century notions of space adhered to the Aristotelian definition, linking it 
wi th place as the "innermost bounding surface of the containing body -
which of course coincided with the outer boundary of the contained body." 
(Leclerc, p.88; quoted above, p.18) Descartes beg1n the abstraction of 
space by tying it mare with the idea of . magnitude, and place with 
situation; Leibniz carried it further by iAdentifYing space not only with 
all places in their totality, but wi th tJ~ abstracted order of all such 
places too (see above p.19). We saw, too, that Kant's space was abstract, 
formal, totalising and organising. A foetid space, where subjects were barn 
to be constrained; the type of space Beckett defines in Waiting for Godot 
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(1965)'· in the following suitably macabre and cynical way: "They give 
birth astride a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once 
more." (Act II, p.89) But .maybe Beckett's description is too optimistic, 
~ . 
with his gleaming light flashing for an instant ... perhaps this is due to 
the modernist in him .... Jameson's saturation bombing of postmodern space 
by fragmentary images, delimits a type of space which he calls 
"disorientating" and which we can recharacterise as the dead space ordered 
along Kantian lines. For Jameson the "new sp'ace involves the suppression of 
distance," the consequent conglomerates of fragmentary stuff can therefore 
be determined according to our understanding of "place." Whatever way 
Jameson approaches this space, his account never strays far from the idea 
of an abstract, totalised space that can be saturated in the postmodern 
manner. Harvey's postmodern space seems to borrow from both the 
Aristotelian and the Enlightenment traditions, in that the totalising and 
abstract formulation of a global space articulated according to the 
transcendental moveme.nts and relations of Capital, is filled wi th various 
places articulated according to the diversion and solidification of capital 
at a point. Harvey's map is a highly organised representation of a single 
empty space that is, however, occupied by fragmentary places. He writes, 
Capital, in short, continues to dominate, and it does 
so in part through superior command over space and 
time, even when opposition movements gain control over 
a particular place for a time. The 'otherness' and 
'regional resistances' that postmodernist politics' 
emphasize can flourish in a particular place. But they 
are all too often subject to the power of capital over 
the co-ordination of universal fragmented space and the 
march of capitalism's global historical time that lies 
Conclusion 
outside of the purview of any particular one of them. 
(Harvey, pp.238-239) 
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So _____ what Harvey describes here as the "universal fragmented space" of 
./ 
postmodernism should be interpreted as merely another series of places 
under the overpowering gaze of a truly universal spatialisation of 
capi talism. There is fragmented space and a space that dri ves towards 
homogenisation. 
In his monumental book The Production of Space (1991) 15 Henri Lefebvre 
describes the constitution and· proliferation of a material (or, maybe it 
would be more precise to say "a materialist's ..... ) space, under the 
auspices of - as the title suggests - its "production". He never tries to 
transplant any of his theses into faddish cultural organisations 
remaining true to his lifelong adherence to Marxism. 16 His project, similar 
to those promoted by both Harvey and Jameson, is stated as follows: 
Our present analysis will not attain its full meaning 
until political economy has been reinstated as the way 
to understand productive activity. But a new political. 
economy must no longer concern itself with things in 
space, as did the now obsolete science that preceded 
it; rather, it will have to be a political economy of 
space (and of its production). (Lefebvre, p.299) 
Indeed, it is an economics of space, of the spaces productive of 
subjectivities, and of space as produced according to a political economy 
(Guattari's ecology/ecosophy) that will interest Lefebvre. What is more 
important, given the discussion currently underway concerning the 
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production of various histories of space (by Harvey and Jameson), is the 
history of space given by Lefebvre. He characterises it in terms similar to 
~ 
those adopted by Leclerc; for Lefebvre, the understanding/production of 
space has changed from an Absolute to an Abstract one. The farmer Lefebvre 
describes thus: 
Absolute space was made up of fragments of nature 
located at sites which were chosen for their intrinsic 
qualities (cave, mountain top, spring, river), but 
whose very consecration ended up by stripping them of 
their natural characteristics and uniqueness. Thus 
natural space was soan populated by poli tical farces. 
Typically, architecture picked a site in nature and 
transferred it to the political realm by means of a 
symbolic mediation; one thinks, for example, of the 
statues of local gods or godesses in Greek temples, or 
of the Shintoist's sanctuary, empty or else containing 
nothing but a . mirror. (Lefebvre, p.48; Lefebvre's 
emphasiS) 
This space is the space produced and invested by magical and religious 
symbolism. It is nat wholly supplanted by abstract space, for it farms the 
basis for what Lefebvre terms (and we shall describe later) 
"representational space." Absolute space seems a naive space, the space 
which Bachelard would have laved as productive of dreams, like an opiate 
(in Bachelard' 5 case, mare like Brandy). Nevertheless, this space is not 
devoid of its o~ganisations and political affiliations. This is the space 
of Imperial Rome, the cathedrals of the Holy Raman Empire and the 
commercial squares of the early mercantile town. It is in terms of these 
facets that abstract space is taken aver by absolute space. 
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Abstract space functions 'objectally', as a set of 
things/signs and their formal relationships: glass and 
stone, concrete and steel, angles and curves, full and 
empty. Formal and quanti ti ve, it erases distinctions, 
as much those which derive from nature and (historical) 
time as those which originate in the body (age, sex, 
ethnicity). (Lefebvre, p.49) 
Abstract space 1s not homogeneous; it simply has 
homogenei ty as its goal, its orientation, its • lens' . 
And, indeed, it renders homgeneous. But in itself it is 
multiform. Its geometric and visual formants are 
complementary in their antithesis. (Lefebvre, p.287; 
Lefebvre'S emphases) 
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Abstract space is thus slightly different to that introduced by Leclerc 
(though Lefebvre does adorn another of his descriptions of it wi th a 
philosophical lineage from Descartes to Hegel [see p. 308] ). The most 
interesting notion introduced here by Lefebvre with respect to abstract 
space, is its drive to homogenise. In this way we can understand abstract 
space in the terms we have borrowed from Bachelard, as "geometricising", 
from Deleuze and Guattari, as "reterri torialising", and from Kant as 
"organising". Throughout this thesis, these terms have been used to 
characterise that space which is productive of the most repressed, neurotic 
and oppressed forms of subjectivity. In this chapter alone, we have seen 
that it is this type of space that provides the conditions according to 
which the Subject Dies. Indeed, "abstract space", with its "multiform" 
fragmentations being forcibly brought under a 'unified political control, is 
that space we have been describing as postmodern. 
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Jameson's "new space", which I have characterised as abstract following 
Leclerc's analysis of Kant, we can now see as abstract in the terms offered 
by Lefebvre. Abstract space is that space which is defined, delimited and 
~ 
policed by global capitalism; it is constituted, or, rather, poly-sected 
(rather than merely bisected) by fragmentary spaces/stuff which it must 
bring und~r control. In so doing it provides for the Jameson-type saturated 
places particular of postmodernism. Where Lefebvre's analysis transgresses 
Jameson's is in the more fluid history that it writes. We saw above that 
for Lefebvre abstract space did not merely supercede absolute space, but 
that the latter remained underground, so to speak. Jameson's formulation, 
however, relates and regulates different spaces to different stages "in the 
enlargement of capital," <quoted above p. 165). His history is far more 
rigid than Lefebvre's, and anything overflowing from a previous stage of 
capital is soon dissipated, or subsumed by the (term) postmodern. It is at 
this paint that we should return to a point intimated at the outset of the 
description of Lefebvre's absolute/abstract distinction. 
Like Guattari, and even like Jameson, Lefebvre provides a tripartite 
structure according to which an economics· of space can be oriented; he 
provides the following co-ordinates: 1. Spatial Practice; 2. Representation 
of Space; and 3. Representational Space. The first of these, spatial 
practice, can be broadly understood as social space. It describes the 
space (s) produced and provided in everyday life: "It embodies a close 
association, within perceived space, between daily reality <daily routine) 
and urban reality <the routes and networks which link up the 'places set for 
work, 'private' 11fe and leisure). II (Lefebvre, p.38) Bachelard would have 
called this "lived-in space", my emphasis. 
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Representations of space describe "conceptualized space, the space of 
scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social 
engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of 
~ 
whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived." 
(Lefebvre, p.38) This we have termed geometric(ised) space, space which can 
be cut-up and apportioned seperate roles. 
Finally Lefebvre introduces representational spaces. This space is lived 
space, lived "through its associated images and symbols, and hence the 
space of 'inhabitants' and lusers', but also of some artists and perhaps of 
those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to 
do no more than describe. II (Lefebvre, p.39; Lefebvre's emphasis) This is 
the space of the imagination, the space which symbolically overlays real-
perceived space. This is the re-entry point for Lefebvre's Absolute space 
into the Abstract. Representational space describes in more detail the type 
of space which promotes Bachelard's dreams, and in so doing becomes defined 
by them. (It is interesting to note that for Lefebvre some philosophers are 
allowed into this space, whereas we noticed that Bachelard constantly 
lamented the philosopher' s exclusion from such practices.) Having used 
Bachelardian terms to embellish Lefebvre ' s description of this type of 
space, I think we should note that Lefebvre ' s description appears far 
colder than Bachelard I S; that is, Lefebvre does not allow himself to be 
carried away on the wings of reverie as does Bachelard, indeed, Lefebvre's 
analysis seems to contain mild approbation of such activities. 
Nevertheless, I think the comparison still stands. 
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These three axes provide the co-ordinates according to which Lefebvre 
produces his space-productive histories/economies. Absolute and abstract 
underpin and interact with each ather in terms of these three axes. On the 
~ 
whale, abstract space may have supplanted absolute insofar as we take the 
perspective of perceived and conceived space; but, as was stated above, 
with reference to representational, lived space, or even dreamed space, the 
absolute still lingers. What this shows us, is that though Lefebvre's 
desire to institute a new kind of "political economy" along the lines of an 
analysis of the production, or types of production, of space appears on one 
level just another archaic, systematised, unificatory machine, on another 
level it introduces many points of dislocation which undermine any attempt 
at tota1isation or systematisation. Perhaps the best citation of his 
project that Lefebvre gives in his The Production Of Space (1991) comes in 
the final paragraphs; he writes: 
The creation (or production) of a planet-wide space as 
the social foundation of a transformed everyday life 
open to myriad possi bi1i ties - such is the dawn now 
beginning to break on the far horizon. 
I speak of an orientation advisedly. We are concerned 
with nothing more and nothing less than that. We are 
concerned with what might be called a 'sense': an organ 
that perceives, a direction that may be conceived, and 
a directly lived movement progressing towards the 
horizon. And we are concerned with nothing that even 
remotely resembles a system. (Lefebvre, pp.422-423; 
Lefebvre'S emphasis) 
Here Lefebvre's three axes, that have provided him with a sometimes 
immovable critical co-ordinates, now open out towards a realm in which they 
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are used to determine the production of a new space. Lefebvre's absolute 
space ~ abstract space movement that we have described as the formation of 
postmodern space is nat only circumvented but poly-sected by the triadic 
~ 
cri tique of the production of space. Indeed. when this triadic cri tique 
begins to oscillate itself - as the quotation above shows - then any 
semblance of critical rigidity in Lefebvre's work must disappear. 
To recap: Jameson provides a historical reification of space-production in 
terms of the changes in capitalism since the late-eighteenth. early-
nineteenth centuries. Harvey provides an excellent analysis of the 
contemporary postmodern space and its relation to capitalism. In both cases 
the contemporary space according to which we must articulate and 
constitute subjectivities - is one which is sickeningly putrid ... a theme 
which has been present throughout this thesis. Yet nei ther Jameson nor 
Harvey offer us any al ternative. Jameson is content to try to forge a 
political praxis from within this space; whereas Harvey yearns for the good 
old days of,the Modernist space. before the subject died (or had the life-
support machine's plugs pulled on it) and when the future was one that 
could be forged. As the quotation immediately above (and the one below) 
shows. Lefebvre does offer us an al ternati vet To the type of Marxist 
nostalgia that Harvey exhibits Lefebvre has the following advice: 
The hypothesis of an ultimate and preordained meaning 
of historical becoming collapses in face of an analysis, 
of the strategies deployed across the surface of the 
planet'. 
The transformation of society presupposes a 
collective ownership and management of space founded on 
a permanent participation of the I interested parties', 
Conclusion 
with their multiple, varied and even contradictory 
interests. It thus also presupposes confrontation - and 
indeed this has already emerged in the problems of the 
'environment' .... (Lefebvre, pp.418, 422)17 
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It is the alternative view of space that Lefebvre (along with all the 
others this thesis has mentioned) offers that will provide us wi th an 
articulation of the "politically coherent collective praxes" intoned at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
Final ReDarks. 
As the preceding chapter closed we witnessed a prolonged advocation for the 
proliferation of a material space. Such a line of flight must be briefly 
re-accessed in order to continue with the cartography of Guattari's 
"poli tically coherent collective praxes." A material space, a space which 
oozes, is a necessary production of both the dislocation of the map/thing-
mapped dialectic - such that the map and its terri tory are instances of 
mutual and immanent production - and the promotion of the myriad vectors 
I 
constituitive of subjectification. In the terms used throughout this 
l' I 
chapter: the advocation and burgeoning of schizophrenic becomings do not 
only transgress the boundaries inflicted in the production of a (dead) 
Subject, but they also ensure the deterritorialisation of striated space. I 
hope to have shown how postmodern space, its abstraction and coagulationl 
--
compression into different places, has its roots wi thin the tradi tion I 
have described using Kant ("organisation"), Bachelard ("geometricisation" 
and ,"co-ordination"), Deleuze and Guattari ("deterritorialisation ~ 
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reterritorialisation"), and Lefebvre (Hhomogenisation"), 
..,-----
Therefore, it is in the creation of a material space, in the 
schizophrenisation of the flows constructive of capitalism, in the final 
destruction of the Dead Subject (and the postmodern charnel house which has 
protected not only those watching over the corpse, but has provided the 
site for those offering various theoretical libations to it), in the 
rhizomatic burgeoning of vectors of subjectification, in short, in 
cartography, that "politically coherent collective praxes" can 
proliferate, Given the terms in which this thesis has been couched, what 
are the consequences of such "politically coherent collective praxes"? 
1. Politically coherent. It would seem that these two words - maybe 
"coherent" especially - consign the whole of this proj ect back into the 
realms of systematic, totalising and homogenising discourse. Yet this is 
not the case. In keeping with the constant entreaty throughout this thesis 
to multiply the vectors constituting subjectivity, to proliferate the 
material swarm according to which such, vectors are put into motion, 
Guattari's invocation of "political coherence" must not be viewed as a call 
to unification. In his Les trois ecolagies (1989) he explains: 
Not only is it necessary not to homogenize the various 
levels of practice - not to join them under the aegis 
of some transcendent insistence; we have also to engage 
them in processes of heterogenesis. Feminists· will 
never be involved enough in a becoming-woman. and there 
is no reason to ask the immigrant population to 
renounce the cultural features of its being, or its 
Conclusion 
membership of a particular nationality. Our objective 
should be to nurture individual cultures. while at the 
same time inventing new contracts of citizenship: to 
create an order of the state in which singularity. 
exceptions, and rari ty coexist under the least 
oppressive possible conditions. ('The Three Ecologies', 
p.139. Guattari's emphasis. translation modified.)18 
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We have seen singularities function within the terms of the production of 
subjectivities, as particular pOints of saturation of subjective vectors. 
the passage quoted above gives these singularities a concretely political 
complexion. Marginalised groups and cultures will benefit from the 
proliferation of subjective vectors in that such vectors have already 
expunged any notions or structures of hierarchy. This was the proj ect of 
the rhizomes. When subjectivities replace Subjects. the margins will be 
multiplied so that anyone grouping will not be oppressed by any other. A 
new "contract of citizenship" will merely be a cartography: the definition 
and construction of a territory according to which such unimpeded vectors 
of subj ectification/singulari ties can operate without fear of oppression; 
that is. a map of the possibilities of deterritorialisation without 
reterritorialisation. In the end - or in the beginning - membership of any 
one group. in other words, the ability to occupy anyone margin/territory, 
will be as fluid as the subjectivities which orient it. It is in this 
respect that such "poli tically coherent" vectors intimate towards 
"collective praxes." 
2. Collective praxes. Once more must we quote from Les trais ecalagies 
(1989) : 
Conclusion 
The aim of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics was the 
"resolution" of opposites. This is no longer the 
objective of eco-logic. Certainly, in the field of 
.r-- social ecology in particular, there will be times of 
struggle in which all men and women feel a need to set 
common objectives and act "like little soldiers" - by 
which I mean good activists. But there will also be 
periods of resingularisation, in which indi vidual and 
collective subjectivities will "reclaim their due", and 
in which creative expression as such will take 
precedence over collective goals. ('The Three 
Ecologies', pp.139-140j myemphasis)Jg 
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Under any circumstances will it be possible to hook up various subjective 
assemblages, to synchronise vectors of subjectivity, to congregate 
singulari ties to achieve particular goals; goals which can occur at any 
time and in any place, without prior prescription. Assemblages and 
collectives can be created and destroyed without fear of being slapped by 
some ideological super-ego. Indeed, collective action will be easier to 
achieve wi thout the forbidding structure of a hierarchy of subj ects, or 
privileged groupings. It is exactly this type, and possibility, of action 
which describes Deleuze and Guattari' s "molecular revolutions". In his 
essay 'The Proliferation of Margins'20 Guattari explains. "What 
characterizes the 'molecular' here is the fact that the lines of flight 
merge wi th the objecti ve lines of de terri torialization of the system and 
create an irreversible aspiration for new spaces of liberty." (p.l09j 
Guattari's emphasis.) Thus, the never ending smoothing of space, the 
constant burgeoning of a line of flight comprising a vector of 
subjectification,· an ongoing cartography, are all "productive" of such 
molecular revolutions. 
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It appears, then, that Guattari's "politically coherent collective pr~xes" 
can be articulated using another phrase, "cartography of subjectification". 
This is all very easy to write, but what relevance does it have (if any) to 
.r--
the cartographic problems I articulated at the opening o.f this chapter? 
that is, how does my "cartography of subjectification" relate' to the 
problems of reactionary nationalism cited above? 
The boundaries currently being marked across Europe are almost entirely 
those drawn by nationalist groups with the aim of outlining national 
territories. The Sarajevo experience is one which best describes such 
cartographies. As was wri tten above, the town-dwellers are resisting the 
imposi tion of divisions with ethnic ti tIes being imposed upon them by 
outsiders. In a way which muddies the Western media I s characterisation of 
the conflict as one purely between Serb and Muslim/Croat, the town-dwellers 
appear to comprise all of these people, and maybe some others too. Yet to 
name their conflict. as one which proceeds cartographically goes against 
everything ~hat I have advocated for such a practice. However, as we have 
seen over and over again throughout this thesis, even the most posi ti ve 
flows for liberation can be retrenched wi thin an oppressi ve . framework. 
Remember Deleuze and Guattari' s warning that smooth space alone will not 
save us? The same warning must be voiced viz cartography (and its attendant 
practices: schizoanalysis, topoanalysis, ecology/ecosophy ... ). 
It is for this reason that the cartographic concern must be a global one. 
Complaining about the vision of the world in which human "intervention is 
irrelevant a perspective outlined for us by structuralism and 
postmodernism - Guattari in Les trois ecalqgies (1989) concludes: 
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It is quite simply wrong to regard action on the 
psyche, the socius and the environment as separate. 
Indeed, if we continue ... to refuse squarely to confront 
~ the simul taneous degradation of these three areas, we 
will in effect be acquiescing in a general 
infantiliazation of opinion, a destruction and 
neutralization of democracy.... (' The Three Ecologies', 
p.34; Guattari's emphasis)21 
There is not an area of contemporary life which is not affected by change -
or indeed stagnation - in any other. If such a situation is not a recent 
0-1 
occu[ance, then certainly contemporary capitalism - integrated world 
capitalism - has accentuated it. In a world co-ordinated according to the 
flows of capital (the organised flows of capital) any manifestation,upon it 
has links with capital. This is why Guattari emphasises the 
interrelatedness of his analyses. A cartography must cast its gaze 
globally: otherwise its use for outlining particular territorial boundaries 
consti tutes a falling back under the control of reactionary nationalism; 
and it must spread itself following the routes of capital: revving it up so 
that capitalist co-ordination has no affect. 
It is according to this global (though not homogenising) view that a 
cartography of subjectification will provide for the pu11ulation not only 
of material spaces but of their attendant subjective possibilities. When 
the blinkers of nationalism have been wrenched from _ the cartographic 
process, its violence can be directed towards that which has been 
productive of the empty spaces and dead subjects with which we have become 
accustomed. 
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The beauty of cartographic virulence is that it has been born of the 
knotting of Kantianism and Capitalism (at least). As we have seen, the 
usual fate of such a coupling has been sunk straight into a grave. Yet, as 
~ /T 
soon as cartography glimpses the cemetary's milky daylight, it 
V 
proliferates. This is not optimism (of the modernist kind) but awe. 
Capitalism endeavours to constrain it with talk of nationalities, natural 
boundaries and ethnic superiority; indeed, it is according to these stories 
that Capitalism seeks to inhibit its own blind workings. (We should 
remember, at this point, the lengths to which Kant went in order to shackle 
his ~thetic subjectivity to his critical system.> Localised skirmishes -
whether nationalist wars like those erupting in central-eastern Europe and 
the Middle-East (with their structuration of the flow of surplus weaponry), 
or drug related, user v. power structure clashes, which can 
reterri torialise particular neighbourhoods in particular ci ties (that is, 
constrain such areas to the ghettoes) - can only aid the retrenchment of 
the global capitalist network. Even the transport-artery blockades by 
lorry-dri vers, taxi-dri vers, farm workers and air-traffic controllers in 
France and Italy in early summer 1992, though threatening to European 
commerce in toto, worked wonders for the tourist trades of the Low 
Countries. (The nature of the road-blockade in France has exhi bi ted true 
cartographic potential, however, coming from the extreme irrelevance of 
its targets to its problems: indiscriminately, 'any major road and any type 
of transported goods have been targeted without the need to shackle the 
action to particular spaces. ) 
The assertion of a "dead subject" exemplifies the conservatism and apathy 
of the postmodern condition; a condi tion where poli tical action is, at 
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least, useless. This must be the conlusion reached from reading the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari. To this conclusion we must add a cartography of 
subjectification. 
~ 
Kant's subject was always constrained to be, at least, an obsessional 
neurotic: neatly arranging its organs, its constitutive pieces, into,ever 
cleaner, rational spaces in order that it can function on a level of the 
most numbing normality. The subject - whose brief affirmation of sunlight 
as it plopped into the grave, provided it with a story about consciousness 
to range against the assertion of it being still-born - now provides the 
site for cartographic exacerbation. Like Artaud's plague-theatre attacking 
and infecting the body-politic worthy of it, a cartography of 
subjectification will disorganise the pieces that have constituted this 
subject. Like the rhizomes sprouting from the organised branches of an 
arboreal structure, the cartography of subjectification will burgeon in the 
spaces emptied or compressed under capitalism. Like Bachelard' s dreamed 
topoanalysis, oozing throughout (in and out, up and down) the house of 
reason, its movement - rather its relative speeds and slownesses - will be 
utterly indiscriminate, fluctuating, disruptive and enjoyable ... 
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NOTES. 
PREFACE-; 
1. Lacoue-Labarthe, Ph. and Nancy, J.-L., L'Absalu litteraire. Tbearie de 
la litterature du ramantisme allemand, collection Poetique (Paris, Editions 
du Seuil: 1978) 
2. In his book, The Story of Modern Art, 2nd edition (Oxford, Phaidon Press 
Ltd.: 1989), Norbert Lynton uses as an epigraph to the second chapter 
(titled, 'Reality Questioned and Answered') the following lines from Yeats, 
"The close of the past century was full of a strange desire to get out of 
form ... 1 now feel an impulse to create form." (quoted p.55) In 1912 the art 
critic Roger Fry wrote of the Post-Impressionist exhibitors (in exhibitions 
held at the Grafton Galleries in 1910 and 1912, which included Picasso, 
Braque and Matisse), that they "do not seek to imitate form, but to create 
form; not to imitate life, but to find an equivalent for life" (quoted by 
Peter Faulkner in the 'Introduction' to his anthology. A Modernist Reader. 
Modernism in England 1910-1930 [London, B. T. Batsford Ltd.: 1986], p.19). 
In both cases we can see the growing urge of the artists at the outset of 
the present century, to break away from the ossified ideas of the previous 
century, and forge those necessary to understand the experiences that 
seemed 50 different. Norbert Lynton goes on to describe, in The Story Of 
Modern Art, the move the artistic avant-garde made into Synthetic and 
Analytic Cubism, Futurism, Neo-Plasticism, Suprematism, Constructivism and 
Expressionism in the early part of this century; in the second chapter he 
writes: 
In his Reminiscences (1913) Kandinsky wrote that 'the 
disintegration of the atom was t.o me like the 
disintegration of the whole world.' Mass. location, 
space, and time could no longer be received as the 
absolut.es they had once seemed to be. The artist could 
respond to this in a variety of ways: he could try to 
find images for this discontinuity and complexi ty; he 
Iotes 
could seek to build models of man-made order and offer 
them as metaphors for the new social order that was 
needed in this much changed world; he coluld turn 
.,-- inward to explore unconscious area that are permanent 
and inalienable; he could ignore change and continue to 
give his attention to natural beauty, making truer and 
possibly more energetic representations than before. 
and he could attach himself to the comforts of past 
art, offering his public a sense of security by 
upholding time-honoured values and screening it against 
the new. <p.65) 
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Whatever course was taken, whatever style of art was followed, it appears 
~hat each one offered a <particular?) way of understanding and reacting to 
the immense upheavals of the early part of this century, and further that 
this understanding was based upon the sensible, conceptual or rational 
structures of an individual subject - most notably the figure of the artist 
itself. Such problems were not the sole province of the plastiC or 
figurative arts. In his novel What Maisie Knew (1897), Henry James orders 
the events which make up its contents according to the "perceptual 
register" of a little girl. In his 'Preface' to the 1909 edi tion he 
explains: 
The one presented register of the whole complexity 
would be the play of the child's confused and obscure 
notion of it, and yet the whole, as I say, should be 
unmistakebly, should be honourably there, seen through 
the faint intelligence, or at the least attested by the 
imponderable presence, and still advertiSing its sense. 
(What Maisie Knew [Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin Books 
Ltd.: 1966], p.9) 
Writing about the artist, novelist, bombardier and occasional fascist 
Wyndham Lewis, Fred~ic Jameson provides what could be seen not only as a / 
gloss on James's passage (above), but also as an elucidation of literary 
Modernism in general; he writes: 
Iotes 
The modernist gesture is thus ideological and Utopian 
all at once: perpetuating the increasing 
subjectivization of individual experience and the 
~ atomization and disintegration of the older social 
communi ties, expressing" the anxiety and revulsion of 
intellectuals before the reification of social life and 
the ever intensifying class conflicts of industrial 
society, it also embodies a will to overcome the 
commodification of late nineteenth-century capi tal ism, 
and to substitute for' the mouldering and overstuffed 
bazaar of late Victorian life the mystique and promise 
of some intense and heightened, more authentic 
experience. (Fables Of Aggression. Wyndham Lewis. the 
Modernist as Fascist [Berkeley and Los Angeles, Ca., 
The University of California Press: 1979], p.39) 
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These are just a few examples of the reactions of organisation around a 
subject to the fragmentations felt by 'modernist' artists at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. 
INTRODUCTION; 'A SPATIAL REVOLUTION, KANT, SPACE AND THE SUBJECT,' 
1. Kant, I., Critique Of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd 
Impression (London, Macmillan: 1933). When quoting from this book, 
references will be made in the text, following the convention of ci ting 
both the first and second edition page numbers, in the form: (A ... /B ... ). 
2. Bencivenga, E., Kant's Copernican ReYolution (New York/Oxford, O.U.P.: 
1987) 
3. The bracketting of "time" in this passage will be the nearest this 
thesis comes to"dealing with it theoretically. This is not a political move 
- my aim is not to marginalise the problem of' time because I think it has 
had its philosophical day - but merely a move designed to keep this thesis 
within its word-count boundaries. However, the reappraisal of the notion of 
time across the area(s) mapped by this thesis, would not present an 
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impossible task: to thrust time into the muddy realms of the material, as I 
will do with space, could provide the paradigms for another research 
project. Furthermore, what would history after cartography look like? 
Suffice--to reiterate, that there 1s no space 1n this thesis for an adequate 
examination of these problems. 
For one of the most recent discussions of the role of time in relation to 
contemporary Continental philosophy, see David Wood's, The Deconstruction 
Of Time (Atlantic Highlands N. J., Humanities Press International: 1989); 
and for a contemporary philosophical account of the questions of history 
and historiography, see 'David Ashby's theSiS, Foucault. Ricoeur and the 
Narratiyp- Of History (unpublished), Department of Philosophy, University of 
Warwick. 
4. Kemp Smith, N., A Commentary on Kant's 'Critique Of Pure Reason', 2nd 
edi tion [1923] (Bath, Cedric Chivers 1 td.: 1969). When quoting from this 
book, references will be made in the text, in the form: (Kemp Smith, 
p .... ). 
5. Leclerc,!., 'The Meaning of "Space" in Kant', in Kant's Theory Of 
Knowledge, edt Lewis Whi te Beck (Boston/Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing 
Co.: 1974) pp.87-94. When quoting from this essay, references will be made 
in the text, in the form: (Leclerc, p .... ). 
6. In Part II of the Principles Of Philosophy, titled 'Principles of 
Material Things', Descartes writes: 
XIV. The terms place and space differ in that place 
signifies posi tion more expressly than size or shape, 
and these features, conversely, are rather what we have 
in mind when we speak of space. (p.204) 
thus explaining the difference he observes between place and space. The 
following principle explains his relation to the Aristotelian definition of 
space, with respect to bounding surfaces (that we have already encountered 
in this chapter), as follows: 
Iotes 
XV. Thus we always take a space to mean an extension in 
length, breadth, and depth. Place is considered 
sometimes as intrinsic to an object that is in a place, 
~ and sometimes as extrinsic to it. Intrinsic place is 
just the same as space; "extrinsic place may be taken to 
mean the surface immediately surrounding the body that 
is in the place. It should be noted that surface here 
does not mean a part of the surrounding body, but only 
the common boundary of the surrounding and the 
surrounded bodies, which is a mere aspect of them; at 
least, what is meant is the surface as a common 
property, which is not part of one body rather than the 
other, and is deemed to be always 'the same' so long as 
it keeps the same size and shape. For even if the body, 
and the surface of the body, surrounding a given 
object, should completely change, yet the object so 
surrounded is nat considered as changing its place, 
provided that it meanwhile retains the same posi tion 
relatively to the bodies that are taken as unmoving. 
(pp.204-205) 
194 
We can see that Descartes' definition of space is still couched in the 
Aristotelian terms peculiar to his historical context; however, as Leclerc 
shows, Descartes' PrinCiple XIV announces a considerable shift from the 
Aristotelian norm. 
7. Kant, I., 'Concerning the ultimate foundation of the differentiation of 
regions in space' (1768], in Kant: Selected Pre-Critical Writings and 
Correspondence with Beck, translated by G. B.' Kerferd and D. E. Walford 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1968) pp.36-43. When quoting from 
this essay, references will be made in the text, in the form: (Kant, 
.. 
p. , .. ), 
8. Some of Kant's examples are: the right and left hands; the right or left 
hand and its mirror image; the right and left sides of the body; and 
various species of snail and types of screw. 
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9. Hume, D., A Treatise Of Human Nature, Book One [1739], Fontana Library, 
Sixth Impression (Glasgow, William Collins Sons & Co. ltd.: 1982). When 
quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, in the farm: 
(Hume,~ .. ). 
10. One of the mast striking similarities between bath Hume and Nietzsche's 
analyses of subj ecti vi ty, can be noticed in comparing the two following 
passages; Hume's first: 
The whole of this doctrine [of personal identity] leads 
us to a conclusion, which is of great importance in the 
present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile 
[sic] questions concerning personal identity can never 
be properly decided, and are to be regarded rather as 
grammatical than as philosophical difficulties .... All 
the disputes concerning the identity of connected 
objects are merely verbal, except so far as the 
relation of parts gives rise to same fiction or 
imaginary principle of union, as we have already 
observed. (Hume, pp.311-312) 
With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall 
never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact, which 
these superstitious minds hate to concede - namely, 
that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and nat when "I" 
wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the 
case to say that the subject "I" is the condi tion of 
the predicate "think." It thinks; but that this "it" is 
precisely the famous old "ego" is, . to put it mildly, 
only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an 
"immediate certainty." After all, one ;has even gone tao 
far with this "it thinks" - even the "it" contains an 
interpretatiDn of the process, and does not belong to 
the pr~cess itself. One infers here according to the 
grammatical habit: "Thinking is an activity; every 
activity requires an agent; consequently -" (Nietzsche, 
Iotes 
F., Beyond GOOd and Eyil, translated by Walter 
Kaufmann, A Vintage Book (New York, Random House Inc.: 
1966), § 17. ) 
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In both cases, we can see that any· idea of subjective identity is described 
merely in terms of it being nothing more than a grammatical exigency. 
CHAPTER ONE; • CARTOGRAPHY' , 
1. Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F., CaDi talisme et Scbizopbrenie 2: Kille 
1 ~ 
Plateaux, collection « Critique» (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit: 1980). 
- A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi (London, The Athlone 
Press: 1987) 
When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the 
English translation, in the form: (A Thousand Plateaus, p .. , ,). The 
equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the 
corresponding note. 
2. Guattari, F., Les trois 8calQgies, (Paris, Editions Galilee: 1989). 
- • The Three Ecologies' ,translated by Chris Turner, Material World, N.e:d. 
Formations, vol.8 (Summer 1989), pp.131-147. 
3. Strictly speaking, the production of the organism - "organisation" -
constitutes, for Deleuze and Guattari, a third axis, as the quotation that 
follows in the text shows. However, I will not be as precise as Deleuze and 
Guattari in this chapter and will equate both the movements towards 
signifiation and subjectification as modes of organisation. 
4. I am here adopting the convention used by the English translator of 
K1lle Plateaux in using the term "signifiation". In his Glossary, Brian 
Massumi explains this usage as follows: 
I have followed the increasingly common practice of 
importing signifiance and interpretance into English 
without modification. In Deleuze and Guattari these 
Iotes 
terms refer respectively to the syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic processes of language as a "signifying 
regime of signs." They are borrowed from Benveniste .... 
~(A Thqusand Plateaus, p.xviii.) 
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5. "Tu seras organise, tu seras un organisme, tu articuleras ton corps -
sinon tu ne seras qu'un deprave. Tu seras signifiant et signifie, 
interprete et interprete - sinon tu ne seras qu'un deviant. Tu seras sujet, 
et fixe C0111111e tel, sujet d'enonciation rabattu sur un sujet d'enonce -
sinon tu ne seras qu' un vagabond." (NJ.lle Plateaux, p. 197). 
6. Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F., Capitalisme et Schizophrenie 1: L'Anti 
OEdipe, collection ,'( Cri tique )) (Paris, Les Editions de Minui t: 1972). 
- Anti-OEdipus, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Steem, and Helen R. Lane 
(London, The Athlone Press: 1984) 
7. Artaud, A., I Le the~tre de cruaute' 
(Paris, Les Editions Gallimard: 1974) 
in OEuvres completes, 
.. 
tome XIII 
8. In an early section of Anti-OEdipus, Deleuze and Guattari explain the 
nature, e::;pecially the non-productive nature, of Bodies wi thout Organs. 
They write: 
The full body without organs is the unproductive, the 
sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable. Antonin 
Artaud discovered this one day, finding himself with no 
shape or form whatsoever, right there where he was at 
the moment .... To the machine-organs,_ the body without 
organs opposes the sliding, opaque and- taut surface. To 
the linked, connected and interrupted flows, it opposes 
its amorphous and undifferentiated fluid. To' 
phonetically articulated words, it opposes gasps and 
cries that are sheer unarticulated' blocks of sound. 
(Anti-OEdipus, pp.8, 9; translation modified.) 
Hotes 
[Le corps p1eln sans organes est l' lmproductlf, 1e 
sterl1e, l'lnengendre, l'lnconso~b1e. Antonln Artaud 
~' a decouvert, 1a au i1 etai t, sans forme et sans 
flgure. . .. Aux machlnes'-organes, 1e corps sans organes 
oppose 1a surface g11ssante, opaque et tendue. Aux flux 
11es, connectes et recoupes, 11 oppose son f1ulde 
Bmorphe lndifferencle. Aux mots phonetlques, 11 appose 
des souffles et des crls qui sont autant de blocs 
lnarticu1es. (L'Anti OBdipe. pp.14. 15)] 
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It should be noted. then. that the "production of the Body without Organs" 
does not refer to what it produces. precisely because it produces nothing, 
but rather to the making of a Body without Organs. We shall see that though 
the BwO produces nothing. it does chart, or map the sliding surface/smooth 
space it opposes to the co-ordinated space. 
9. "qul ne cesse de defalre l' organlsme, de falre passer et clrcul er des 
partlcules asignlflantes, lntensites pures, et de s'attribuer les sujets 
auxquels 11 ne 1alsse p1 us qu' un nom C01111I1e trace d' une lntensl te." (l!1.l1.e 
Plateaux, p.10) 
10. "Nous ne parlons pas d'autre chose: les multiplicites, les 11gnes, 
strates et segmentarl tes, 11gnes de ful te et lntensl tes, 1es agencements 
machlnlque et leurs different types, les corps sans organes et leur 
constructlon, leur se1ectlon, 1e plan de consistence, les unltes de mesure 
dans chaque cas. Les stratometres, 1es deleometres, les uni tes CsO de 
densi te, 1es uni tes CsO de convergence ne forment pas seulement une 
quantiflcation de l'ecrlture, mals deflnlssent celle-cl comme etant 
toujours la mesure d'autre chose. Ecrire n'a rlen a volr avec slgnlfler, 
mals avec arpenter, cartographier, ~l11e des contrees a venlr." (l!1.l1.e 
Plateaux, pp.10~11; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.) 
11. The principle of Connection, Deleuze and Guattari describe thus: 
Iotes 
any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, 
and must be. A rhizome ceaselessly establishes 
-----connections between semiotic chains, organisations of 
power, and circumstances relati ve to the arts, 
sciences, and social struggles. (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p.7) 
[ n' importe quel point d' un rhizoJ11e peut ~tre connecte 
avec n'importe quel autre, et doit l'~tre. Un 
rhizome ne cesserai t de connectes des chai nons 
semiotiques, des organisations de pouvoir, des 
occurences renvoyant aux artes, aux sciences, aux 
luttes sociales. (Kille Plateaux, pp.13, 14)] 
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They explain the principle of Heterogeneity with reference to language, as 
follows: 
Language is, in Weinreich's words, 'an essentially 
heterogeneous reality.'... A method of the rhizome 
type, can analyse language only by decentring it onto 
other dimensions and other registers. A language is 
never closed upon itself, except as a function of 
impotence. (A Thqusand Plateaus, pp.7-8) 
[La langue est, se10n une formule de Weinreich, « une 
rea1ite essentiellement heterogene » •... [Ulne methode 
de type rhizome ne peut analyser 1e langage qu'en le 
decentrant sur autres dlmensions et d'autres registres. 
Une langue ne se referme jamais sur el1e-~me que dans 
une fonctioD d'impuisance. <M1lle Plateaux, p.14)] 
We can see that in both cases, both principles extend and expand upon each 
other. The possibility of a rhizome's multiple connections must involve its 
open-endedness. Language is merely an example of the rhizome's ability to 
connect various semiotic chains. 
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12. "ni sujet ni objet, mais seulement des determinations, des grandeurs, 
des dimensions qui ne peuvent croitre sans qu'el1e change de nature (les 
lois de cOJ11binaison croissent donc avec la multip1icite)." <Kille Plateaux, 
p.14) 
It is interesting to note further elaborations Deleuze and Guattariglve of 
the term "multiplicity" in the later "plateau" named, '1730: Becomlng-
Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible ... '. Therein they write, 
and, 
a mul tiplici ty is defined not by the elements that 
compose it in extenSion, not by the characteristics 
that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and 
dimensions it encompasses in "intension." (A Thousand 
Plateaus, p.245) 
a multiplicity is defined not by its elements, nor by a 
centre of unification or comprehension. It is defined 
by the number of dimensions it has; it is not 
divisible, it cannot lose or gain a dimension without 
changing its nature. Since its variations and 
dimensions are immanent to it, it amoun ts to the same 
thing to say that each multiplicity is already composed 
of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and that a 
multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a 
string of other multiplicities, according to its 
thresholds and doors. (A Thqusand Plateaus, p.249; 
Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.) 
13. "routes les multiplicites sont plates en- tant qu'el1es remp1issent, 
occupent toutes leurs dimensions: on par1era donc d'un plan de consistance 
de mu1 tip1ici tes, bien que ce (( plan » soi t a dimensions croissantes 
suivant 1e nombre de connexions qui s'etablissent sur lui." (Kille 
Plateaux, p.15; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis) 
14., "La 1igne de fui te marque a 1a fois 1a reali te d' un nombre de 
dimensions finies que 1a mu1tip1icite remp1it effectivementi 
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l'impossibilite de toute dimension supplementaire, sans que la multiplicite 
se transforme suivant cette ligne; la possibilite et la necessite d'aplatir 
toutes ces multiplicites sur un m~me plan de consistance ou d'exteriorite, 
quelles/que soient leurs dimensions." (}fille Plateaux, p.16) 
15. These themes are discussed in a commentary on a passage from Kant's 
Introduction to his third Critique, in Spring 1991 edition of flL [formerly 
the Warwick Journal Of Philosophy]. They are dealt with, again, in the 
following section. 
16. " Ecrire, faire rhizome, accroi tre son terri toire par 
deterritorialisation, etendre la ligne de fuite jusqu'au point OU elle 
couvre tout le plan de consistance en une machine abstrai te." (ll1l..lJl 
Plateaux, p.19) 
17. "un rhizome n'est justiciable d'aucun modele structural ou generatif. 
11 est etranger a toute idee d'axe genetique, comme de structure pro[onde. 
Un axe genetique est comme une unite pivotale objective sur laquelle 
s'organisent des stades successifs; une structure profonde est plutot comma 
une suite de base decomposable en constituants immediats, tandis que 
l' uni te du produi t . passe dans une autre dimension, transformationelle et 
subjective." (Mille Plateaux, p.19) 
18. The motif of 'the trace' has an important role in contemporary 
Continental philosophy. Derrida uses the terms "trace" and "trace-
structure" in his De la Grammqtolagie, collection « Cri tique » (Paris, Les 
Editions de Minuit: 1967) [Of Grammatology. translated by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Uni versi ty 
Press: 1976)]. These, however, translate la "trace; which refers to: the 
track. trail, weal, scar, or mark. The type of trace that one observes in a 
particle chamber; the tracks a wolf makes across the snow. Le calque refers 
to a tracing, a traced design; the type of tracing that a draughtsman makes 
of his design. Al though the two terms' seem" to be slightly different in 
meaning, they come together in this description, for la trace becomes the 
outline of which le calque is the whole. 
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Derrida writes that. "The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in 
general. rihich a1110unts to saying once again that there is no absolute 
origin of sense in genra1. The trace is the differance which opens 
-------appearance and signification." (Of Grammatology. p.65; Derrida's emphasis) 
In the understanding offered by Derrida. trace becomes valorised even in 
its production (and veiling of such production) of signification. and its 
attendant systems of heirarchy and order. The movement of the rhizome over 
that of the trace. will circumvent - or destroy - such hierarchies. 
19. "Tout autre est le rhizome," they wri te. "carte 
Faire 1a carte, et pas 1e calque." (Hille Plateaux, 
Guattari's emphasis.) 
et non pas calque. 
p. 20; Deleuze and 
20. "Elle [la cartel concourt a la connexion des champs, au deb10quage des 
corps sans organes, a leur ouverture maximum sur un plan de consistance. 
E11e fait e11e-111~111e partie du rhizome. La carte est ouverte, e1le est 
connectable dans toutes ses dimensions, demontab1e, renversab1e, 
susceptible de recevoir constamment des modifications. Elle peut ~tre 
dechiree, renversee, s'adapter a des montages de toute nature, ~tre mise en 
chantier par un individu, un groupe, une formation socia1e. On peut 1a 
dessiner sur un mur, 1a concevoir C0111JI1e une oeuvre d' art, 1a construire 
C0111JI1e une action po1itique ou C0111JI1e une meditation." (Mille Plateaux, p.20) 
21. "Une carte est affaire de perfor11Jance, tandis que le calque renvoie 
toujours a une « competance » pretendue." (Kille Plateaux, p.20) 
22. "Or je dis que 1 'etat social actuel est inique et bon de detruire. 8i 
c'est 1e fait de the~tre de s'en preoccuper, c'est encore plus ce1ui de 10. 
mi trail1e." Artaud, A., Le tbe"tre et son double, in OEuyres completes, 
tome IV (PariS, Les Editions Gallimard: 1964), p.50; my translation. 
23. "Une carte ne comporte-t-elle pas des phe~omenes de red~ndance qui sont 
deja comme ses propres calques? Une multiplicite n'a-t-e1le pas ses strates 
ou s'enracinent des unifications et tota1isations, des 11Jassifications, des 
mecanismes mi111etiques, des prises de pouvoir signifiantes, des attributions 
subjectives? ]r[~me 1es lignes de fuite ne vont-e11es pas reproduire, a 10. 
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faveur de leur divergence eventue11e, 1es formations qu'e11es avaient pour 
fonction de defaire ou de tourner?' (Hille Plateaux, p.21) 
24. "11 Ya rupture dans 1e rhizome chaque fois que des 1ignes seg111entaires 
exp10sent dans une 1igne de fUite, mais 1e 1igne de fuite fait partie du 
rhizo111e. Ces 1ignes ne cessent de se renvoyer 1es unes aux autres. C'est 
pourquoi on ne peut jamais se donner un dua1is111e ou une dichoto1111e, 111~111e 
sous 1a for111e rudi111entaire du bon et du mauvais." (Hille Plateaux, p.16) 
25. "Etre rhizo111orphe, c'est produire des tiges et fi1a111ents qui ont l'air 
de racines, ou 111ieux encore se connectent avec e11es en penetrant dans 1e 
tronc, qui tte ales faire servir a de nouveaux usages etranges." (l!ill.e. 
Plateaux, pp.23-24) 
26. "Ce qui c0111pte, c' est que 1 e arbre-racine et 1 e rhizome-canal ne 
s'opposent pas comme deux 111ode1es: l'un agit comme 111ode1e et comme calque 
transcendants, 111~111e s'i1 engendre ses propres fui tesj l' autre agi t COl11111e 
processus immanent qUi renverse 1e 111ode1e et ebauche une carte, 111~111e s'i1 
construite ses propres hierarchies, 111~me s'i1 suscite un canal despotique . 
• t. 11 s'agit du modele, que ne cesse pas de s'eriger et de s'enfoncer, et 
du processus qui ne cesse pas de s'a11onger, de se r0111pre et reprondre." 
(Kille Plateaux, p.31) 
27. The idea of a "project" has an ambiguous role in recent p~ilosophical 
thought; an ambiguity that is encaptured in Georges Bataille's L'experience 
interieure, OEuvres c0111p1etes V (Paris, Editions Gallimard: 1973). For 
Bataille, the notion of a project involved order, homogeneity, and 
oppression, or in the terms employed by Deleuze and Guattari, 
subjectification, signifiation and organisation. A project - or, to project 
- embraces the notion of a determining end, or aim. Bataille's exhortation 
of the inner experience is deSigned to destroy such dialectical thinking. 
But - and it is at this point that Derrida' s critique of Bataille takes 
hold - it could be argued that the urge to embrace inner experience (as 
opposed to discursive experience) is merely another project. Artaud's 
cruel, screaming theatre (as opposed to discursive drama) could suffer the 
same criticism. Bataille, however, has already encountered such criticism, 
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"llean111Oins 1 'experience interieure est projet ... " he wri tes 
interieure, p.35). He explains further: 
(L'experience 
.. 
"'E11e l'est, l'holI1l11e l'etant en entier pas 1e 1angage 
qui par essence, exception faite de sa perversion 
poetique, est projet. Hais 1e projet n'est plus dans ce 
cas ce1ui, posi tif, du sa1ut, mais ce1 ui, negatif, 
d'abo1ir 1e pouvoir des mots, done du projet. 
(L'experience interieure, p.35) 
The projection of Bataille's experience is based upon, again in Deleuze and 
Guattari's terms, the possibility of the multiplicity of connections of 
that experience; his proj ect does nat define the aim of such experience, 
but, rather, articulates the myriad lines of flight that it can take. It is 
the same with Artaud's theatre: a cry does nat represent a dramatic 
construction of a bodily function, but the written theatrification of such 
a function. What is the difference? The farmer is the empty production of 
paradigms, set to control and repress; the latter is the articulation of 
the destruction of such oppressive power. Bataille explains, "Car 1e projet 
est 1e prison dont je veux m'echapper (le projet, l'existence discursive>: 
j'ai forme 1e projet d'echapper au projet!" (L'experience interieure, p.73) 
Deleuze and Guattari make a similar move in }fille Plateaux in discussing 
their use of dualisms; they write, "Nous ne nous servons d'un dua1isme de 
mde1es que pour atteindre a un processus qui recuserai t tout modele." 
(X1lle Plateaux, p. 31). For Bataille and Deleuze and Guattari, nat to 
mention Artaud, their projects, or models, serve as a type of user's 
manual. Nat as a transcendent outline which thereby organises the contents, 
but as a type of map. 
My cartography operates in the same way, as a sort of "walk this way ... ", 
which does nat serve to shaw the dead Subject in all its ratting splendour, 
but which maps subjectivities whereby we no longer have to say The Subject. 
28. "Non pas en arriver au point ou l'on ne dit plus je, mais au point ou 
fa,n'a plus aucune importance de dire ou de ne pas dire je." (J!1l.l.e. 
Plateaux, p.9) 
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29. This notion of the role and power of ~sthetic experience, is similar to 
that expounded by Schopenhauer. For him, to engage in ~thetic experience 
is to suspend all those psychological, epistemological and metaphysical 
mechanis~ich perform individuation; thereby relieving the experiencing 
being from the pain which necessarily accompanies it as an individual 
subject. 
30. Kant,!., CritiQ.ue of Judgement, translated by J. C. Meredi th (1928] 
(Oxford, Oxford Uni versi ty Press; 1952). Cf. also the following passage, 
wherein Kant elucidates the theory of the imagination under free-play, and 
the grounds for its sumsumption under the critical structure: 
If ... we attach to a concept a representation of the 
imagination belonging to its presentation, but inducing 
solely on its own account such a wealth of thought as 
would never admit of comprehension in a definite 
concept, and, as a consequence, giving resthetically an 
unbound expansion to the concept itself, then the 
imagination here displays a creative activity, and it 
puts the facul ty of intellectual ideas (reason) into 
motion - a motion, at the instance of a representation, 
towards an extension of thought, that, while germane, 
no doubt, to the concept of the object, exceeds what 
can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly 
expressed. (Critique Of Judgement, p.177) 
31. "11 a g~nere, structura1ise 1e rhizome, et 1e calque ne reproduit deja 
que 1ui-m~me quand i1 croit reproduire autre chose. C'est pourquoi 11 est 
si dangereux. 11 injecte des redondances, et 1es propage. Ce que 1e calque 
reproduit de 1a carte ou du rhizome, c'en sont seu1ement 1es impasses, 1es 
b1ocages, 1es germes de pivot ou 1es points de structuration." (lL!.ll.e. 
Plateaux, p. 21) .. 
32. cf. Heidegger, M., 'Language' in Poetry. Language, Thought, translated 
by ~Al bert Hofstadter, A Harper Colophon Book (New York, Harper & Row 
Publishers Inc.: 1975), For example, he writes: 
Iotes 
and: 
This is 
language 
language 
------speaks. 
p.190) 
why we 
itself'?" 
occur 
Is this, 
pander the question, "What about 
This is why we ask, "In what way 'does 
as language'?" We answer: Language 
seriously, the answer'? ('Language', 
"Language is language." This statement does nat lead us 
to something else in which language is grounded. Nor 
does it say anything about whether language itself may 
be a ground for something else. The sentence, "Language 
is language," leaves us to haver aver an abyss as lang 
as we endure what it says. ('Language', p.191) 
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33. Bachelard, G., La poetique de l'espace, 4· edition (Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France: 1964) 
CHAPTER TWO, 'TOPO- ANALYS IS'; 
1. Bachelard, G., La poetique de 1 'espace, 4· edi tion (Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France: 1964). 
- The Poetics Of Space, translated by Maria Jolas (Baston, Beacon Press: 
1969) . 
When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the 
English translation, in the farm: (The Poetics of Space, p .... ). The 
equivalent passage from the French edition will be quoted in the 
corresponding nate. 
2. .. 11 faut en venir, pour ec1airer phi1osophiquement 1e prob1eIDe de 
l'image poetique, a une phenomeno1ogie de l'inagination. Entendons par 1a 
une etude du phenomene de l' image poetique quand l' image emerge dans 1e 
conscience comme un produit direct du coeur, de l'~me, de l'~tre de l'homme 
saisi dans son actua1ite." (La Postique de l'espace, p.2) 
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3. In using this word, "phenomenology", and in dealing wi th the term 
throughout this chapter, I am interested neither in it as a Movement in the 
History of Philosophy, nor in Bachelard's relationship with such a 
Movement. Any criticism of Bachelard's "phenomenological" approach, will 
refer purely to Bachelard, as far as possible. For Bachelard's reaction to 
the phenomenological reduction, see notes 11 and 39, below. 
4. Most notably his Psycbanalyse du feu, (Paris, Librarie Gallimard: 1938) 
5. Bachelard quotes the phenomenologist and psychologist, Eugene Minkowski, 
in the opening pages of La Poetique de l'espace. As a note in the 
translation of this text explains, Minkowski following Bergson 
described the vital force of human life, not as a feeling of existence, but 
"a feeling of participation in a flowing onward." (The Poetics of Space, 
p.xii, n.1) The editor/translator quotes the following passage from 
Minkowski's Vern une COS1PQlogie: 
If, having fixed the original form in our mind's eye, 
we ask ourselves how that form comes alive and fills 
with life, we di~~ver a new dynamic and vital 
category, a new pro~~y of the universe: reverberation 
[retentirl .... (lac. cit.) 
Reverberation, then, exemplifies the dynamic quality of consciousness, not 
only for Minkowski, but for Bachelard too. My choice of the term "resonate" 
in this passage, reflects the sonic quality of Minkowski's metaphor quoted 
by Bachelard. 
6. Bachelard interweaves many themes in The Poetics of Space, one of which 
is the nature of reading/writing. The r~ionshiP between poet and reader 
is referred to in the most detail in §iv of the introduction to The Poetics 
Of Space; and is a major theme in Bachelard's The Poetics Of Reyerie (for 
edition details see note 9 below). A proper investigation of such a theme 
in Bachelard's work calls for more space than this thesis has to offer. 
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7. Coleridge, S. T., B1ograph1a L1teraria, edited by George Watson, An 
Everyman Classic (London and Melbourne, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.: 1975). 
The most famous passage from this book, concerning the imagination, runs as 
follows: 
~ 
The imagination then I consider either as primary, or 
secondary. The primary imagination I hold to be the 
Ii ving power and prime agent of all human perception, 
and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AX. The secondary I 
consider as an·echo of the former, co-eXisting with the 
conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary 
in the kind of its agency, and differing only in 
degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, 
diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where 
this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all 
events, it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is 
essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are 
essentially fixed and dead. (Pi 167; Coleridge's 
emphases. ) 
It is easy to wi tness the influence of Kant (wham Coleridge calls "The 
venerable Sage of Koenigsberg ... " at the beginning of this chapter) 
throughout this passage. 
8. For an examination of Bachelard's notion of space and subjectivity, with 
special reference to the work of the novelist Georges Perec, see my • The 
Space-out Subj ect: Bachelard and Perec', in Sub1 ectiyity and Literature 
from the ROmantics to the Present Day. Creating the Self, edited by Philip 
Shaw and Peter Stockwell (London, Pinter Publishers: 1991), pp.146-158. 
Al though some of the themes I am dealing w~ th in the pr~sent work, were 
present in the one mentioned above, they are now differently oriented and 
more thouroughly examined. 
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9. Bachelard, G., La faBtique de 1a reverie (Paris, Presses Universitaires 
de France: 1960). 
- The Poetics of Reyerie, translated by Daniel Russel (Baston, Beacon 
Press: 197[)'-
When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the 
English translation, in the form: (The Poetics Of Reyerie, p .... ). The 
equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the 
corresponding nate. 
10. "i1 s'agissait de mettre en p1eine 1umiere 1a prise de conscience d'un 
sujet emervei11e par 1es images poetiques." (La PoBtique de 1a reverie, 
p.1) 
11. "Et c'est ainsi que j'"i choisi 1a pheno.meno1ogie dans l'espoir de 
reexaminer d' un regard neuf les images fide1ement aimees, si solidement 
fixees dans ma 11Iemoire que je ne sais plus si je me souviens ou si 
j'imagine quand je 1es retrouve en :mes r~veries." (La PoBtique de 1a 
reverie, p.2) 
12. "e11e revient a :mettre l'accent sur leur vertu d'origine, a saisir 
l'~tre m~me de leur originalite et a beneficier ainsi de l'insigne 
productivite psychique qui est ce11e de l' imagination." (La Poetique de 1a 
reverie, p.2) 
13. "Un phi1osophe reste, CO!111I1e on dit aujourd'hui, « en situation 
phi1osophique », i1 a parfois 1a pretention de tout comencerj mais, ha1as! 
i1 continue.,. 11 a 1u tant de 1ivres de phi1osophie! Sous pretexte de 1es 
etudier, de 1es enseigner, i1 a deforme tant de « systemes »! Quand 1e soir 
est venu, quand i1 nenseigne plus, i1 croit avoir 1e droit de s'enfermer 
dans 1e systeme de son choix," (La POBtique de 1a reverie, p.2) 
14. "Pour nous, toute prise de conscience est un accroi semen t de 
conscience, une augmentation de 1umiere, un renforcement de la coherence 
psychique. Sa rapidite ou son instantaneite peuvent nous masquer la 
croissance. Hais i1 y a croissance d'~tre dans toute prise de conscience. 
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La conscience, a elle seule, est un acte, l'acte humain. C'est un acte vif, 
un acte plein. }[~me si l' action qui sui t, qui devai t sui vre,' qui aurai t dri 
sui vre reste suspendue, l' acte conscienciel a sa pleine posi ti vi teo Cet 
-------.... 
acte, nous ne l'etudierons, dans le present essai, que dans le domaine du 
langage, plus precisement encore, dans le langage poetique, quand la 
conscience imaginante cree et vi t l' image poetique." (La poetique de 1a 
r~yerie, p.5) 
15. "Nous voulons examiner, en effet, des images bien simples, les images 
de l'espace heureux. Nos enqu~tes meriteraient, dans cette orientation, le 
nom de topophilie. Elles visent a determiner la valeur humaine des espaces 
de possession, des espaces defendus contre des forces ad verses, des espaces 
aimes. Pour des raisons souvent tres diverses at avec les differences que 
comportent les nuances poetiques, ce sont des espaces louanges." (La. 
Paetique de l'espace, p.17j Bachelard's emphases) 
16. "La topo-analyse serait donc 1 'etude psychologique systematique des 
sites de notre vie intime. Dans ce the~tre du passe qu'est notre memoire, 
le decor maintient les personnages dans leur role dominant. On croit 
parfois se connaitre dans le temps, alors qu'on ne connait qu'une suite de 
fixations dans des espaces de la stabilite de l'~tre, d'un ~tre qui ne veut 
pas s'ecouler, qui, dans le passer ~me quand il s'en va a le recherche du 
temps perdu, veut « suspendre » le vol du temps. Dans ses mille al veoles, 
l'espace tient du temps comprime. L'espace sert a fa." (La Poetique de 
l'espace, p.27) 
17. "Psychologie descriptive, psychologie des profondeurs, psychanalyse et 
phenomenologie pourraient, avec le maison, constituer le corps de doctrines 
que nous designons sous le nom de topo-analyse." (La poetique de 1 'espace, 
p.18) 
18 ... Examinee dans les horizons theoriques le plus divers, i1 semble que 
l' i:mage de la mison devienne 1a topographie de notre ~tre intime .... Non 
seulement nos souvenirs, mis nos oublis sont « loges ». Notre inconscient 
est « loge ». Notre ~me est une demeure." (La poetique de 1 'espace, 
pp.18,19) 
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19. With respect to the nation of day-dreaming and the hause, as 
articulated in The Poetics of Space, please nate the fallowing passage: "if 
I were asked to name the chief benefit of the house, I should say: the 
~ house shelters daydreaming, the house protects the dreamer, the house 
allows one to dream in peace." p.6 ["si l'on nous demandait 1e bienfait 1e 
plus pr~cieux de 1a maison, nous dirions: 1a maison abrite 1a r~verie, 1a 
maison protege 1e rt3veur, 1a maison nous permet de r~ver en paix." <LA.. 
Pa~tlque de l'espace, pp.25-26)] 
20. "Kanter 1 'esca1ier dans 1a maison du J1lDt c'est, de degre en degre, 
abstraire. Descendre a 1a cave, c'est r~ver, c'est se perdre dans 1es 
lointains couloirs d'une etY111D1ogie incertaine, c'est chercher dans 1es 
mots des tr~sors introuvab1es. Konter et descendre, dans 1es mots ~mes, 
c'est 1a vie du poete. Konter trop haut, descendre trop bas est permit au 
po~te qui joint 1e terrestre a l' aerien. Seu1 1e phi1osophe sera-t-i1 
condamn~ par ses pairs a vivre toujours au rez-de-chauss~e?' (La PQBtique 
de l'espace, p.139) 
Such a passage has reverberations in a recent commentary on the work of 
Deleuze (and Guattari). In his examination of de1ire and language, 
Philosophy through .the Looking-Glass. Language. nonsense. desire (Landon, 
Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.: 1985), Jean-Jacques Lecercle writes the 
fallowing: 
Satire is concerned with the depth of primary order, it 
deals wi th insul ts and obscenities, and regresses to 
oral aggreSSive sex, to excrement and food: it is the 
art of regreSSion, and Swift, the famous satirist, is 
also the author of the infamous poe'InS to Stella. But 
irony is the art of heights: its game of equivocation 
and metaphor is controlled by an all-mastering subject; 
it is·a farm of domination where the subject is placed 
in the elevated position of a God. Humour, however, 
forces the subject to creep along the ground, on the 
surface: not going dawn to the satirical incoherence of 
depth, where objects are dismembered, but clinging to 
Iotas 
the discreet absurdi ty of surfaces, where sense rules 
over the serious game of paradoxes, and negation no 
longer denies but only confuses: the place where Alice 
can--no longer say whether meaning what one says and 
saying what one means ~ two different acts, where time 
has stopped and lit{~e girls forget their names. 
(p.112) 
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Though the spaces of this passage do not fit those of Bachelard's like a 
template, I think that where they do ooze into each other provides an 
interesting reading. Lecercle provides another territorialisation in terms 
of depth-surface-height schema introduced above, but this time with 
reference to philosophers (and following Deleuze): 
Pre-socratics = Philosophers of Depth = language of desire and primary 
order; 
Megarics and Stoics = Philosophers of Surface = language is organised 
but not tied to signification and communication, therefore more poeticj 
Platonists = Philosophers of Height = tertiary order of language, where 
signification, communication and expression rule. 
Yet translated into the terms of Bachelard's house, we can see that such a 
schema still exhibits a rigid reterritorialisation. Each group is allowed 
its own space in the rational system - even if it is outside or on the 
margins of that system. The P1atonists merely steal a glance up the stairs 
and say, "Oh, look up there! You can almost see the sun shining through the 
skylight. I think that the attic looks like this .... " The Pre-Socratics 
only chance a peek into the cellar; the odd madman has taken the plunge -
Empedocles for example - but their fear of the dark becomes philosophically 
valorised as such. The Stoics, however, are content to roll around on the 
dusty floorboards, without the need to imagine depths or heights, with only 
the comfort of surface events. Bachelard's dream is for fre'e movement 
ihroughout the ,system, and eventually beyond the limits of such a system. 
Lecercle proposes the destruction of the system of language/philosophy 
along the lines of flight of the madman, of the delirious. Bache1ard begins 
his dissolution of the rational boundaries of the house wi th an eli tist 
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vision of imaginative power, but we will come to see his destructive 
aspects take an those of the delirious. 
21. "Pour accDmpangner 1a psychana1yse dans cette action salutaire, i1 
faudrait entreprendre une topo~analyse de tous 1es espaces qui nous 
appel1ent hors de nous-m~mes." (La PoBtique de l'espace, p.29) 
22. "Chacun devrai t a10rs dire ses routes, ses carrefours, ses bancs. 
Chacun devrai t dresser 1e cadastre de ses campagnes perdues. Thoreau a, 
dit-i1, 1e plan des champs inscrit en son ~me." (La PoBtique de l'espace, 
p.30) 
23. In my 'Spaced-aut Subject', (see nate 8 above) I analyse the house of 
George Perec's La Vie made d'emp1oi (Paris, Hachette: 1970). It is as fluid 
and soft as Bachelard' s becomes under tapa-analysis, and its subj ect-
construction becomes accordingly fluid. 
24. "Que1 que soit 1e pole de 1a dia1ectique ou 1e r~veur se situe, que se 
soit 1e maison ou l'univers, 1e dia1ectique se dynaIIlise. La maison et 
l'univers ne sont pas simp1ement deux espaces juxtaposes." (La PoBtique de 
l'espace, p.55> 
25. It Envers et contre tout, 1a maison nous aide a dire: je serai un 
habitant du II1Onde, ma1gre 1e II1Onde. Le prob1eme n'est pas seulement un 
prob1eme de 1 '~tre, c'est un prob1e!I1e d'energie et par consequent de 
contre-energie. 
Dans cette communaute dynamique de l'homme et de la maison, dans cette 
riva1it~ dynandque de 1a maison et de l'univers, nous sommes loin de toute 
reference aux simples formes geometriques. La' maison vecue n' est pas une 
bot te inerte. L' espace habi te transcende 1 'espace geoJD8trique. It (14 
PoBtique de l'espace, p.58) 
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26. "Le maison est donc bien un instrument de topo-ana1yse. C'est un 
instrument tres efficace prscissment parce qu'i1 est d'un usage diffici1e." 
~ (La Postique de l'espace, pp.58-59) 
27. "Ha maison [ ... Jest dlaphane, mais non pas de verret E11e serai t 
p1utot de 1a nature de 1a vapeur. Ses murs se condensent et se re1~chent 
sulvant 1110n deslr. Parfols, je 1es serre autour de mol, te11e une 'armure 
d'iso1ment ... Mals parfois, je 1aisse 1es murs de ma maison s'epanouir dans 
leur espace propre, qui est l'extensibi1ite infinie." (quoted, La PoBtique 
de l'espace, p.6l) 
28. "les espaces qu'on aime ne veu1ent pas toujours ~tre enfermes! I1s se 
depo1oient. On dirait qu'i1s se transportent alssment ai11eurs, en d'autres 
temps, dans des plans differents de r~ves et de souvenirs," (La Postique de 
l' espace, p.63) 
29. "Hais notre c01I1111entaire devient trop precis." Bachelard explains, "11 
accuei11e faci1ement des dia1ectiques partle11es sur 1es dlfferents 
caracteres de 1a .malson. A 1e poursulvre, nous brlserlons l'unite de 
l'archetype. 11 en est toujours ainsi." (La PoBtique de l'espace, p.63) 
30. "11 apparattralt a10rs c1alrement que 1es oeuvres d'art sont 1es sous-
produits de cet exlstentla11sme de l'~tre lmaglnant, Dans cette vole de 1a 
r~verie d'l~nslte, 1e verltab1e produit, c'est 1a conscience 
aggrandissement." (La PoBtlque de l'espace, p.169; Bachelard's emphasis.) 
31. "1 'arbre a toujours un destin de grandeur. Ce destin 11 1e propage. 
L'arbre agrandit ce qul 1 'entoure". And the quotation from Rilke: "Ces 
arbres sont magnifiques, mais plus magnifiques encore l'espace sublime et 
pathstique entre eux, C01I1111e si avec leur crolssance i1 augmentai t aussi." 
.. (La PaBtlque de l'esp~ace, p.183) 
32. "Des qu' un espace est une valeur - et y a-t-i1 plus grande valeur que 
l'intindte? - 11 grandit, L'espace va10rlse est un verbe; jamals en nous au 
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hors de nous ia grandeur n'est un « objet »." (La Paetique de 1 'espace. 
p.183) 
33 ... Le phi1o~e de 1 'espace se .met 1ui-m~me a r~ver. 8i 1 'on aime 1es 
I110tS de metaphysique composee, ne "peut-on pas dire que Joe Bousquet vient 
de nous reveler un espace-substance, 1e mie1-espace ou 1 'espace mie1? A 
chaque matiere sa localisation. A chaque substance son existance. A chaque 
matiere 1a conqu~te de son espace, sa puissance d'expansion au de1a des 
surfaces par 1esque11es un geometre voudrai t 1a definir." (La poetique de 
l'espace, p.184) 
34. "Ce theoreJDe d'anthropo1ogie, esthetique est enonce avec une te11e 
nettete qu'on sent poindre un theoreme corre1atif qu'on pourrait exprimer 
en ces termes: Tout sentiment qui nous grandi t p1anifie notre si tuation 
dans 1e I11Onde." (La poetique de l'espace, pp.184-185) 
35. II je suis toujours ai11eurs, un ai11eurs f1ottant, f1uide. LDnguement 
absent de moi-~.me, et present nu11e part, j 'accorde trop faci1ement 
l'inconsistance de mes r~veries aux espaces i11imites qui 1es favorisent." 
(La poatique de l'espace, p.185) 
36. "La metaphysique 1a plus profonde s'est ainsi enracinee dans une 
geo111etrie imp1icite, dans une geometrie qui - qu 'on 1e veui11e ou non -
spatia1ise 1a pensee; si 1e metaphysicien ne dessinait pas, penserait-i1?' 
(La Poetique de l'espace, p.191) 
37. .. On fait passer au rang d' absolu 1a dia1ectique de 1 'iei et du la. On 
donne aces pauvres adverbes de lieu des Pl!issances de deter111ination 
onto1ogique mal survei11ees. Bien des metaphysiques demanderaient une 
cartographie. Kais, en phi1osophie, toutes 1es faci1ites se paient et 1e 
savoir phi1osophique s'engage mal a partir d'exp~riences schematisees." <LA 
faetique de l'espace, p.192; Baehelard's emphases.) 
38. II f;tudions d'un peu plus pres cette cancerisation geometrique du tissu 
1inguistique de 1a phi1osophie contemporaine." (La faetique de 1 'espace, 
p.192) 
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39. The role of expansion and amplification have important consequences for 
Bachelard's nation of phenomenology. Nate the fallowing passage from the 
chapter in question: 
~ 
Aussit8t, le gain pheno111enologique apparalt: en 
eiOl~~~ l'exag~re, on a en effet quelque chance 
d'echapper aux habitudes de la reduction. A propos des 
images de l'espace, on est precisement dans une region 
ou la reduction est facile, commune. On trouvera 
toujours quelqu' un pour effacer toute c01Ilplication et 
pour nous obliger de partir des qu'on parle d'espace -
QUejiOlt d'une manl~re flgur~e ou non - de l'opposltloD 
du dehors et du dedans. Kals st0)reductlon est 
facile, l'exaggeration neen est que 
phenomenologiquement plus interessante. (La Pastique de 
l'espace, p.197j Bachelard's emphases) 
Even though, on one~~~d Bachelard performs a reduction - in his desire to 
treat the poetic image in itself, as a cypher for consciousness in itself -
the outcome of such a treatment is expansion, nat only of his philosophical 
method, but of his nations of consciousness and subjectivity tao. 
40. Coincidentally, this is the same Henri Michaux who describes the 
schizophrenic table, quoted in the opening section of Deleuze and 
Guattari's Anti-OEdipus, (pp.6-7) [L'Anti QEdipe, <pp.12-13)]. 
41. "Prenons toute la le90n philosophique que nous donne le poete. De quoi 
s'agit-il dans une telle page? D'une ~1Ile qui a perdu son « etre-la », d'une 
~.me qui va j usqu' a dechoir de l' ~tre de san ombre pour passer, comme un 
vain bruit, C0111111B une rumeur insituable dans les on-dit de l'~tre." <14 
Pastique de l'espace, p.195) 
42. "C'est tout l'espace-te111ps de l'~tre equivoque que Michaux nous donne 
comme a priori de l'~tre. Dans cet espace equivoque, l'esprit a perdu sa 
patrie geometrique et l'~me flotte." (La Pastique de l'espace, pp.196-197) 
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43. "Ce qui est frappant ici, s'instruit par 1e brievete ~me de l'image, 
au niveau d'une image qui trouble 1es notions d'une spatia1ite communement 
consideree co~e susceptible de reduire 1es troubles et rendre l'esprit a 
~ 
son statut d'indifference devant un espace qui n'a pas loca1iser 1es 
dra111es." (La Paetique de 1 'espace, p.197) 
44. "11 est dangereux quand on s'exprime de« travai11er de la racine ». 
Preci semen t, 1a phenomeno1ogie de l' i111O.gination poetique nous per111et 
d'explorer l'~tre de l'homme C0111111e l'~tre d'une surface ...... (La Paetique 
de l'espace, p.199; Bachelard's emphasis.) 
CHAPIER THREE; 'SPACES' , 
1. Deleuze and Guattari, Ca..oi talisme et Schizaphrenie 1; L' Anti OEdi..oe, 
collection « Critique» (Paris, Les Editions de Xinuit: 1972). 
- Anti-OEdipus, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Steem and Helen R. Lane 
(London, The Athlone Press: 1984) 
Whent quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the 
English translation, in the form: (Anti-OEdipus, p .... ). The equivalent 
passage from the French edition will be quoted in the corresponding 
footnote. 
2. Deleuze and Guattari explain such a movement in anthropological terms. 
The /Prim1tive Territorial Machine, they say, is a machine for declining 
alliances and filiations. Filiation and alliance are described thus: 
Filiation is administrative and hierarchical, but 
alliance is political and economic, and expresses power 
insofar as it is not fused with the hierarchy and 
cannot be deduced from it, and the economy insofar as 
it is"not identical with administration. Filiation and 
alliance are like two forms of primitive capital: fixed 
capital or filiative stock, and circulating capital or 
mobile blocks of debts. (Anti-OEdipus, p.146) 
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[La filiation est administrative et hi erarchi que, mais 
l'a11iance, po1itique et econondque, et exprime 1e 
pouvoir en tant qu' i1 ne se confonde pas avec 1a 
hier~hie ni ne s'en dedu1t, l'econonae en tant 
qu'el1e ne se confonde pas avec l'admin1stration. 
Filiation et alliance sont com.me 1es deux formes d' un 
capital prim1tif, capital fixe ou stock fi1iatif, 
capital circulant ou blocs mobiles de dettes. (L'Anti 
OEdipe. p. 172)] 
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We can see that filiation and alliance are explained in terlllS of proce,sses 
that take place on the plane of consistency: Stocks and Blocks describe 
\ 
ways of organising the flows on the plane. All in all. the Primitive 
Machine territorialises by organising filiative and alliance systems. thus 
compounding the full body of the earth - blocking and taking stock of the 
flows on the surface of the territory. works also to this end. The 
relevance this has with respect to our discussion, is in the relationship 
Deleuze and Guattari show exists between the movement of territorialisation 
and the entrenchment of certain forms of hierarchical structures. 
3. "C'est en ~me temps que 1es flux sont decodes et axiomatises par le 
cap1ta11sme. La sch1zophren1e n'est donc pas l'ident1te du capita11sme, 
mais au contraire sa difference, son ecart et sa mort." 
p.293; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.) 
(L' Anti DEdioe • 
... 
4. .. La schizophreni e au contraire est bi en 1a 1imi te absol u, qui fai t 
passer 1es flux a 1 'etat 1ibre sur un corps sans organes desocia1ise. On 
peut done d1re que la schizophrenie est 1a limite exterieure du capita1isme 
1ui-m~me ou 1e terme de sa plus profonde tendanee, ou de repousser et de 
dep1acer cette limite, en y substituant ses propres limites relatives 
immanentes qu' il ne cesse de reproduire a une eche11e e1argie. Ce qu' 11 
d~code d'une main, i1 l'axiomaise de l'autre." (L'Anti DEdipe, p.292; 
Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.) 
4a. ·,"L'Etat est a10rs determine a jouer un role de plus en plus 1mportant 
dans 1a regulation des flux ax1omatises, tant a l'egard de la production et 
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de sa planification que de 1 'economie et de sa ({ lIlonetarisation )), de la 
plus-value et de son absorption (par 1 'appareil d'Etat lui-1I1~111e)." (L'Anti 
OEdipe, p.301) 
5. De I euze and Gua t tari , Ca pi tal isme e t ScbizQ,pbrBni e 2; Ni 11 e Pl a tea ux, 
collection « Critique)) (Paris, Les Editions de Xinuit: 1980). 
- A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi (London, The Athlone 
Press: 1988) 
When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the 
English translation, in the form: (A Thousand Plateaus, p .... ). The 
relevant passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the 
corresponding footnote. 
6." Le lisse et le strie se distinguent en premier lieu par 1a rapport 
inverse du point et de la 1igne (la 1igne entre deux points dans le cas du 
strie, le point entre deux lignes dans le lisse). En second lieu, par 1a 
nature de la ligne (lisse-directionnelle, intervalles ouvertes; strie-
dimensionnelle, intervalles ferme). 11 y a enfin une troisieme difference 
concernant la surface au l' espace. Dans l' espace stri e on ferme une 
surface, et on la ({ repart·it » suivant des intervalles determines, d'apres 
des coupures assignees; dans le 1isse, on se (( distribue )) sur un espace 
ouvert, d' apres des frequences et 1 e long des parcDurs a ogos et nomos). II 
(Mllle Plateaux, p.600) 
In a later section of this "plateau" Deleuze and Guattari provide a 
mathematical model for the determination of smooth and striated space. They 
write: 
(1) we shall call striated or metric any aggregate with 
a whole number of dimensions, and for which it is 
possi ble to assign constant directions; (2) nonmetric 
smooth space is consti tuted by the ·construction of a 
line with a fractional number of dimensions greater 
than one, or of a surface with a fractional number of 
dimensions greater than two; (3) a fractional number of 
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dimensions is the index of a properly directional space 
(wi th continuous variation in direction, and without 
tange~; (4) what defines smooth space, then, is that 
it does not have a dimension higher than that which 
moves through it or is inscribed in it; in this sense 
it is a flat multiplicity, for example, a line that 
fills a plane without ceasing to be a line; (5) space 
and that which occupies space tend to become 
identified, to have the same power, in the anexact yet 
rigorous form of the numbering number or nonwhole 
number (occupy without counting); (6) a smooth, 
amorphous space of this kind is constituted by an 
accumulation of proximities, and each accumulation 
defines a zone of indescernibility proper to "becoming" 
(more than a line and less than a surface; less than a 
volume and more than a surface). (A Thousand Plateaus, 
p.488; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis) 
(1) on appelera strie ou metrique tout ensemble ayant 
un nombre entier de dimensions, et ou l'on peut 
assigner de constantes directions; 2) l'espace lisse 
n9n metrique se constitue par constructiDn d'une ligne 
de dimension fractionnaire superieure a 1, d'une 
surface de dimension fractionnaire superieure a 2; 3) 
le nombre fractionnaire de dimensions est l'indice d'un 
espace proprement directionnel (a variation continue de 
direction, sans tangente) ; 4) l'espace lisse se definit 
des lors en ce qu'il n'a pas de dimension 
supplementaire a ce qui le parcourt ou s' inscri t en 
lui: c'est en ce sens une multiplicite pla te, par 
example une ligne que remplit en tant que telle un 
plan; .. 5) 1 I espace 1 ui -m€)me et ce qUi occupe l' ~space 
tendent a s' identifier, a avoir ~me pUissance ... ; 6) 
un tel espace lisse, amorphe, se constitue par 
accumulation de voisinages, et chaque accumulation 
definit une zone d'indiscernabilite propre au «devenir)) 
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<plus qu'une ligne et moins qu'une surface, moins qu'un 
volume et plus qu'une surface>. (MJlle Plateaux, p.609; 
Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)] 
~ 
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Though this passage is resplendent with references to the mathematical 
theory of "fractals", I think that its importance viz. the smooth-striated 
distinction is still apparent. 
7. "Le trajet nomade ... i1 distri bue les hommes (ou les betes) dans un 
espace ouvert, indefinl, non communiquant . ... Le nomade se dlstribue dans 
un espace 11sse, 11 occupe, i1 hablte, 11 tient cet espace, et c'est 1J son 
principe territorial." (Hille Plateaux, p.472; Deleuze and Guattari's 
emphasis) 
8. Notice the following quotation from Henri Lefebvre's The Production Of 
~, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford UK and Cambridge USA, 
Basil Blackwell: 1991), concerning the relationship between the State and 
space: 
What, then, is the state? According to the 
'politicologists', it is a framework - that of a power 
which makes decisions in such a way as to ensure that 
the interests of certain minorities, of certain classes 
or fractions of classes, are imposed upon society - so 
effectively imposed, in fact, that they become 
indistinguishable from the general interest. Fair 
enough, but we must not forget that the framework in 
question is a spatial one. If no account is taken of 
this spatial framework, and of its strength, we are 
left with a state that is simply a rational unity - in 
other words, we revert to Hegelianism. Without the 
concepts of space and of its production, the fraemwork 
of power (whether as reality or concept) simply cannot 
achieve concreteness. We are speaking of a space where 
centralized power sets itself above other power and 
eliminates it; where a self-proclaimed 'sovereign' 
nation pushes aside any other nationality, often 
:rotes 
crushing it in the process; where a state religion bars 
all other religions; and where a class in power claims 
to have suppressed all class differences. The 
relat~hip between institutions other than the state 
itself (for instance, university, tax authority, 
judiciary) and the effectiveness of those institutions 
has no need of the mediation of the concept of space to 
achieve self-representation, for the space in which 
they function is governed by statute (and regulations 
for their enforcement) which fall within the political 
space of the state. By contrast the state framework, 
and the state as framework, cannot be concei ved of 
wi thout reference to the instru1I1enta1 space that they 
make use of. Indeed each new form of state, each new 
form of political power, introduces its awn particular 
way of partitioning space, its own administrative 
classification of discourses about space and about 
things and people in space. Each such form commands 
space, as it were, to serve its purposes; and the fact 
that space should thus become classificatory makes it 
possi ble for a certain type of non-cri tical thought 
simply to register the resul tant 'reali ty' and accept 
it at face value .. (p.281; Lefebvre's emphases.) 
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This passage has many resonances with the structure of the state we have 
already encountered viz. Deleuze and Guattari nat to mention many 
dissonances. The most striking similari ty must be the conception of the 
state as a spatial framework, whose primary function is the classification 
(overcoding) of its constituents in the name of an imperialist despotism. 
9. "S1 1e nomade peut ~tre appe1e 1e Deterr1toria1ise par excellence, c'est 
juste1I1ent parceque la reterr1toria11sation ne se fait ~s a~res comme chez 
le 1I1igrant, nl sur autre chase C0111111e chez le sedentaire (en effet, le 
sedenta1re a un rapport avec 1a terre 1I1ed1atlse ~r autre chose, regi1I1e de 
propr1ete, apparel 1 d'Etat ... ). Pour 1e nomade, au contralre, c'est la 
deterritor1a11sat1on qu1 const1tue 1e rapport a 1a terre, s1 bien qu'll se 
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reterritoria1ise sur 1a deterritoria11sation m~me. C'est 1a terre qui se 
deterritoria1ise e11e-~me, de te11e maniere que 1e nomade y trouve un 
territoire." (Hille Plateaux, p.473; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.) 
~ 
10. "Et pourtant nous retrouvons toujours une necessite dissymetrique, de 
passer du 11sse au strie, comme du str1e au 11sse. Or tradu1re n'est 
pas un acte simple: i1 ne suff1t pas de remp1acer 1e mouvement par l'espace 
parcouru, i1 faut une serie d'operations ricbes et complexes .... Traduire 
n'est pas un acte secondaire. C'est un operation qui consiste sans doute a 
dompter, a surcoder, a metriser 1 'espace 1isse, a 1e neutra1iser, mais 
aussi bien a lui donner un milieu de propagation, d'extension, de 
refraction, de renouve11ement, de poussee, sans 1eque1 11 mourrai t peut-
~tre de 1ui-~1I1e." (Hille Platea"ux, pp.606-607; Deleuze and Guattari' s 
emphasiS. ) 
11. "Cbaque fois donc, 1 'opposition simple « 1isse-strie )) nous renvoie a 
des complications, a des a1ternances et a des superpositions beaucoup plus 
diffici1es. Hais ces complications confirment d'abord 1a distinction, 
justement parce qu'e11es mettent en jeu des mouvements dissymetriques. Four 
1e moment, i1 faudrait seu1ement dire qu'i1 y a deux sortes de voyage, qui 
se distiguent par 1e role respectif du point, de 1a 1igne et de l' espace." 
(Mjlle Plateaufu p.601) 
12. "C'est a propos de ces nOIIJades qu'on peut dire, CO!1ll11e 1e suggere 
Toynbee: ils ne bougent pas. 115 sont nomades a force de ne pas bouger, de 
ne pas migrer, de tenir un espace 1isse qu' i1s refusent de qui tter, et 
qu'i1s ne quittent que pour conquerir et mourir." (Hille Plateaux, p.602; 
Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.) 
13. This notion of a "picaresque-in-place" is especially well exemplified 
by George Perec's novel, La Vie made d'emplol (Paris, Hachette: 1970). 
Vhere the adventures described throughout the novel are articulated 
according to the structure of the house in which the story is based. This 
does not attest to a striation of the space of the novel, for as we saw in 
the chapter in which I discussed the image of the house wi th respect ta 
Bachelard, a tapa-analysis of the house explodes the limits of the house. 
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This is exactly what happens in Perec's house - as I describe in my essay 
on it, 'The Spaced-Out Subject: Bachelard and Perec', in Subjectivity and 
Literature from the ROmantics to the 
Subject, edite~by Philip Shaw and 
Publishers: 1991), pp.146-158. 
Present Day: The Coming Of the 
Peter Stockwell (London, Pinter 
14. "Le mouvement designe le caractere relatif d' un corps considere C0111111e 
( un », et qui va d' un paint a un autre; la vi tesse au cantraire consti tue 
Ie caract~re absolu d' un corps dont les parties irreductibles (atomes) 
occupent au remplissent un espace lisse a la fa<;on d'un toubillian, avec 
possibilite de surgir en un point quelconque." (Hille Plateaux, p.473; 
Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.) 
15. In his book, Philosophy through the Looking-Glass: Language, nonsense, 
desire (Landon, Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.: 1985), Jean-Jacques 
Lecercle - writing of Deleuze's LaKique du Sens, collection « Critique » 
(Paris, Edi tions de Minui t: 1967) - states, "The only adequate instrument 
for an assessment of Deleuze is pastiche." (p.113) Pastiche does for the 
cri ticism of literature what the rhizome does for root-systems. Pastiche 
follows the twists and turns of a way of writing, breaking aut of those 
turns to fallow a different course, all the while creating another farm of 
wri ting. The machine productive of pastiche also produces maps; pastiche 
and cartography operate an/in a cammon space. 
16. "est abstrait en un tout autre sens, precisement parce qu'elle est 
d'orientation multiple, et passe entre les points, les figures et les 
contours: sa motivation positive dans l'espace 1isse qu'elle trace, et non 
dans 1e striage qU'e1le opererait pour conjurer l'angoisse et se 
subordonner le lisse. La ligne abstrait est l'affect des espaces lisses, et 
non le sentiment d' angoisse qui appelle au striage." (Kille Plateaux, 
p.620; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.) 
CHAPTER FOUR: 'SUBJECTIFICATION', 
1. Felix Guattari, Les trois Bcolagies, collection ({ 1 'espace critique » 
(Paris, Editions Gallimard: 1989) 
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When quoting from this book, - references will be made in the text, in the 
form: (Ies trois ecolagies, p .... ). The equivalent passage from the French 
edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note. The English translations 
--------
thus cited are m1'own (for references to the English translation of part of 
this text, see note 12 below). 
2. Kant's Critique of Judgement is discussed in a special issue of the 
journal E.l1.. (Spring 1991). The section, '''Snapshots'' of Kant's Critique of 
Judgement', provides short commentaries on section ix of the Introduction 
to this text, by Will McNiell, Diane Beddoes, Jamie Brassett, Douglas 
Burnham, Nicholas Blincoe. The comments made in this chapter of my thesis 
concerning Kant's Judgement, are a precis of those made in the above 
mentioned article. 
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique Of Judgement, translated by J. C. Meredi th 
[1928] (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1952). 
4. Felix Guattari, eartqgraphies schizoanalytiques, collection de l'espace 
critique (Paris, Editions Gallimard: 1989). 
When quoting from t~is book, references will be made in the text, in the 
form: (Cartagraphies schizaanalvtiques, p .... ). The equivalent passage from 
the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note. The English 
translations thus cited are my own. 
5. "C'est la rapport de la subjectivite avec son exteriorite - qu'e1le soit 
sociale, animale, vegetale, cos111ique - qui se trouve ainsi c0111pro111is dans 
une sorte de mouve111ent general d'i111plosion et d'infantilisation regressive. 
L'alterite tend a-predre toute asperite." (Ies trois ecalqgies, p.12) 
6. "11 n'y aura de reponse veritable a la crise ecologique qu'a 1 'echelle 
planetaire et ,a la condition que s'opere une authentique revolution 
politique, sociale et culturelle reorientant les objectifs de 1a production 
des biens materials et i.11lII1aterials." (Ies trois ecalogies, pp.13-14) 
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7. "Cette revolution ne devra donc pas concerner uniquement les rapports de 
forces visibles a grande echelle ~is egalement des domains moleculaires de 
sensibilite, d'intelligence et de desir." (Les trois ecologies, p.14) 
~ 
8. "L'ecosophie sociale consistera donc a developper· des practiques 
specifiques tendant a modifer et a reinventer des fa~ons d'~tre au sein du 
couple, au sein de la fam1.lle, du contexte urbain, du travail, etc. 
Hais il s'agira litteralemant de reconstruire l'ensemble des modalites de 
1 ' ~tre-en-groupe. Et cela pas seulement par des interventions « c0111111uni-
cationelles » mais par des mutations existentialles portant sur l'essence 
de la subjectivite." (Les trois ~cologies, p.22) 
9. "De son cote, 1 'ecosophie 111entale sera a111enee are-inventer le rapport 
de sujet au corps, au fantasme, au temps qui passe, aux « mysteres » de la 
vie et de la mort. Elle sera amenee a chercher des antidotes a 
1 ' uniformation mass-mediatique et telematique, au conformisme des modes, 
aux manipulations de l' opinion par la publici te, les sondages, etc." (L..e..s, 
trois ecolqgies, pp.22-23) 
10. II L' instauration a longe terJ11e d'iJ11111enses zones de misere, de famine et 
de mort semble desormais faire partie integrante du monstrueux systeme de 
« stimulation » du Capitalisme Hondial Integre." (Les trois ecologies, 
p.17) 
11. "de serrer d'un peu plus pres les implications d'une telle perspective 
ecosophique sur la conception de la subjectivite." (Les trois ecologies, 
p.23) 
12. Felix Guattari, 'The Three Ecologies' trans. Chris Turner, Material 
Ward, New Fqrmations, ' Techno-Ecologies' edition, Number 8, Summer 1989, 
pp.131-147. 
When quotating from this book, references will be made in the text, in the 
form: (' The Three Ecologies', p .... ). The equivalent passage from the 
French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note (any modifications 
of the translations, will be noted in the reference given in the text). 
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13. .. Hais plutcSt que de sujet, peut-~tre conviendrait-il de parler de 
composantes de subjectivation travaillant chacune plus ou moins a leur 
propre compte." (Les trais ecalogies, p.24) 
~ 
14. "Ces vecteurs de subjectivation ne passent pas necessairement par 
l' individuj lequel, en realite, se trouve en position de « terminal » a 
l'egard de processus impliquant des groups humaines, des ensembles soc10-
economiques, des mach1nes informatione11es, etc. Ainsi, l'interiorite 
s'instaure-t-elle au carrefour de multiples composantes relativement 
autonomes 1es unes par rapport aux autres et, 1e cas echeant, franchement 
discordantes." (Les trais· ecologies, p.24) 
It is interesting to note that, as we saw with respect to }f111e Plateaux, 
Deleuze and Guattari have much to sayan the relevance of vectors in their 
philosophy. 
15. Guattari's discussions of the scientistic super-ego occur not only in 
Les trois ecologies but in Cartogra .. ohies schizoanalytiques as well. As 
such, an examination of this concept appears later in this chapter. 
16. "Le prealab1e a toute relance de l'ana1yse par exaJIlple, 1a 
schizoanalyse - consiste a admettre qu' en reg1 e general e, et pour peu 
qu'on s'attache ales travai1ler, les Agencements subjectifs individue1s et 
col1ectifs sont potentiellsJIlent aptes a se developper et a pro1iferer loin 
de leurs equi1ibres ordinaires. Leurs cartographies ana1ytiques debordent 
done par essence 1es Territoires existentie1s auxque1s e1les sont 
affectees. Aussi devrai t-il en aller, avec ces cartographies, C011l111e en 
peinture ou en 1itterature, domaines au sein desquels chaque performance 
concrete a la vocatiDn d'evoluer, "d'innover, d'inaugurer des ouvertures 
prospecti ves, sans que leurs auteurs pUissent se prevaloir de fondements 
theor1ques assures ou de l'autorite d'un groupe, d'une ecole, d'une 
conservatoire ou d' une acadeJIlie... Work in progress! Fin des catechisJIles 
psychanalytiques, cDmportamentalistes ou systemattstes." 
ecolqgies, pp.29-30) 
(Les trais 
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17. "Les rapports de l'humanite au socius, a la psyche et a la (( nature » 
tendent, en effet, a se deteriorer de plus en plus, pas seulement en raison 
de nuisances et de pollutions objectives mais aussi du fait d'une 
meconnaissanceet-a~ne passivite fataliste des individus et des pouvoirs a 
1 'egard de ces questions considerees dans leur ensemble." (Les trois 
~, p.31) 
18. "Il n'est pas juste de separer 1 'action sur la pSYChS, le sociLis et 
l'environnement. Le refus de regarder en face les degradations de ces trois 
domaines, tel qu'il est entretenu par les medias, confine a une entreprise 
d'infantilisation de l'opinion et de neutralisation destructive de la 
democratie . ... il conviendrait desormais d'apprehender 1e monde a travers 
les trois verres interchangeables que constituent nos trois points de vues 
eco1ogiques." (Les trois ecolagies, p.32) 
19. "A 1 'evidence, une prise en charge et unegestion plus collective 
s'imposent pour orienter 1es sciences et 1es techniques vers des fina1ites 
plus humaines. On ne peut s'en remettre aveuglement aux technocrates des 
apparei1s d'Etat pour contrdler les evolutions et conjurer 1es risques dans 
ces domaines, regis, pour l'essentiel, par les principes de l'economie de 
profit." (Les trois ecOlogies, pp.32-33) 
20. "La solidarite internationa1e n'est plus assumee que par des 
associations humani taires alors qu' i1 fut un temps OU el1e concernai t au 
premier chef 1es syndicats et 1es parties de gauche. De son cote, le 
discours marxiste s'est devalue. (Pas le texte de Marx qUi, lui, conserve 
une tres grande valeur.) .. . Non seu1ement 1es especes disparaissent mais les 
mots, 1es phrases, les gestes de 1a solidarite humaine." (Les trois 
ecolagies, p.35) 
21. "au fai t que s' y trouve impliquee une logique differente de celle qui 
regit 1a communication ordinaire entre locuteurs et auditeurs et, du m~me 
coup, l'inte11igibilite des ensembles discursifs et l'emboftement indefini 
des champs de signification." (Les trois ecolagies, p.36; Guattari's 
emphaSiS. ) 
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22. "Cette logique des intensites, qui s'app1ique aux Agencements 
existentie1s autoreferes et engagement des durees irreversibles, ne 
concerne pas seulement les sujets humains constitues en corps totalis~s 
mais aussi tous ~s objets partie1s, au sens psychana1ytique .... A10rs que 
1a logique des ensembles discursifs se propose de bien cerner ses objets, 
1a logique des intensites, ou 1 'eco1ogique, ne prend en compte que 1e 
mouvement, l'intensite des processus evo1utifs." (Les trois ecologies, 
p.36) 
23. "A chaque foyer existentie1 partie1, 1es praxis eco1ogiques 
s'efforceront de reperer 1es vecteurs potentiels de subjectivation et de 
singu1arisation." (Les trois ecolag1es, p.37) 
24. "La est 1e coeur de toutes praxis eco1ogiques: les ruptures a-
signifiantes, 1es cata1yseurs existentie1s sont a portee de main, mais en 
l'absence d'Agencement d'enonciation, qui leur donne un support 
expressif, ... " (Les trais eca1agies, p.37) 
25. "En tous 1ieux et a toutes epoques, 1 'art et la religion ont ete 1e 
refugge des cartographies existentie11es fondees sur une assuIIJation de 
certaines ruptures de sens (( existentia1isantes ». Hais 1 ' epoque 
contemporaine, en exacerbant 1a production de biens materials et 
iII1!11ateria1s, au detriment de 1a consistance des Terri toires existentie1s 
indi vidue1s et de groupe, a engendre un immense vide dans 1a subjecti vi te 
qui tend a devenir de plus en plus absurde et sans recours." (Les trals 
Bca1qgles, p.39) 
26. "Une te11e remontee de ce qu'on pourrait appe1er un conservatisme 
subjectif n'est pas uniquement imputable au renforcment de 1a repression 
socia1e; e11e tient ega1ement a une sorte de crispation existentiel1e 
impliquant l'ensemb1e des acteurs sociaux." (Les trais eca1agies, p.40) 
27. "Le capitalisme post-industriel que, pour ma part, je prefere qualifier 
de Cap1 ta11sme Mandial Integre (CHI) tend de plus en plus, a decentrer ses 
foyers de pouvoir des structures de production de biens et de services vers 
les structures productrices de signes, de syntaxe et de subjectivite, p~r 
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le biais, tout particullerement, du contr61e qu ' i1 exerce sur 1es medias, 
1a pub1icite, les sondages, etc. 
"11 y a la une evolution qui devrait nous amener a ref1echir sur ce que 
~ furent, a cet egard, 1es forIIJes anterieures du capita1lsme, car elles 
n'etaient pas non plus exemptes d'une tel1e propenslon a capitaliser du 
pouvoir subjectif dans les rangs de ses elites aussi bien que dans ceux de 
ses pro1etaires." (Les trois ecologies, pp.40-41) 
28. "E11e ne devrait jaIIJais perdre de vue que 1e pouvolr capita1lste s'est 
dtdocalise, deterritoria1ise, a 1a fois en extension, en etendant son 
emprise sur 1 'ensemble de 1a vie sociale, economique et cu1 ture11e de 
planete et, en « intension )) en s' infil trant au sein des stra tes 
subjectives 1es plus lnconscientes." (Les trols ecolagies, pp.43-44) 
29. "Esperons qu'une recompositlon et un recedrage des fina1ites des luttes 
emancipatoires deviendront, au plus tot, correlatifs du developpement des 
trois types de praxis eco-1ogiques evoques ici." (Les trais ecalagies, 
p.43) 
30. "La subjectivite capita1istique, te11e qu'e11e est engendree par des 
operateurs de toutes natures et de toute tai11es, se trouve manufacturee de 
fa~on a premunir 1 'existance contre toute intrusion d'evenements 
susceptib1es de deranger ,et de perturber 1 'opinion. Se10n e11e, toute 
singu1ari te devrai t soi t ~tre evi tee, sol t passer sous 1a coupe 
d'equipements et de cadres de reference specialises. Ainsi e11e s'efforce 
de Serer 1e monde de l'enfance, de ]'amour, de l'art aussi bien que tout ce 
qui est de l'ordre de l'angoisse, de la folie, de la douleur, de la mort, 
du sentiment d' ~tre egare dans 1e cosmos... C' est a partir des donnees 
existentiel1es le plus personnelles on devrait m~me dire infra-
personne11es que 1e CNI consti tue ses agregats subjectifs massifs, 
accroches a 1a race, a 1a nation, au corps professionne1, a 1a competition 
sportive, ala· viri1ite domina trice, a 1a star IIJass-m~dlatique... En 
s'assurant du pouvoir sur 1e maximum de ritournelles existentielles pour 
les contr61er et les neutra1iser, 1a subjectivite capita1istique se grise, 
s'anesthesie el1e-~me, dans un sentiment col1ectif de pseudo-eternite." 
(Les teais ecalagies, pp.44-45) 
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31. "11 convient de laisser se deployer les cultures particulieres tout en 
inventant d'autres contrats de citoyennete. 11 convient de faire tenir 
ensemble la singularite, 1 'exception, la rarite avec un ordre etatique le 
moins pesant pos;ale." (Les trois ecologies, p.46) 
32. "Le principe C011l111un aux trois ecologies consiste donc en ceci que les 
Territoires existentiels auxquels elles nous confrontent ne se donnent pas 
C01111Ile en-soi, ferme sur lui-m~me, mais C01111Ile pour-soi precaire, fini, 
finitise, singulier, singularise, capable de bifurquer en reiterations 
stratifiees et mortiferes ou en ouverture processuelle a partir de praxis 
permettant de le rendre « habi table » par un projet humain." (Les trois 
ecolQgies, p.49) 
33. "Le principe specifique a l'ecologie mentale reside en ce que son abord 
des Territoires existentielsreleve d'une logique pre-objectale et pre-
personelle evoquant ce que Freud a decri t COJ111De etant un « processus 
primaire »." (Les trois eco1agies, p.50) 
34. "A tout moment, en tous lieux, la question de l'ecologies mentale peut 
surgir, par-de1a des ensembles bien constitues, dans l'ordre individuel ou 
collectif." (Les trois ecologies, p.51) 
35. "L'objectif crucial est la saisie des points de rupture a-
signifiantes . . · a partir desquels un certain nombre de chai'nons semiotique 
se 111ettront a travail1er au service d'un effet d'autoreference 
existentielle." (Les trois ecologies, p.53) 
36. "Hais ces objets, generateurs de subjectivi te « dissidente », ils les 
ont con~us COJ11111e demeurant essentiel1ement adjacents aux pu1sions 
instinctuelles et a un imaginaire corporeise. D'autres objets 
institutionne1s architecturaux, economiques, cosmiques, supportent 
egalement de plein droi tune telle fonction de production .existentielle." 
(Les trois ecolqgies, pp.53-54) 
37. '''Hais i1 m'apparait qu'une generalisation des experiences d'analyse 
institutionelle (a 1 'hopital, a 1 'ecole, dans 1 'environnelIIent urbain ... ) 
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pourrai t modifier profondement les donnes de ce probleme." (Les trois 
ecolqgies, p.57) 
38. "Une immens~econstruction des rouages sociaux est necessaire pour 
faire face aux deg~ts du CNI. Seulement, celle-ci passe moins par des 
reformes de sommet, des lois, des decrets, des programmes bureaucratiques 
que par la promotion de practiques innovantes, 1 , essa i mage d'experiences 
alternatives, centrees sur le respect de la singularite et sur un travail 
permanent de production de subjectivite, s'autonomisant tout en 
s' articu1ant convenablement au reste de 1a societe." (Les trois ecolazies, 
p.57) 
39. "Le prlncipe particuler a l'eco10gie sociale se rapporte a la promotion 
d'un investlssement affectif et pragmatique sur des groupes humains de 
dl verses tailles. Cet « Eros de groupe )} ne se presente pas comme une 
quantite abstraite, mais correspond a une reconversion qualitativement 
specifique de la subjectivite primire relevant de 1 'ecologie mentale." 
(Les trois ecolQgies, pp.58-59) 
40. "la triangulation personnologique de la subjectivite sur un mode JE-TU-
IL, pere-mere-enfant... la constitution de groupes-sujets autoreferents 
I s'ouvrant 1argement sur 1e socius et le cosmos." (Les trois ecOlazies, 
p.59; Guattarl's emphases.) 
41. " .•• systemes identificatoires se trouvent mis en oeuvre des tralts 
d'efflclence dlagrammatiques. On echappe lcl, au moins partlellement, aux 
semiologies de la modelisation lconique au proflt de se11110tlques 
processuelles que je me garderai d'appe1er symb~liques pour ne pas retomber 
dans les errements structura1istes." . (Les trois ecOlogies, p.59) 
42. "le fascisme des Ayatollahs, ne 1 'oublions pas, ne s'est instaure que 
sur la base d'une profonde revolution popu.laire en Iran." (Les trois 
ecologies, p.64) 
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43. "L'ecologie sociale spontanee travaille a la constitution de 
Territoires existentiels qui suppleent tant bien que mal aux anciens 
quadrillages rituels et re1igieux du socius." (Les trois ecologies, p.65) 
~ 
44. "11 parait evident que, dans ce domaine, tant qu'un re1ais ne sera pas 
pris par des praxis collectives politiquement coherentes, ce seront 
toujours, en fin de compte, 1es entreprises nationalistes reactionnaires, 
oppressi ves pour 1es feIIJ.IDes, 1es enfants, les marginaux, et hostiles a 
toute innovation, qui prendront le dessus." (Les trois ecologies, p.65) 
45. "Un point progra1I111Jatique pri1I1Ordial de 1 'ecologies sociale sera de 
faire transiter ces societes capitalistiques de l'ere mass-mediatique vers 
une ere past-medlatlqe; j'entends par la une reappropriation des medias par 
une mul ti tude de groupes-sujets, capables de les gerer dans une voie de 
res1ngularisation. Une telle perspective peut paraitre aujourd'hui hors de 
portee. Kais 1a situation actuelle d'optimum d'alienation par les medias ne 
re1eve d'aucune necessite intrinseque." (Les trois ecologies, p.6l; 
Guattarl's emphasis.) 
46. "Ce qui conda111Ile le systeme de va1orisation capitalistique, c'est son 
caractere d'equiva1ent general, qui aplatit tous les autres modes de 
; va1orisation, 1esquels se trouvent ainsi alienes a son hegemonie. A cela, 
i1 conviendrait, sinon d'opposer, a tout 1e moins de superposer des 
instruments de valorisation fondes sur les productions existentielles qui 
ne peuvent ~tre determinees ni en fonction uniquement d'un temps de travail 
abstrait, ni d'un profit capita1iste escompte." (Les trois ecologies, 
pp.66-67) 
47. "De plus en plus, les equilibres'nature1s incomberont aux interventions 
humaines. Un temps viendra OU i1 sera necessaire d'engager d'iJ111I1€nses 
programmes pour r'egu1er les rapports entre 1 'oxygene, 1 'ozone et 1e gaz 
carbonique dans l'atmosphere terrestre. On pourrait tout auss1 bien 
requalifier 1 'ecologie environnementa1e d'ecalagle machlnlque puisque, du 
cote du cosmos comme du cote des praxis humaines, 11 n'est jamais question 
que de machines . .... (Les trois ecologies, p.68; Guattari's emphasis.) 
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48. "Une ecosophie de type ·nouveau, a 1a fois pratique et speculative, 
ethico-po1itique et esthetique, me parait donc devoir remp1acer 1es 
anciennes formes d'engagement re1igieux, po1itique, associatif .. , E11e ne 
sera ni une a.i~cip1ine de rep1i sur interiori te, ni un simple 
renouve11ement des anciennes formes de ({ 111i1itantisme )), 11 s'agira p1utot 
d'un 1110uvement aux multiples facettes mettant en place des instances et des 
disposi tifs a 1a fois ana1ytiques et producteurs de subjecti vi te." (L.e..s. 
trois ecolagies. p.70) 
49. "les trois ecologies devraient ~tre con~ues, d' un 111~111e tenant, C01111I1e 
relevant d'une commune discipline ethico-esthetique et comme distinctes les 
unes des autres du point de vue des pratiques qui 1es caracterisent. Leurs 
registres relevent de ce que j'ai appe1e une heteragenese, c'est-a-dire de 
processus continu de re-singu1arisation." (Les trais ecalo.gies. p.72; 
Guattari's emphasis.) 
50. "La reconqu~te d'un degre d'auton0111ie creatrice dans un domine 
partlcu11er appe11e d'autres reconqu~tes dans d'autres do~ines. Ainsi 
toute une cata1yse de la reprise de confiance de l' hu~ni te en elle-l1J"me 
est-e1le a forger, pas a pas, et que1quefois a partir des moyens 1es plus 
miniscules. Tel cet essai qui voudrai t, si peu que ce soi t, endiguer 1a 
grisai11e et 1a passi vi te ambiante." (Les trais ecolagies. pp.72-73) 
51. "Notre souci principal est de developper un cadre conceptuel qui 
pre111unisse 1a schizoana1yse contre toute tentation de s'abandonner a 
l' ideal de scientifici te qui prevaut ordinairement dans ces domaines «psy)) 
a 1a maniere d'un Surmoi co11ectif. Nous chercherons plutot a lui trouver 
un fondement qui l' apparante, par son mode de va1orisation, son type de 
verite et sa logique, aux disciplines esthetiques." (Cartographies 
schizoanalytiques. p.47) 
52. "J'ai qua~ffle 1a seconde voie d'identification hysterique parce 
qu'el1e consiste en une appropriation mimetique de 1a scientificite, peu 
soucieuse de « coller» a des procedures experimenta1es reproductibles, au 
de s' appuyer sur des theories testables et falsifiables, au sens de K. 
Poppers [sicl." (Cartagraphies schizoanalvtiques. p.49) 
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53. "La troisieme voie, ce11e de 1 'etayage, fera un usage lateral de 1a 
science, dont 1es enonces conserveront un caractere d'exteriorite par 
rapport a 1a discipline consideree, ou qui ne seront utilises qu'a titre de 
metaphore." (CartQgraphies schizoanalytiques, p.49) 
54. "De fait, 1es methodes scientifiques sont d'autant moins en mesure de 
porter secours a l' analyse de 1a psyche, qu' e11es ne sont e11es-memes 
parvenues a « deco11er », en tant que Phylum semiotique specifique, qu'a 
partir du moment ou e11es se sont engagees dans une mise entre parentheses 
systematique des questions relatives a leur enonciation, aux modes 
idiosyncrasiques de va1orisation, ainsi qu'aux processus irreductub1ement 
singu1iers, autrement dit a des dimensions essentie11es de 1a 
subjecti vi te!" (Cartographies schizaanalytiques, p.50) 
55. "Non seu1ement 1es cartographies de 1a subjectivite n'ont rien a gagner 
a singer 1a sCience, mais ce11e-ci a peut-~tre beaucoup a attendre des 
prob1ematiques qu'e11es drainent dans leur si11age." (Cartauaphies 
schizaanalytiques, p.50) 
56. "La subjecti vi te a l' oeuvre au sein des paradigmes scientifiques 1es 
plus e1abores fonc~ionne encore, pour partie, en termes d'animisme et 
d/'abstractionnisme transcendental." (Cartographies schizaanalytiques, p.51) 
57. "les cartographies de subjectivite incosciente devraient devenir 1es 
complements indispensables des systemes de rationa1ite ayant cours dans 1es 
sciences, 1a po1i tique en toutes autres regions de 1a connaissance et 
1 'activite humaine." (Cartographies schizaanalytiques, p.51) 
58. "Non seu1ement 1a carte se met iei a renvoyer indefinement a sa propre 
cartographie, comme l'a bien vu Alfred Korzybski, mais c'est 1a distinction 
entre 1a carte et 1e territoire (the map and « the thing mapped ») qui tend 
a disparaitre." (Cartqgraphies schizaanalytiques, p.51 n.1) 
59. "Qu'i1 me suffise, a cette etape, de sou1igner que 1es index intensifs, 
1es operateurs diagra~tiques, .imp1iques par cette fonction existentiel1e, 
n'ont aucune caractere d'universa1ite: c'est ce qui conduira 1a 
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schizoanalyse ales demarquer, nalgre certaines similitudes, des « objets 
partiels » du kleinismes ou de « l' objet a » du 1acanisme." (Cartagraphies 
schizaanalytiques, p.52) 
~ 
60. "D'ail1eurs 1es mei11eures cartographies de 1a psyche ou, si l'on veut, 
1es mei1leures psychanalyses n'ont-e11es pas ete 1e fait de Goethe, Proust, 
Joyce, Artaud et Becket, p1utot que de Freud, Jung et Lacan?' (Les trois 
ecal~ies, p.25) 
CONCLUSION; 'THE SUBJECT. POSTMQDERNISM. SPACE AND BEYOND'. 
1. Felix Guattari, Les trois ecolagies, collection « L' espace cri tique » 
(Paris, Editions Galilee: 1989) 
- 'The Three Ecologies', translated by Chris Turner, Material World, in ~ 
Formations, no.8 (Summer 1989), pp.131-147 
When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, to the 
English translation in the form ('The Three Ecologies', p .... ). The 
equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the 
corresponding note. Where translations are entirely my awn, the French 
edition will be cited in the text and the French passage noted. 
"11 parait evident que, dans ce donaine, tant qu'un re1ais ne sera pris par 
des praxis collectives politiquement coherentes, ce seront toujours, en fin 
de compte, 1es enterprises nationalistes reactionnaires, oppressives pour 
les femmes, 1es enfants, 1es marginaux, et hostiles a toute innovation, qui 
prendront le dessus." (Les trois eCOlogies, p.65) 
2. Hilary Lawson, Reflexiyity. The postmodern predicament, (Landon, 
Hutchinson & Co. (publishers) Ltd.: 1985) 
In this book, . Lawson gently elucidates the. philosophies, of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Derrida, emphasising the motif of "reflexivity" in them all. 
"Reflexivity, as a turning back an oneself, a form of self-awareness ... " 
<p.9) Lawson recognises, has been abundant in philosophy since its birth, 
what marks its "contemporary" usage is the way it underlines the 
:totes 237 
problematic of the reader's relationship to a text. The project of his 
book, however, is to examine those philosophical writings in which "the 
destructive aspects of reflexivity" <p.10) are taken to their limit. 
Consequently, "they, can be seen to open up the postmodern world - a world 
without certainties, a world without absolutes." (loc. cit.) 
3. David Harvey, The Condition Of Postmodernity, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 
Ltd.: 1990). 
/' When quoting from this book, refer-nces will be made in the text, in the 
L form: (Harvey, p .... ). 
4. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Capitalisme et SchlzaphrBnie 2: !1lle 
Plateaux, collection « Critique» (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit: 1980) 
- A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi (London, The Athlone 
Press: 1987) 
When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the 
English translation, in the form: (A Thousand Plateaus, p .... ). The 
equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the 
corresponding note. 
5 ... Devenir est un rhizome, ce n 'est pas un arbre c1assificatoire ni gene 
alogique. Devenir n'est certainement pas imiter, ni s'identifierj ce n'est 
pas non plus correspondre, instaurer des rapports correspondantsj ce n'est 
pas non plus produire, produire une filiation, produire par filiation. 
Devenir est un verbe ayant toute sa consistance; i1 ne se ramene pas, et ne 
nous amene pas a « paraitre », ni {{ ~tre », ni ({ equiva10ir », ni 
{{ produire »." (}fi1le Plateaux, p.292) 
6 "Une 1igne de devenir ne se definit ni par des pOints, qu'e11e relie ni 
par des points qUi la composent: au contraire, e11e passe en~re 1es pOints, 
e11e ne pousse que par 1e milieu, et file dans une direction 
perpendicu1aire aUx points qu' on ad' abord distingues, transr.rersale au 
rapport loca1isab1e entre points contigus ou distants." (HIlle Plateaux, 
p.359. Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.) 
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7. "Dans un devenir-animal, on a tau} ours affaire a une meute, a une bande, 
a une population, a un peuplement, bref a une multiplicite." (~ 
Plateaux, p.292) 
8. In the opening paragraph of his essay, 'The Proliferation of Margins' 
translated by Richard Gardener and Sybil Walker in Semiotext (e), Italy: 
Autquomia, vol.3, no.3 (1980), pp.108-111, Guattari writes: 
Integrated world capitalism does not aim at a 
systematic and generalized repression of workers, 
women, youth, minorities ... The means of production on 
which it rests will indeed call for a flexi bili ty in 
relationships of production and in social relations, 
and a minimal capacity to adapt to the new forms of 
senSibility and to new types of human relationships 
which are "mutating" here and there (i. e. exploitation 
by advertising of the "discoveries" of the marginals, 
relative tolerance with regard to the zones of laissez-
faire .... ) Under these conditions, a semi-tolerated, 
semi-encouraged, and co-opted protest could well be an 
intrinsic part of the system. (p.108, Guattari' s 
ellipses.) 
According to this passage, IWC has already reterri torialised those forms 
and even the contents of oppositional politics which seem to be advocated 
by Harvey. This does not mean that all forms of "opposition" to capitalism 
are always already bound up within its system; merely that many of the more 
traditional modes of opposition have been outmanoeuvred, or 
reterri torialised, by IWC. Indeed, the' project of this concluding chapter -
if not the thesis as a whole - is to map the directions new forms of 
"opposition" can take. 
9. In his The Production Of Space, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd.: 1991), Henri Lefebvre writes of Marxism: 
lates 
The best way to get Marx's thinking into perspective is 
to reconstitute it, to restore in its entirity, and to 
look upon it not as an end point or conclusion but 
rather ~ point of departure. In other words, Marxism 
should be treated as one moment in the development of 
theory, and not, dogmatically, as a definitive theory. 
(p.321) 
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It seems to me that Harvey's work seeks to bend everything into his idea of 
a Marxist theory; rather than using Marx's works - as I think Deleuze and 
Guattari do -, as Lefebvre says, as a point of departure. 
10. Frederic Jameson, 'Cognitive Mapping, , in MaI:x1sm and the 
In:teI:pI:e:ta:t1cn cf ClJl:tuI:e, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 
Communications and Culture series (Basingstoke and London, Macmillan 
Education Ltd. : 1988) pp.347-357. 
When quoting from this article, references will be made in the text, in the 
form: (Jameson, p .... >. 
Jameson sets out his project for this article before its opening paragraph 
- in,"'whi te text on black background - thus: 
Wi thout a conception of the social total1 ty (and the 
possibility of transforming a whole social system>, no 
properly SOCialist poli tics is possible. It involves 
trying to imagine how a society wi thout hierarchy, a 
society that has also repudiated the economic 
mechanisms of the market, can possibly cohere. (p.347> 
Jameson then outlines the fulfilment of such ,a project in terms of the 
~sthetic critique of contemporary cultural space. Hen~e, "cognitive 
mapping". In any event, this mapping is the production of a unificatory 
critique (or, "totalising" as Jameson puts it) as a response to the current 
globally entrenched capitalist system. The "poor person's" cognitive 
mapping - i.e. Conspiracy Theories - are denegrated by Jameson for their 
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"slippage into sheer theme and content" (p.356). whereas "achieved" 
cognitive mapping occur as matters of form, as Utopias. 
~ 11. Notice the following passage fr.om Anti-OEdipus: 
What makes the schizophrenic ill, since the cause of 
the illness is not schizophrenia as a process? What 
transforms the breakthrough into a breakdown? It is the 
constrained arrest of the process, or its continuation 
in the void, or the way in which it is forced to take 
itself as a goal. We have seen in this sense how social 
production produced the sick schizo: constituted on 
decoded flows that constitute its profound intensity or 
its absolute limit, capitalism is constantly 
counteracting this tendency, exorcizing this limit by 
substituting internal relative limits for it that it 
can reproduce on an ever expanding scale, or an 
axiomatic of flows that subjects this tendency to the 
harshest forms of despotism and repression. It is in 
this sense that contradiction installs itself not only 
at the level of flows that traverse the social field, 
but at the level of their libidinal investments, which 
form the flows'. consti tuent parts between the 
paranoiac reconstruction of the Urstaat and the 
positive schizophrenic lines of escape. (Anti-OEdipus, 
pp.362-363) 
[De quoi est ma1ade 1e schizophrene, .puisque ce n'est 
pas de 1a schizophrenie comme processus? Qu'est-ce qui 
transforme 1a percee en effondreJI1ent? C' est au 
contraire l' arr~t contraint du processus, ou sa 
continuation dans 1e vide, ou 1a maniere dont i1 est 
force de se prendre pour un but. Nous avons vu en ce 
sens comment 1a production socia1e produisait 1e schizo 
ma1ade: construit sur 1es flux decodes qui constituent 
sa tendance profonde ou sa 1 iJI1i te abso1ue, le 
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11a. 
capi ta1isme ne cesse de contrarier cette tendance, de 
conjurer cette limite en y substituant des 1imites 
relatives internes qu'i1 peut reproduire a une echel1e 
toujoursplus grande, ou une axiomatique des flux qui 
soumet 10. tendance au despotisme et a 10. repression 10. 
plus ferme. C'est en ce sens que 10. contradiction 
s'insta11e non seulement au niveau des flux qui 
traversent 1e champ social, mais au niveau de leurs 
investisse111ents 1i bidineaux qUi en sont parties 
constituantes - entre 10. reconstruction paranoraque de 
l' Urstaat despotique et 1es 1ignes de fuite 
schizophreniques positives. (L'Anti OEdipe, p.435)] 
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"le processus se met a tourner dans1e vide. Processus de 
deterritoria1isation, i1 ne peut plus chercher et creer so. nouvelle terre. 
Confronte a 
residue11e, 
10. re-territoria1isation oedipienne, 
ridicu1ement restreinte, 11 formera 
terre archaique, 
des terres plus 
artificie11es encore qui s'arranget tant bien que mal, sauf accident, avec 
l'ordre etab1i: 1e pervers." (L'Anti OEdipe, pp.435-436) 
12. Examples of these works are not only Lefebvre's The Condition Of 
postmodernity and Harvey's The Condition Of Postmodernity, but also C. 
Jencks, The Language Of Post-modern Architecture, (London, 1984). 
I am endebted to John O'Reilly (Department of Philosophy, University of 
Warwick) for this information. The Introduction to O'Reilly's thesis, ~ 
BJaudrillardi From Valye to Object (unpublished), in order to give an 
I 
outline of philosophical postmodernism, makes reference to theories of 
postmodern architecture as announced in the works of Harvey and Jencks. 
13. Ivor Leclerc, 'The Meaning of "Space" in Kant,' in Kant's Theory Of 
Knowledge, edt Lewis White Beck (Boston/Dardrecht, D. Rei<;iel Publishing 
Ca.: 1974) pp.87-94. 
14. Samuel Beckett, Waiting for GOdot, 2nd edition (London, Faber and Faber 
Ltd.: 1965) 
lates 242 
15. Henri Lefebvre, The Production Of Space. For edition details please see 
note 9 above. When quoting from this book, references will be made in the 
text to the English translation, in the form: (Lefebvre, p .... ). 
--------.... 
16. For an instance of Lefebvre's attitude to Marxism - as shown in I.ll.e. 
Productiqn Of Space - please see note 9 above. 
17. I think there is a striking similarity between this passage and several 
in Guattari's Les trois ecolqgies. For example: 
If we are to· reorient the sciences and technology 
towards more human goals, we clearly need collective 
management and control· not blind reliance on 
technocrats in the state apparatuses, in the hope that 
they will control developments and minimize risks in 
fields largely dominated by the pursuit of profit. 
('The Three Ecologies', p.134; quoted above p.121) 
Our objective should be to nurture individual cultures, 
while at the same time inventing new contracts of 
citizenship: to create an order of the state in which 
singularity, exceptions, and rarity coexist under the 
least oppressive possible conditions. ('The Three 
Ecologies', p.139; quoted above p.128) 
A fundamental reconstruction of social mechanisms is 
necessary if we are to confront the ravages produced by 
integrated world capi talism - a reconstruction which 
cannot be achieved by top-down reforms, laws, decrees 
or bureaucratic programmes. What it requires is the 
promotion of innovative practices; the proliferation of 
al ternati ve experiments which both re.spect singular:i ty, 
and work permanently in the production of a 
subjectivity that is simultaneously autonomous, yet 
articulates itself in relation to the rest of society. 
('The Three Ecologies', p.142; quoted above p.133) 
Iotes 243 
While it is a facile exercise merely to slot various passages from various 
authors side by side and say, "aren't they similar ... ", in this case I 
think that such a remark serves to orient our reading of Lefebvre wi th 
respect to that of-Cuattari <and even De1euze). Thus, we are left with a 
version of Lefebvre which wrenches it out of any "pure", or "traditional", 
or "dogmatic" Marxist doctrine and thrusts it deep wi thin the cartography 
written here. 
18. "les di vers ni veaux de pratique non seu1e111ent n' ont pas e ~tre 
h0111ogeneises, raccordes 1es uns aux autres sous nue tute11e transcendante, 
mais i1 convient de 1es engager dans des processus d'heterogenese. Jamais 
1es feministes ne seront assez i111p1iquees dans un devenir-femme et i1 n'y a 
nu11e raison de demander aux i111111igres de renoncer aux traits cu1ture1s qui 
co11ent a leur ~tre, ou bien a leur appartenance nationa1itaire. 11 
convient de 1aisser se dep10yer 1es cultures particu1ieres tout en 
inventant d'autres contrats de citoyennete. 11 convient de faire tenir 
ense111ble 1a singularite, l'exception, 1a rarite avec un ordre etatique 1e 
1110ins pesant possible." (Les trois ecol~ies, p.46; Guattari's emphasis.) 
19. "L'eco-1ogique n'impos~ plus de ({ resoudre )) 1es contraires, C011l111e 1e 
vou1aient 1es dia1ectiques hegeliennes et marxistes. En particu1ier dans 1e 
domaine de l'eco1ogies socia1e, i1 existera des te111ps de lutte ou tous et 
toutes seront conduits a se fixer des objectifs C011l111uns et a se comporter 
({ C01111118 de petits soldats )) - je veux dire, C011l111e de bons militants, mais, 
concurre1111118nt, i1 existera des te111ps de resingu1arisation ou 1es 
subjectivites individuelles et collectives ({ reprendront leurs bi11es )) et 
ou, ce qui pri111era, ce sera l'expression creatrice en tant que te11e, sans 
plus de soucis a 1 'egard des fina1ites collectives." (Les trois ecologies, 
pp.46-47) 
20. For edition details please see note 8 above. 
21. II 11 n'est pas juste de separer 1 'action sur 1a psyche, le socius et 
l'environne111ent. Le refus de regarder en face 1es degradations de ces trois 
domaines, tel qu'i1 est entretenu par les 111edias, confine a une entreprise 
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d'infantilisation de l'opinion et de neutralisation destructive de la 
democratie." (Les trois eCQl~ies, p.32) 
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